Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

More than two years after being denied tenure at Columbia College of Chicago, Monroe sued the College, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, for being subject to race discrimination in a federally-funded program or activity. The statute does not specify a limitations period.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit as untimely. Monroe argued that the correct period is the Illinois five-year catch-all limitations period for civil claims, while the College cited the two-year period for personal injuries. The court noted that other Circuits have emphasized that a Title VI claim, although aimed at the discriminatory use of federal funds, is one that ultimately seeks to vindicate personal rights, “closely analogous to [42 U.S.C.] sections 1983 and 1981.” Title VI specifically refers to discrimination against a “person” and should be governed by the limitations period that a state has specified for personal injury claims. View "Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

In March 2019, Jordan, convicted of crimes involving crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, began three years of supervised release. For three months, Jordan consistently tested negative on drug tests and called the probation office to find out about his next required tests. Over two days in June 2019, he missed a drug test and two assessments, prompting his probation officer to petition to revoke his supervised release. Jordan claimed that he was mistaken about the dates of the test and assessments at issue and emphasized his efforts to comply. The district court ruled that Jordan had committed the violations, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him to six months in prison followed by 26 months of supervised release (including 120 days in a halfway house). The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not sufficiently explain its decision, consider Jordan’s defense that his violation was unintentional, or otherwise ensure that its sentence conformed to the parsimony principle of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court needed to say explicitly why it thought that six months in prison was necessary for a defendant who had tested negative on every test and committed no other violations. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Kennedy, a CPA working for Nemera, met Lundberg, an escort, through the website Backpage and gave her a credit card that belonged to Kennedy’s employer, which was intended for company purchases only. In less than two years, Lundberg spent more than $5.8-million at exclusive stores, paying more than $100,000 to rent a mansion in California, and purchasing a Jaguar automobile, diamonds, and Rolex watches. She paid for plastic surgery and trips to places like Jamaica and Bora Bora. When Nemera discovered the scheme, Kennedy cooperated with the government, pled guilty, and testified against Lundberg, who was convicted of five counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 53 months’ imprisonment and over $4 million in restitution.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of Kennedy’s testimony about Lundberg’s background as an escort, about an email that Kennedy wrote to himself in which he admitted that he was “committing fraud and theft,” and about Lundberg’s unauthorized opening of personal credit lines in Kennedy’s name. The evidence supported that Lundberg knew all the spending was illicit. The court upheld the application of the “sophisticated means” sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). View "United States v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

Responding to a 911 call, Officer Kristensen, outside behind the residence, saw someone in the backyard and shined a flashlight toward the figure, a black man wearing a black sweatshirt with writing on the arm and black pants. This man then raised his right hand straight out in front and pointed a silver handgun at Kristensen. Kristensen took cover, identified himself as a police officer, and radioed other officers that he had seen someone with a gun. The figure fled. Officers heard a fence rattle indicating the man ran east. He triggered a motion-detector light; the officers saw him. Kristensen ordered him (Wallace) to the ground. He put his hands up--they appeared empty. He wore the clothes Kristensen had described. Officers handcuffed and searched him but did not find a gun. Officers found a silver handgun on the roof gutter of a nearby house. No debris was on the loaded gun, which had a round in the chamber and was visible from the ground.Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, Wallace was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the officers’ testimony sufficient evidence that Wallace possessed a firearm. The court upheld the addition of two criminal history points based on Wallace’s 2015 Illinois conviction for fleeing police and the addition of eight offense levels for n his 2004 Illinois drug conviction. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Now in his sixties, Bridges has been in and out of prison since he was a teenager. After staying out of trouble for eight years, Bridges got involved in drugs again and committed four robberies in two days in 2017. He netted scarcely $700. Charged with four counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, Bridges agreed to plead guilty, stipulating that he was subject to the career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which could apply only if his crimes of conviction were “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines. The enhancement more than doubled his sentencing range. The court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 140 months.Bridges sought postconviction relief, alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to argue that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a “crime of violence.” At the time, there was no Seventh Circuit precedent on that issue. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed for an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel’s performance, joining other circuits that have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is not a Guidelines “crime of violence.” When Bridges pleaded guilty, the building blocks for a successful legal argument were in place. Effective counsel would have considered this important question; minimal research would have uncovered a Tenth Circuit decision holding that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence under a 2016 amendment to the Guideline definition of a crime of violence. View "Bridges v. United States" on Justia Law

Filzen robbed seven Indianapolis stores while brandishing a firearm. He pleaded guilty to seven counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and four counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(a)(ii). The government dismissed three brandishing counts and moved for a three‐level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The plea agreement states that “if the Court accepts this plea agreement, the Court will sentence the defendant within the specific sentencing range set forth" and contains a sentencing range of 360-420 months’ imprisonment and payment of $900.00, “the mandatory special assessment fees imposed” under 18 U.S.C. 3013The district court discussed with Filzen that “[t]here will be a special mandatory assessment of $100 for each count. The total is $900.” Filzen responded that he agreed. The court imposed a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment but ordered that “Defendant shall pay a mandatory special assessment fee of $100 per count for a total of $1,100” without acknowledging the $200 discrepancy. No one noticed the mistake. Filzen appealed his sentence on the basis of the $200 difference in his special assessment and the fact that the district court did not offer him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 11. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On plain‐error review, the imposition of the correct, statutorily mandated special assessment although it differs by $200 from that in Filzen’s plea agreement need not be undone. View "United States v. Filzen" on Justia Law

Charged in Wisconsin state court with armed robbery and false imprisonment, Saechao retained attorney Kronenwetter. The state charged Alonso-Bermudez and others, based on the same crimes. Those cases proceeded separately. The public defender did not know that Kronenweer was representing Saechao when it appointed him to represent Alonso-Bermudez. Kronenwetter told the judge in Saechao’s prosecution that he was concerned about a potential conflict of interests. After six weeks, he withdrew as Alonso-Bermudez’s lawyer. The public defender named Bachman as his replacement. The Saechao judge wanted an unconditional waiver of any conflict from both defendants. Saechao provided one; Alonso-Bermudez declined. The prosecutor listed Alonso-Bermudez as a potential witness in Saechao’s case; the judge disqualified Kronenwetter. By then Bachman had indicated that Alonso-Bermudez was willing to sign a general waiver but Alonso-Bermudez fired him; the judge thought that Bachman no longer could speak for Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao went to trial with a new lawyer and was convicted. Wisconsin’s appellate court affirmed, rejecting his argument that the judge had violated the Constitution by depriving him of his chosen lawyer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. The judge had the discretion to disqualify counsel to avoid a serious risk of conflict. and had at least one good reason for disqualification, the fact that Alonso-Bermudez appeared on the prosecution’s witness list. View "Saechao v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The underlying class action alleged that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) unlawfully denied hearing-impaired inmates “the assistance they need to communicate effectively and participate in IDOC programs and services.” A 2018 Settlement required IDOC to screen inmates for hearing problems, refer inmates in need to a licensed audiologist for a more thorough audiological evaluation, maintain records of inmates’ evaluations, and provide inmates with care according to the results of their evaluations. For about a year after the court approved the Settlement, IDOC incorrectly referred about 700 inmates to licensed hearing instrument dispensers (LHIDs)—hearing-aid salesmen—instead of audiologists for evaluations. IDOC discontinued the practice in July 2019, based on an out-of-court agreement.In 2020, Plaintiffs moved to enforce the Settlement arguing that IDOC is not ensuring that the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable time period and sought attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of the LHID violations. The district court concluded that IDOC was in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement through the LHID violations,, ordered IDOC to pay about $54,000 in attorney fees, and held that the Settlement requires IDOC to ensure the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable timeframe, which it defined as 90 days after a referral. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to attorneys’ fees. The district court incorrectly determined that IDOC was obligated to ensure that its inmates receive audiological evaluations within a set timeframe; the Settlement contains no such requirement. View "Holmes v. Godinez" on Justia Law

Thomas broke his hand at the Hill Correctional Center in March 2011. X-rays from May 9 showed that Thomas’s hand was still fractured. On May 11, Thomas was transferred to Stateville. Hill officials removed his cast, stating that Thomas would receive a new cast at Stateville. No one re-casted him. A Stateville doctor reviewed Thomas’s May 9 x-ray on June 19, finding the fracture “unresolved.” A physician’s assistant looked at that x-ray on June 30 and determined that Thomas required no further treatment. An August 2011 doctor’s note described the hand as “still healing.” In December 2011, a doctor referred Thomas to physical therapy, which Thomas received in October-December 2012. Dr. Obaisi then became Stateville’s medical director; In August 2014, Thomas's low-bunk permit expired. Thomas met with Stateville medical staff and submitted grievances, describing lingering complications. Thomas met with Dr. Obaisi in January 2015 and repeated his requests, then submitted another grievance. Five months later, Dr. Obaisi renewed Thomas’s low-bunk permit and referred Thomas to an orthopedic specialist. Five months later, a specialist reported that Thomas had suffered nerve damage and that he would not have suffered such significant complications if his hand had been properly treated.The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Triable issues of fact remain with respect to Dr. Obaisi. A reasonable jury could conclude that a person who had asked twice for a renewed permit and had submitted grievances still needed the permit and that the delay would expose him to pain by forcing him to use his poorly healed hand to climb. The evidence would also permit a jury to conclude that Obaisi acted with deliberate indifference by unnecessarily delaying the referral. View "Thomas v. Martija" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Patterson testified that his repeated requests to be moved from an unheated cell were ignored and, to get attention, he violated the rules. On February 7, officers repeatedly ordered Patterson to remove a paper covering from his cell window. Patterson testified that the officers returned later and beat him by punching him where bruising would go unnoticed, stripped him naked, paraded him around the cell block, and ignored his request for medical treatment. He claims he endured another beating two days later at the hands of different officers. The officers testified that after Patterson refused to remove the window covering, they found Patterson naked in his cell and moved him to another cell. They denied any other physical contact. On February 10, Patterson saw Licensed Practical Nurse Aldridge, who testified that Patterson reported scrapes, neck and ankle pain, and swelling of his wrists. She saw “no visible signs” of injury other than small scrapes on his wrists. She diagnosed Patterson with a “minor” “soft tissue injury.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the officers, rejecting Patterson’s argument that the district court never should have allowed Nurse Aldridge, who testified as a fact witness, to offer an expert opinion on recross about whether, based on Patterson’s account of the beatings he experienced, she would have anticipated seeing signs of injury during her examination of him on February 10. View "Patterson v. Baker" on Justia Law