Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, pursuant to a plea agreement, Fowowe pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine. The district court determined that Fowowe’s sentencing range was a statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment and sentenced Fowowe to 262 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, Fowowe sought a reduced sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 to the federal sentencing guidelines, to which the government agreed; the district court reduced Fowowe’s sentence to 235 months.Although the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 had reduced the amount and kind of punishment for crack cocaine convictions like Fowowe’s, the changes only became retroactive with the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Fowowe unsuccessfully requested a reduced prison sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Fowowe’s argument that the district court’s evaluation of his request was deficient because the court failed to apply a 2020 Seventh Circuit decision concerning sentencing enhancements for prior cocaine convictions. Section 404(b) authorizes but does not require district courts to apply an intervening judicial decision in evaluating First Step Act motions. View "United States v. Fowowe" on Justia Law

Cook County inmate Bowers filed a federal civil rights lawsuit after other inmates attacked him in 2012, alleging the defendants failed to protect him, instituted an observation policy that caused the attack, and later discriminated against him because of a resulting disability. Bowers remains in a wheelchair. The jail is short on ADA‐ compliant cells, however, and, save for one month, Bowers has lived in cells without accessible showers or toilets. The district court dismissed most of Bowers’s claims before trial. A jury returned a verdict in the Sheriff’s favor on the remaining claims,The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bowers, before filing suit, did not exhaust his failure‐ to‐protect claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Bowers prison grievances did not assert the same claims as his complaint; his “Monell” claim was untimely. A reasonable jury could find that Bowers is not a qualified individual with a disability--someone who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities,” has “a record of such an impairment,” or is “being regarded as having such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). The jury had sufficient evidence to find that Bowers lied about needing a wheelchair. View "Bowers v. Dart" on Justia Law

Eaton was an apprentice in 2011 when Local 139 dispatched her to Findorff. At the end of Eaton’s first day on the job Findorff’s Project Superintendent, Szymkowski, terminated Eaton, concluding that she was inadequately trained. Local 139 filed a grievance. Findorff agreed to hire Eaton for a different job when that position became available. Weeks later, Findorff hired Eaton. Szymkowski privately told Eaton that she was slow and inefficient but rated her an average apprentice when filling out reports, which addressed only her technical skills. In late 2011, Findorff found itself overstaffed and implemented a rotating layoff schedule. Eaton filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that her layoff amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex; her complaint was dismissed. In August 2012, Findorff no longer needed a skip hoist operator and her employment was terminated.In 2017, Eaton left a resume at Findorff. Szymkowski told the company’s receptionist that he would not rehire her. Later, a position opened. Local 139 notified Findorff’s receptionist that it was dispatching Eaton. Szymkowski sent a letter to Local 139, declining to hire Eaton due to past performance issues.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Findorff. Eaton waived a claim of sex discrimination. She lacks any evidence that the decision-makers knew that she had engaged in protected activity; she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in support of causation for her retaliation claim. View "Eaton v. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

The Kerstiens family runs companies that build single-family homes out of Jasper, Indiana. Plan Pros and Prime Designs are home design companies that license their plans through Design Basics, which acts as a broker, serving as an intermediary between home builders and design firms. Design Basics markets the thousands of plans it holds copyrights to through trade publications, promotional materials placed in home improvement stores, and national builder associations and “has become a serial litigant,” having filed more than 100 infringement suits against home builders.In affirming the dismissal of Design Basic’s suit against the Kerstiens, the Seventh Circuit referred to “intellectual property trolls,” enforcing copyrights not to protect expression, but to extract payments through litigation. Design Basics has thin copyright in its plans because they consist largely of standard features found in homes across America. View "Design Basics, LLC v. Kerstiens Homes & Designs, Inc" on Justia Law

Officer Cowick’s informant informed Cowick that she believed that Gholston was about to pick up large quantities of methamphetamine using his green pickup truck. At least three months later, Cowick spotted Gholston’s green pickup truck, followed Gholston, and activated his lights when Gholston turned without using a signal. Gholston parked and was walking away, which heightened Cowick’s suspicions but eventually returned. Cowick handcuffed Gholston at 12:18 am and began writing a ticket. Dispatch informed Cowick that Gholston’s ID was valid but that he had a Notice of Violation for improperly parking over a year earlier. At 12:24:23 am, Cowick called for a K9 officer, Saalborn, and requested assistance in delivering the Notice to the traffic stop. Sargent Elbus responded that he could bring the Notice. Cowick told Elbus, “take your time!!” because he was “trying to get” Saalborn While completing the ticket, Cowick continued to urge Elbus to move slowly and to urge Saalborn to “drive fast.” Cowick printed Gholston’s ticket at 12:32:27, then realized that he had not asked Gholston for insurance information. Gholston did not have proof of insurance. Cowick returned to his car to write another ticket. As Cowick was finishing that ticket, Saalborn arrived; his drug-sniffing dog alerted as the ticket was printing. The officers searched the truck and discovered nine grams of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Gholston’s motion to suppress. Cowick did not unreasonably extend the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment; his failure to request Gholston’s insurance information at the start of the stop was a good-faith blunder. View "United States v. Gholston" on Justia Law

McHaney participated in at least four armed cellular phone store robberies around Chicago. While attempting a fifth, he was arrested. He was charged with Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); four counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); attempted Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); three counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)); and possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied McHaney’s motion to dismiss the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) counts, finding that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). McHaney entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to 177 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to reject its precedent that Hobbs Act robbery meets the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and is a qualifying predicate crime under the statute. Putting any person in fear in the context of robbery necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” “Every other court of appeals to have considered this agrees with this conclusion.” View "United States v. McHaney" on Justia Law

Esposito sexually assaulted and abused his adopted son from Guatemala for years, beginning when his son was about seven years old. Esposito documented his repetitive, shocking, and horrific abuse in videos and photographic images which he shared online. He also downloaded other child pornography in hundreds of thousands of images and videos.Without a plea agreement, Esposito pleaded guilty to 20 counts of sexually exploiting a minor, each reflecting a different instance of abuse documented in videos and images, and to one count of possessing child pornography. His PSR calculated an offense level of 51, which defaulted to a maximum of 43 under the Sentencing Guidelines. Esposito had no criminal history. The resulting Guidelines range was life in prison, but none of the crimes of which Esposito was convicted had a statutory maximum of life imprisonment. The defense suggested 420 months because Esposito was already in his mid-fifties.The district court concluded that a de facto life sentence was appropriate and imposed sentences totaling 200 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Esposito’s argument that the court should have considered his criminal conduct, history, and characteristics as a whole, determined an appropriate overall punishment, and then set the sentences for each count to equal that overall punishment, rather than imposing sentences for each count, then adding them together. View "United States v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Inmate Robinson was offered new medication. Unaware of any prescription, he questioned the officer who gave it to him and followed up with the health services manager and others. Despite learning that there was no record of any new prescription for him, Robinson took the medication. Days later, Robinson passed out. A nurse advised him to keep taking the medication. Robinson then was sent to an outside hospital, where doctors surmised that he might be allergic to the medication. The prescription was meant for a different inmate. Robinson sued. The defendants moved for summary judgment; 20 days after his deadline for filing a brief in opposition, Robinson filed a brief to support his own request for summary judgment, supplemented by a proposed statement of facts. He did not respond to the defendants’ statement of facts. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court permissibly applied Eastern District of Wisconsin Local Rule 56(b)(4) to deem the defendants’ facts unopposed, regardless of Robinson’s later filings. Based on those facts, no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference to a serious medical risk. Nor could a jury conclude that the health‐services manager violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene. Robinson’s state‐law negligence claims were barred by Wisconsin’s notice‐of‐claim statute. The defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based only on Robinson's failure to timely respond. View "Robinson v. Waterman" on Justia Law

Black, a corrupt Chicago police officer, participated in a scheme to take resell drugs and weapons found during police work. In 2007, Black was convicted of conspiracies to engage in racketeering, drug distribution, and robbery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Black was sentenced to a total of 40 years’ imprisonment.The 2018 First Step Act significantly lowered the mandatory minimums for 924(c) convictions. Today, Black’s mandatory minimum sentence would be 10 years. In 2020, Black sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3852(c)(1)(A), arguing that his cancer and chemotherapy meant he faced an increased risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Black had not shown that his cancer was terminal or chronic or that he was at risk of contracting COVID-19 and that the section 3553(a) factors weighed against early release. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” issue was, under the First Step Act, no longer governed by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements that the district court relied upon.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the denial of Black’s motion. The district court did not consider statutory changes, reflecting a substantially different view of section 924(c) violations; the alternative 3553(a) rationale does not render the error harmless. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

During heavy snow, Lieutenant McAuly approached a car that was far off the roadway. Lao lowered the driver's window and stated that a tow truck was on its way. According to McAuly, Lao displayed nervousness and was acting as though he wanted McAuly to leave while speaking sharply to his passenger, Chang. Their driver’s licenses revealed extensive recent felony criminal histories. Both were under supervised release for methamphetamine convictions.Both consented to pat-down searches. McAuly discovered that under her shirt Chang was carrying a locked, portable gun safe. Chang denied both ownership of the safe and knowledge of its contents. Through the car windows, McAuly saw a razor blade and a piece of cardboard that he associated with dividing drugs. Wisconsin Act 79 authorizes an officer, without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, to search any property under the control of a person who is under court supervision if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McAuly found the key, opened the gun safe, and found what was determined to be 75.6 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale. A later search revealed a firearm and ammunition. After receiving Miranda warnings, Chang declared that everything in the safe belonged to her, although she was unable to describe its contents. Both were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Lao was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of the defendants’ motion to suppress. Although the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Chang’s statements did not fall within any hearsay exception and could not be admitted if Chang chose to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. View "United States v. Lao" on Justia Law