Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mandacina was sentenced to life imprisonment for paying to kill a potential witness in a criminal case. His conviction and sentence were affirmed in 1995. Mandacina filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral attack. While his appeal was pending, he attempted to add a contention that the prosecutor failed to produce information that a trial witness—FBI agent Craft—had committed misconduct in other cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed without discussing that contention. Mandacina requested permission to pursue a second 2255 collateral challenge based on information about Craft. The Eighth Circuit denied the request in 2005. Mandacina sought a 28 U.S.C. 2241 writ of habeas corpus, based on the same considerations presented to the Eighth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the petition is blocked by section 2255(e), which says that habeas relief is unavailable unless it appears that the remedy under 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention. Mandacina does not contend that Craft engaged in misconduct while investigating or testifying in his prosecution and did not contend that the prosecutors knew of Craft’s misconduct. Brady claims concerning potential impeachment evidence are routinely decided under section 2255. That Mandacina did not previously succeed does not make section 2255 inadequate or ineffective, nor is a prisoner entitled to section 2241 review just because the court did not write an opinion. “We do not use section 2241 to regulate how our colleagues in other circuits handle their business.” View "Mandacina v. Entzel" on Justia Law

Indiana statutes provided a fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their parents, guardians, or custodians. In 2017, Act 404 added a requirement that parents be given prior notice of the planned abortion unless the judge also finds such notice is not in the minor’s “best interests” unlike the judicial bypass of parental consent, which may be based on either maturity or best interests. In 2019, the Seventh Circuit held that Act 404 created a substantial risk of a practical veto over a mature yet unemancipated minor’s right to an abortion, likely to impose an undue burden for the unemancipated minors who seek to obtain an abortion without parental involvement via the judicial bypass. On remand from the Supreme Court in light of its 2020 “June Medical” decision, which struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers, but without a single majority opinion. “The opinions in June Medical show that constitutional standards for state regulations affecting a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy are not stable, but they have not been changed in a way that would change the outcome here.” The court again affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the challenged law pending full review. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Box" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's mother married a U.S. citizen in 1999 and divorced him in 2004 because of his violent behavior. Plaintiff had run away the year before, when she was 15, to escape the abuse. At issue is whether, after the divorce, plaintiff remained a "child" of her mother's ex-husband. Plaintiff's mother died shortly after the divorce and could not file a petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff had to petition on her own behalf, and the agency rejected her application because a self-petition may be filed only by someone who "is the child" of an abusive U.S. citizen. Because, in the agency's view, plaintiff lost stepchild status in 2004, and only a person who "is" a child of an abusive parent may seek relief, the agency denied her application. However, the agency and the district court, relying on Matter of Mowrer, 17 I&N Dec. 613, 615 (1981), both concluded that even after divorce, a person remains a stepchild as long as "a family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the stepparent and stepchild."The Seventh Circuit held that, in the context of VAWA, "stepchild" status survives divorce. The court explained that someone who is a stepchild during a marriage remains one after divorce, when termination of "stepchild" status would defeat application of the substantive rule that abused stepchildren are entitled to an immigration benefit. The court clarified that Mowrer does not interpret VAWA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arguijo v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment declaring that Zurich had no duty to defend Ocwen in the underlying litigation brought by a consumer. In the underlying case, the consumer's complaint relied on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), as well as common law claims of defamation and invasion of privacy. Zurich insured Ocwen under a series of commercial general liability policies, but two provisions in the policies expressly excluded injuries resulting from conduct that violates certain laws.Setting aside the live-operator calls to the consumer's home and the manually dialed calls to her cell phone, and assuming that neither violated the TCPA, the court concluded that it remains true that if Ocwen caused "a telephone to ring … repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at that called number," which the district court concluded Ocwen did, then it violated the FDCPA. Because the policy exclusion's catch-all clause swept in the FDCPA as an "other statute" that regulates the communication of information, Zurich had not duty to defend based on the factual allegations of the consumer's complaint. View "Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Ocwen Financial Corp." on Justia Law

When Bennett began working as a custodian for the School District, she had to either become a Union member and pay union dues or decline membership and pay “fair‐share” or “agency” fees. She joined the Union. Following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Janus” decision, she notified the Union and the School District that she wished to resign her membership and terminate all payments to the Union. The Union allowed Bennett to resign her membership and opt-out of payments, but only after the lapse of the window set forth in her union‐membership agreement.Bennett sued, asserting that the deduction of union dues from her wages violated her rights under the First Amendment as recognized in Janus and that the Union’s exclusive representation of her interests, even though she is no longer a member, violates her constitutional rights by allowing the Union to speak on her behalf. Bennett sought damages in an amount equal to the dues deducted from her paychecks up to the statute of limitations and declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bennett cannot establish that the deduction from her wages of union dues she voluntarily agreed to pay in consideration for the benefits of union membership violated her First Amendment rights under Janus. Nor can she establish that Janus rendered the long-standing exclusive‐bargaining‐representative system of labor relations unconstitutional. View "Bennett v. Council 31 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees" on Justia Law

Bailey became partially disabled by pneumoconiosis, caused by the inhalation of coal dust. In 2002, he entered into an agreement with his employer to settle his state workers’ compensation claim; $27,677.50 was designated as Bailey’s take-home amount, representing payments of $135.67 per month, for 17 months beginning in July 2002. In November 2011, Bailey filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act. The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) granted Bailey’s claim in October 2013, but his benefits entitlement began the month he filed his claim and continued through May 2016—the month preceding the month that he died. At the time of his death, he had received benefits totaling $30,507.70 but was still owed benefits for the months from November 2011 through September 2013, $21,508.90. Bailey’s employer went bankrupt. He sought the remaining benefits from the federal Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. While the OWCP approved that claim, a District Director reevaluated the original award, finding that Bailey’s state workers’ compensation award represented monthly state benefits, some of which ran concurrently with his federal benefits eligibility period, so that the federal benefits must be offset by the state benefits received for that time—$135.67 per month over 55 months ($7,461.85). The OWCP subtracted this amount from the $21,508.90. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The offset is required by the Act; that Bailey received his state benefits years before he became eligible for federal benefits does not alter the conclusion. View "Bailey v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In July 2009, two people approached a van and opened fire. Patel died; Fernandez was shot but recovered; Russell was not hit. Detectives swore that Russell and Fernandez named Kuri and Gomez as the assailants and that both witnesses had selected their pictures from a photo array. That was the basis of Kuri’s arrest, detention, and prosecution; police lacked any physical evidence such as fingerprints, DNA, or a link between Kuri and the gun. Russell and Fernandez testified at the criminal trial and at the subsequent civil trial that they had not identified Kuri as an assailant, even after the detectives directed them to do so, and that the detectives had made up that accusation. Russell and Fernandez contradicted themselves and changed their statements several times. Kuri spent three years in jail before and during the murder trial. After his acquittal, he sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict of $4 million in compensatory damages plus $50,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that only a violation of the Fourth Amendment could support relief, and that, as a matter of law, Kuri’s arrest and detention were supported by probable cause. Once the jury decided to believe the victims that the detectives were lying, that left his arrest and detention without support. A Fourth Amendment theory based on lack of probable cause survives a judicial decision holding a suspect in custody. View "Kuri v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Law operated three Indiana massage spas that offered sex services. HV and XC were Law’s “employees.” HV was born in Vietnam, knew limited English, and knew no one else in this country. XC traveled from China to Chicago with few personal contacts, almost no money, and knowing little English, believing she would be providing non-sexual massages. HV testified she serviced six to nine men over a 15-hour workday. Law prevented the women from leaving the spa unaccompanied, declined to pay them hourly wages, provided only one meal each day, confiscated their passports, and monitored their activities using security cameras. Law did nothing in response to XC enduring violent treatment by a spa customer and forced HV to work hours after suffering a miscarriage. From information obtained in interviews of HV and XC after a sting operation, Hong Kong authorities arrested Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her convictions for trafficking XC and HV for involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C. 1590(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2; transporting XC for the purpose of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2421 and 18 U.S.C. 2; and using an interstate facility to promote prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and her 360-month sentence. The court rejected hearsay arguments concerning the testimony of agents at Law’s trial, noting the judge’s limiting instruction, and upheld the admission of an affidavit signed by Law. View "United States v. Law" on Justia Law

Arnold applied for Social Security disability benefits based on ailments related to her back, heart, and joints, and chronic pain syndrome. Following the initial denial of her claim, Arnold requested a hearing before an ALJ. Arnold testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expert. The ALJ concluded that Arnold was not disabled, finding Arnold had several severe impairments, but that she retained the ability, with certain movement restrictions, to perform her past relevant work as a daycare center director. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s decision, rejecting an argument that the ALJ failed to analyze whether the side effects of her medications impacted Arnold’s ability to work. While there is some evidence of side effects in the record, there is no evidence that the side effects impacted Arnold’s ability to work. On this record, the ALJ was not required to make findings about Arnold’s side effects. View "Arnold v. Saul" on Justia Law

A class of owners accused Navistar of selling trucks with defective engines. The suit was settled for $135 million. The district court gave its preliminary approval. A court-approved Rule 23(e) notice was sent by first-class mail to all class members describing the settlement terms and the option to litigate independently. The notice's opt-out instructions included a link to a website with the full details and a phone number. The court held a fairness hearing then entered a final judgment implementing the settlement. Class member Drasc had sued Navistar in Ohio concerning the truck engines. The federal court declined to enjoin parallel state court suits, so the Ohio case proceeded while the federal action was pending. After the court approved the settlement, Navistar notified Drasc that its suit is barred by the release in the settlement. Drasc argued that it never received notice of the settlement and that its effort to continue litigating in Ohio should be deemed a “reasonable indication” of a desire to opt-out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Drasc’s arguments, noting findings that two first-class letters were sent to Drasc at its business addresses; Drasc had not provided an email address for notice; Drasc’s Ohio lawyers had actual notice of the settlement and must have known about the need to opt-out. Drasc had actual knowledge of the need to opt-out and could not show excusable neglect that would justify an extension of the opt-out deadline. View "DRASC, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law