Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In May 2019, Jerry entered a cellphone store carrying a firearm, pointed the gun at the two employees, demanded access to the store’s safe, forced an employee to open it, took all the cell phones inside, then left. Police quickly apprehended Jerry, who pleaded guilty to obstruction of commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951). His PSR noted that he had prior convictions in Illinois for robbery and attempted murder, both crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Jerry’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was his third crime of violence, so he received a career offender designation under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, raising his guidelines range from 130-141 months’ imprisonment to 292-365 months’ imprisonment. Jerry made several objections to the Guideline calculations but did not object to the classification of the Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence.The district court imposed a total sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence under the “plain error” standard. While Jerry’s case was on appeal, the court had held that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jerry" on Justia Law

In 2009, Newton pleaded guilty to bank robberies, and possessing and discharging a firearm during a bank robbery, and was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. In May 2020, Newton sought compassionate release, arguing that his asthma, combined with prison mismanagement of the pandemic, constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that his prolonged use of a corticosteroid to treat his asthma weakens his immune system, putting him at greater risk. Newton provided a detailed plan for his release and added that a third condition, hypertension. In July 2020, Newton contracted COVID-19. Three weeks later, a prison physician noted that his infection had “resolved” and that he “did not have a severe illness requiring hospitalization.” Newton still reported “recurrent intermittent coughs, headaches, and asthma flare-ups.” The district court denied his request, stating only: The Government contends, however, that Newton has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a sentence reduction. I agree. … The CDC … has not been able to determine conclusively that [Newton’s conditions[ pose an increased danger.…. the prison has lately succeeded in drastically reducing active cases.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. When an inmate like Newton presents individualized arguments along with a meaningfully detailed record, the district court’s opinion must establish that it considered those individualized arguments and properly exercised its discretion. View "United States v. Newton" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's asylum application. Petitioner challenges only the IJ's alternative basis for denial of his petition—the exercise of discretion to deny asylum. The court concluded that petitioner failed to address the separate and dispositive determination that his application is statutorily time-barred, despite the government pointing out this deficiency in its brief. Consequently, this failure is fatal to his petition.The court also denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's application for withholding of removal. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish any of the elements necessary for withholding of removal where the record does not show that he is likely to suffer persecution due to his experience as a witness to an incident of gang violence twenty years ago—much less that there is no substantial evidence to support the IJ's determination to that effect. In this case, the Board's conclusion that petitioner would not suffer future harm upon return to Mexico was supported by substantial evidence. View "Guzman-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Thill was convicted of sexual contact with A.M.M., his ex‐girlfriend’s eight‐year‐old daughter. A.M.M. testified that Thill had sexually assaulted her; Thill’s semen was found on her underwear. Thill’s defense was that his jilted ex‐girlfriend framed him by saving his semen for over a year, planting it on her daughter’s underwear, and coaching her to make false accusations. While cross‐examining Thill and in closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Thill’s failure to tell the police during his initial interview that he believed his ex‐girlfriend had the means or motivation to frame him. In postconviction proceedings, Thill argued that the prosecutor impermissibly used his silence after receiving Miranda warnings to impeach him and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded Thill had not demonstrated prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that conclusion not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The state court correctly paraphrased Strickland’s prejudice standard and nothing in its analysis suggested it used a standard “‘substantially different’ from or ‘opposite to’” that standard. The state presented significant direct evidence of a specific sexual assault. Thill’s defense had significant holes that extended far beyond his failure to raise this defense to the police; it was “weak and unpersuasive” and largely rested on Thill’s “self‐serving testimony.” View "Thill v. Richardson" on Justia Law

An informant gave South Bend police the number to a phone used by drug dealers. Officers conducted controlled buys in which confidential informants or undercover officers called the number and followed instructions to buy heroin. Officers then submitted an affidavit to a state court judge and obtained a "court order," requiring the phone’s service provider to share 30 days of precise, real-time GPS location data for the phone. The investigation led to two men at the top of the drug-trafficking conspiracy, Gibson and Harris. The district court denied their pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained through the cellphone tracking. Officers and cooperators testified to the large-scale drug-trafficking scheme that the defendants had overseen. Both were convicted of conspiring to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. At sentencing, the court found that the defendants had conspired to distribute a total of 10.5 kilograms of heroin.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the drug-quantity calculations, and the court’s limits on cross-examination of the cooperators about the specific sentences they hoped to avoid by testifying for the government. The court orders for the cellphone data satisfied the requirements for a search warrant: the judge who issued the orders was neutral and found probable cause to believe that the cellphone tracking would lead to the apprehension of drug traffickers and the orders particularly described the object of the search. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GoJet for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after GoJet terminated him following his Diabetes Type II diagnosis. The jury found in plaintiff's favor and the district court granted him back pay, liquidated damages, and front pay. GoJet appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of GoJet's motion to dismiss, holding that the arbitration provisions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) did not clearly, unmistakably, or explicitly state that plaintiff's FMLA claims could only be brought in arbitration. The court rejected GoJet's arguments that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In regard to damages, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating damages based on minimum hours at GoJet because it plausibly could have found that plaintiff would have worked the minimum number of hours from his termination date onward. However, the court held that the district court erred when it calculated front pay based on two different values for how much work the court expected plaintiff to work at GoJet and SkyWest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded on this issue for the district court to apply a uniform hourly figure to calculate expected earnings at GoJet and SkyWest for the purposes of front pay. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff waived his argument regarding the district court's front pay calculations based on post-trial evidence and his argument regarding the correct methodology for calculating damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to all other issues on appeal. View "Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC" on Justia Law

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the suit of a prisoner filing a petition to proceed in a suit in forma pauperis (IFP) must be dismissed if the prisoner deliberately misrepresented his financial status. Reyes, an Illinois prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in 2017 and another in 2018 and petitioned to proceed IFP in both cases. The district court initially granted those IFP petitions but later dismissed both cases under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(A), after the defendants presented evidence that Reyes deliberately misled the court about his finances on his 2017 IFP application. He did not disclose information about his income for three months in 2017, during which time he had received $1,692 in gifts deposited to his trust account. He had spent $785 at the commissary for non-essential items, such as a television. He claimed to have received no income in 2018 but had received $26.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 2017 case because the district court did not clearly err in finding that Reyes was dishonest about his financial status. The court did not give Reyes a chance to explain any potential issues with his 2018 IFP application and the defendants conceded that he should have been given that opportunity. The court vacated that dismissal. View "Reyes v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Smith has been in state prison for 19 years for a 2001 murder and robbery that he insists he did not commit. Smith had been charged on the basis of the confession by another (Houghtaling) and was tried three times. The state had no physical evidence linking Smith to the crime. In 2020, the district court held that he is entitled to release unless the state decides to retry him but Smith was seeking more: an unconditional writ based on the insufficiency of the evidence. The state appealed from the issuance of the conditional writ and Smith cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the issuance of an unconditional writ and Smith’s immediate release. Even taking the highly deferential view required by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), the evidence failed to support Smith’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; the Illinois Appellate Court was unreasonable, in holding otherwise. The court noted the flaws in Houghtaling’s confession, the exclusion of evidence vital to Smith’s defense, and the trial court’s refusal to allow Smith to impeach prosecution evidence. View "Smith v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant sought release based on medical conditions that he says make him vulnerable to serious illness or death from the spread of COVID-19 in prison. In his plea agreement, defendant voluntarily waived "the right to seek modification of or contest any aspect of the conviction or sentence in any type of proceeding." The court held that this waiver included defendant's right to seek compassionate release under the First Step Act and that his knowing and voluntary waiver of that right in an approved plea agreement is enforceable. View "United States v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

Hart was charged with robbing two banks by handing tellers notes, then leaving with the cash to board public transportation. One teller inserted a tracking device with the cash. At trial, the government called Chicago Detective Motyka and FBI Agents Lovernick and Yoder to testify about using the tracking device to find Hart and a bank surveillance photo to identify Hart. The government also introduced public-transit records of cards registered to Hart and fingerprints on the demand notes.Hart argued that he found the cash and the tracking device another way and that law enforcement did not identify him when he was on a certain bus (63) because he had not yet acquired the money and the tracking device. Hart cross-examined Motyka, Yoder, and Lovernick. Before the government rested, Hart asked for a continuance and to recall eight government witnesses, none of whom he had subpoenaed, including Lovernick, Motyka, and Yoder. Hart wanted to ask Yoder about boarding the buses, to impeach the timeline established on direct examination.In denying Hart’s request, the judge explained that Hart’s cross-examination had gone “well beyond” the scope of direct; “all” of the evidence Hart sought to elicit came out on direct; other evidence was in the record from which Hart could argue to support his theory; and Hart was trying to delay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Hart’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), upholding denial of Hart’s requests to recall the witnesses. View "United States v. Hart" on Justia Law