Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers responded to a call of shots fired near a residence, canvassed the area, and, minutes after the shots were fired, came upon Lowe running in an alley. In the alley Lowe had just traversed, other officers noticed a partially opened dumpster; they found a pistol on top of the garbage. Ballistics revealed that the handgun had fired the shots near the residence. No physical or biological evidence conclusively linked Lowe to the gun, cartridge casings, or fired bullets found at the scene. Security video footage from the alley showed someone running from the residence and throwing a gun-shaped object into the dumpster, with the same clothes, backpack, and tattoo as Lowe.Lowe was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). During a jury poll, the court asked each juror whether the verdict “constitute[s] your individual verdict in all respects.” Juror Eleven answered, “Yes. Barely.” The court responded, “You said yes?” The juror replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court stated: “Juror [Eleven], who was a lawyer, did not indicate disagreement with the verdict; he simply indicated that he found the government’s evidence to be minimally sufficient to carry its burden.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lowe’s conviction and 90-month sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony that referred to the prior shooting. The juror’s answer was not equivocal. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The Loughrans defaulted on their home mortgage in 2011. In the ensuing foreclosure litigation, the Loughrans pursued procedural delay tactics; they remain in possession of their home despite not having made a mortgage payment in nine years. In 2019, with their state‐court foreclosure litigation more than seven years old, the Loughrans accused U.S. Bank and its counsel of committing fraud in the course of those proceedings. Months later, sensing that their fraud claim was going nowhere, the Loughrans went to federal court, with a complaint that copied and pasted large swaths of text from their state‐court filings.The district court stayed the federal proceedings, noting the practical identity between the federal and state actions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first concluding that it had appellate jurisdiction because the stay order was entered with the expectation that the state litigation would “largely” resolve the federal litigation. The district court properly stayed the case; the state action will likely “dispose of a majority of the factual and legal issues,” so a stay saved judicial resources. At the time of the order, the state‐court proceedings were well advanced, The Loughrans essentially were asking the federal judiciary to monitor and discipline how parties conduct themselves in state court. View "Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Page, a former advisor to the Trump Presidential Campaign, sued the Democratic National Committee, a subsidiary DNC Corporation, the Perkins law firm, and two Perkins partners. Page alleged defamation based on news stories published in 2016 concerning contacts between the campaign and Russian officials. Having advanced only violations of state law, and alleging that no defendant is a citizen of his home state of Oklahoma, Page relied on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that Perkins (with a few of its U.S.-based partners working and living abroad) does not qualify as a proper defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. Though complete diversity typically hinges on whether any parties on both sides of a lawsuit share citizenship, all parties must fall within the jurisdiction created by the diversity statute. If a party cannot sue or be sued under a provision of the diversity statute, the suit lacks complete diversity. Stateless citizens—because they are not (by definition) a citizen of a state, as section 1332(a) requires—destroy complete diversity just as much as a defendant who shares citizenship with a plaintiff. View "Page v. Democratic National Committee" on Justia Law

In 2008, Canfield was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for knowingly possessing child pornography. Canfield’s first years of supervision went without incident. The district court later modified conditions of and extended Canfield’s supervised release based Canfield’s use of unauthorized smartphones to view adult pornography and his purchase of DVDs containing adult pornography. The district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release in 2017 for failure to participate in sex offender treatment and unauthorized contact with a person under the age of 18.A 2020 revocation petition alleged that two minor females had lived at Canfield’s apartment for several days. Canfield was also charged with violations of Illinois sex-offender registration laws. The probation office memo indicated that the applicable sentencing options were “[n]ot less than 5 years to life.” Canfield’s attorney noted that she had reviewed the petitions and violation memorandum with Canfield; the court recited the applicable penalties. Canfield confirmed he had reviewed the report. In response to his guilty plea, the district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment and an additional five years’ supervised release. Both government and defense counsel referred to the five-year supervised release term as “mandatory.” Canfield waived a reading of the conditions of supervision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Canfield had ample advance notice of the terms of his supervised release and was given a meaningful opportunity to object, His actions amount to waiver. View "United States v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Roush, pled guilty to transportation and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count II, followed by 10 years of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in failing to properly identify the Guidelines range and in failing to consider his primary arguments in mitigation before imposing the sentence. The court recognized the proper Guidelines range, which is confirmed in its post-sentencing statement of reasons, and awarded the two-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, which was the only deduction available to Roush. The court held that Roush’s base offense level was 22, and applied a two-level increase because the offense involved images of minor children as young as five years old; a five-level increase because Roush distributed child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration but not for pecuniary gain; a four-level increase because Roush possessed images that portrayed sadistic conduct or other depictions of violence; and a five-level increase because Roush was responsible for possessing at least 21 video files which represent 1,575 images of child pornography. The court considered and denied Roush’s objections to specific enhancements. View "United States v. Roush" on Justia Law

Leal used an online dating application to contact a user who was an undercover FBI agent, posing as a teenage boy. Despite learning that the user was underage, Leal engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited oral sex. The agent provided Leal an address. Under surveillance, Leal arrived at the house. When a surveillance officer drove an unmarked vehicle up the alley, Leal sped off. Leal was quickly pulled over. Three officers were present, wearing clothes that identified them as officers. Leal was told that he was not under arrest and agreed to speak with other agents in the house. Leal consented to a pat-down and surrendered his cell phone and his car keys. The recorded interview proceeded with the door closed. The agents neither handcuffed nor restrained Leal. Leal quickly confessed and confirmed he had sent the messages. After the 18-minute interview, the FBI arrested Leal for knowingly attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of Leal’s motion to suppress his statements. The agents did not conduct a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The custody inquiry is not whether the defendant was under a subjective belief that his movements were restricted, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he was free to leave. That Leal believed he was in a precarious position says nothing about the officers' behavior or whether a reasonable person would have felt bound to stay. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Frazier, age 45, reported to the jail to begin a sentence for felony theft. Frazier informed the intake officer that she was epileptic, had blackouts and high blood pressure, and had used heroin the night before; that year she had experienced a stroke. Frazier got a “medical designation,” which meant that an officer would check on Frazier at least every 15 minutes. At health evaluations, hours later, she did not report pain or withdrawal symptoms. At 2:30 a.m., Frazier began groaning. Correctional officers responded several times, but Frazier did not describe her problem. Around 9:00 a.m., a nurse spoke with Frazier, who did not voice any complaints nor display signs of distress. Around 11:00 a.m., Frazier was evaluated as having “mild withdrawal.” A doctor prescribed heroin withdrawal medications. At 3:23 p.m., security footage shows Frazier removing (Advil or Aleve) pills from her toiletry bag and placing them in her mouth. Minutes later, Frazier had a seizure. An officer found Frazier unresponsive at 5:11 p.m. and called emergency personnel. Frazier was pronounced dead. A coroner determined that Frazier died of “diphenhydramine toxicity.” Frazier had smuggled the medication into the jail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. There is no evidence that corrections officers were aware of the risk of substantial harm that Frazier ultimately suffered— death from diphenhydramine toxicity. No reasonable jury could conclude that they were deliberately indifferent to Frazier’s heroin withdrawal. View "Jones v. Mathews" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's state criminal charge for animal cruelty was dismissed, plaintiff and his wife filed suit against the City and the Police Department under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for wrongful arrest and excessive force, as well as various state law claims. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all counts. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a mistrial during the trial and later denied a post-trial motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial based on its response to a potential juror's de minimis conduct. In this case, the district court properly dispatched its voir dire duties by probing whether the excused potential juror had made any additional statements which could have prejudiced plaintiff and by considering and rejecting the argument that brief departing comments in this instance required the empanelment of a new venire. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance and properly exercised its discretion by limiting plaintiff's testimony to issues relevant to the substantive issues in the case being tried. The court further concluded that the district court did not err by allowing defendants to argue that the entire requested $975,000 damages award would come from Officer Horan personally. In any event, to the extent that these statements created confusion because of the temporal proximity between the accurate statements of the law and the references to the full amount requested, the district court allowed plaintiff's counsel on rebuttal to explain the issue. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's challenges to the district court's handling of the jury instructions. View "Farnik v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured from a slip and fall in a Home Depot parking lot, he filed suit against the store claiming that he sustained substantial injuries and alleging that his injuries required multiple surgeries, as well as physical and occupational therapy.The Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiff's appeal is limited to the district court's denial of his second post-judgment motion filed under Rule 60(b). The court noted that, as a practical matter, that conclusion changes very little because plaintiff's appeal is all and only about whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his case for lack of prosecution. The court explained that the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion effectively amounted to reinforcing and standing by its original dismissal decision. In this case, the court concluded that the district court acted well within its discretion dismissing plaintiff's suit where plaintiff's counsel missed many conferences. Because plaintiff chose counsel as his agent, he bears the consequences of counsel's actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to reopen the case. View "Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law