Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Avila, a Mexican citizen, has lived continuously in the U.S. since he entered as a minor in 2008. He committed an infraction that led to a disorderly conduct charge in 2019. Days after he pleaded guilty to that charge, he was placed in removal proceedings. A Notice to Appear at a removal hearing must include “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held,” 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). The Notice that Avila received did not comply with that requirement. He later received a “Notice of Hearing” with those details.Avila moved to terminate his proceedings on the ground that the Notice he received was defective. The IJ denied that motion and ordered Avila removed. Although the BIA acknowledged that the Notice was noncompliant, it reasoned that Avila was not entitled to relief because he had not shown that the defects in the Notice prejudiced him in any way. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While the requirements are not jurisdictional but are mandatory claims-processing rules, entitlement to relief does not depend on a showing of prejudice. View "Avila de la Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law

“Teddy” lived in Los Angeles and supplied local distributors with drugs delivered through the U.S. Postal Service. The FBI used a confidential informant to conduct multiple controlled drug purchases from Teddy; obtained court authorization to intercept the phone calls and text messages; and determined that “Porky,” was supplying drugs to Teddy from Mexico. Alvarez-Carvajal, Porky’s father, served as a drug and cash courier in this operation,Alvarez-Carvajal and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Alvarez-Carvajal testified that Teddy gave him money to help Porky during his time in jail and again when Porky was kidnapped in Mexico; while he knew Porky and Teddy were drug dealers, he had no intentional involvement in the drug-distribution conspiracy. Alvarez-Carvajal’s testimony conflicted with that of cooperating witnesses.The jury found Alvarez-Carvajal guilty but did not find that Alvarez-Carvajal had testified falsely; no perjury charges were brought. Applying a two-offense-level increase because Alvarez-Carvajal “stored and allowed [methamphetamine] to be stored at his residence” and another two-level increase for obstruction of justice because Alvarez-Carvajal “testified falsely,” the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Without the enhancements, his range was 235-293 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 240-month sentence. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its Guidelines calculation. View "United States v. Alvarez-Carvajal" on Justia Law

Daza worked as a geologist for INDOT from 1993 until the agency fired him in 2015. In 2017, he sued, citing 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. He alleged that INDOT and its officials had discriminated against him based on race, color, age, and political speech and had retaliated against complaints he made regarding the alleged discrimination.Days after the district court granted INDOT summary judgment in 2018, Daza filed a second action, again alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, age, and political speech, contending that INDOT’s failure to rehire him for the vacancy left after INDOT dismissed him was an independent act of discrimination and retaliation because INDOT filled his position with a young and inexperienced white man. In the first suit, Daza had expressly contended that INDOT’s failure to rehire him and its decision to hire an unqualified replacement proved that INDOT was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in favor of INDOT. Claim preclusion barred the second case. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers responded to a call of shots fired near a residence, canvassed the area, and, minutes after the shots were fired, came upon Lowe running in an alley. In the alley Lowe had just traversed, other officers noticed a partially opened dumpster; they found a pistol on top of the garbage. Ballistics revealed that the handgun had fired the shots near the residence. No physical or biological evidence conclusively linked Lowe to the gun, cartridge casings, or fired bullets found at the scene. Security video footage from the alley showed someone running from the residence and throwing a gun-shaped object into the dumpster, with the same clothes, backpack, and tattoo as Lowe.Lowe was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). During a jury poll, the court asked each juror whether the verdict “constitute[s] your individual verdict in all respects.” Juror Eleven answered, “Yes. Barely.” The court responded, “You said yes?” The juror replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court stated: “Juror [Eleven], who was a lawyer, did not indicate disagreement with the verdict; he simply indicated that he found the government’s evidence to be minimally sufficient to carry its burden.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lowe’s conviction and 90-month sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony that referred to the prior shooting. The juror’s answer was not equivocal. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The Loughrans defaulted on their home mortgage in 2011. In the ensuing foreclosure litigation, the Loughrans pursued procedural delay tactics; they remain in possession of their home despite not having made a mortgage payment in nine years. In 2019, with their state‐court foreclosure litigation more than seven years old, the Loughrans accused U.S. Bank and its counsel of committing fraud in the course of those proceedings. Months later, sensing that their fraud claim was going nowhere, the Loughrans went to federal court, with a complaint that copied and pasted large swaths of text from their state‐court filings.The district court stayed the federal proceedings, noting the practical identity between the federal and state actions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first concluding that it had appellate jurisdiction because the stay order was entered with the expectation that the state litigation would “largely” resolve the federal litigation. The district court properly stayed the case; the state action will likely “dispose of a majority of the factual and legal issues,” so a stay saved judicial resources. At the time of the order, the state‐court proceedings were well advanced, The Loughrans essentially were asking the federal judiciary to monitor and discipline how parties conduct themselves in state court. View "Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Page, a former advisor to the Trump Presidential Campaign, sued the Democratic National Committee, a subsidiary DNC Corporation, the Perkins law firm, and two Perkins partners. Page alleged defamation based on news stories published in 2016 concerning contacts between the campaign and Russian officials. Having advanced only violations of state law, and alleging that no defendant is a citizen of his home state of Oklahoma, Page relied on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that Perkins (with a few of its U.S.-based partners working and living abroad) does not qualify as a proper defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. Though complete diversity typically hinges on whether any parties on both sides of a lawsuit share citizenship, all parties must fall within the jurisdiction created by the diversity statute. If a party cannot sue or be sued under a provision of the diversity statute, the suit lacks complete diversity. Stateless citizens—because they are not (by definition) a citizen of a state, as section 1332(a) requires—destroy complete diversity just as much as a defendant who shares citizenship with a plaintiff. View "Page v. Democratic National Committee" on Justia Law

In 2008, Canfield was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for knowingly possessing child pornography. Canfield’s first years of supervision went without incident. The district court later modified conditions of and extended Canfield’s supervised release based Canfield’s use of unauthorized smartphones to view adult pornography and his purchase of DVDs containing adult pornography. The district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release in 2017 for failure to participate in sex offender treatment and unauthorized contact with a person under the age of 18.A 2020 revocation petition alleged that two minor females had lived at Canfield’s apartment for several days. Canfield was also charged with violations of Illinois sex-offender registration laws. The probation office memo indicated that the applicable sentencing options were “[n]ot less than 5 years to life.” Canfield’s attorney noted that she had reviewed the petitions and violation memorandum with Canfield; the court recited the applicable penalties. Canfield confirmed he had reviewed the report. In response to his guilty plea, the district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment and an additional five years’ supervised release. Both government and defense counsel referred to the five-year supervised release term as “mandatory.” Canfield waived a reading of the conditions of supervision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Canfield had ample advance notice of the terms of his supervised release and was given a meaningful opportunity to object, His actions amount to waiver. View "United States v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Roush, pled guilty to transportation and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count II, followed by 10 years of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in failing to properly identify the Guidelines range and in failing to consider his primary arguments in mitigation before imposing the sentence. The court recognized the proper Guidelines range, which is confirmed in its post-sentencing statement of reasons, and awarded the two-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, which was the only deduction available to Roush. The court held that Roush’s base offense level was 22, and applied a two-level increase because the offense involved images of minor children as young as five years old; a five-level increase because Roush distributed child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration but not for pecuniary gain; a four-level increase because Roush possessed images that portrayed sadistic conduct or other depictions of violence; and a five-level increase because Roush was responsible for possessing at least 21 video files which represent 1,575 images of child pornography. The court considered and denied Roush’s objections to specific enhancements. View "United States v. Roush" on Justia Law