Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deerfield. the general contractor, subcontracted with P.S. Demolition, which agreed to indemnify and hold Deerfield harmless from all claims caused in whole or in part by P.S. P.S. employees were working at the site when an unsecured capstone fell, killing one and injuring another. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act limited P.S.’s liability to $5,993.91 and $25,229.15. The state court held that P.S. had waived the Kotecki cap that would ordinarily apply those limits to a third party (Deerfield) suing for contribution for its pro-rata share of common liability for a workplace injury. A bankruptcy court determined that P.S. had no assets; the state court determined that P.S.’s liability was limited to its available insurance coverage. Deerfield settled with the plaintiffs for substantially more than $75,000 plus an assignment of Deerfield’s contribution claim against P.S.StarNet, P.S.’s employer liability insurer, entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, reserving its defenses to insurance coverage. The plaintiffs dismissed their negligence claims against P.S. The workers’ compensation and employers' liability policy issued to P.S. provides that StarNet will pay damages for which P.S. is liable to indemnify third parties, excluding “liability assumed under a contract, including any agreement to waive your right to limit your liability for contribution to the amount of benefits payable under the Workers Compensation Act ... This exclusion does not apply to a warranty that your work will be done in a workmanlike manner.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment that StarNet owes P.S. no coverage for the employees’ injuries beyond the amounts specified by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Kotecki cap. The court rejected arguments that P.S.’s liability in the personal injury action arose in part from P.S.’s failure to conduct the demolition in a workmanlike manner so that the exception applies. View "StarNet Insurance Co. v. Ruprecht" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago Police Officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. According to Smith, the officers fabricated a story that, during this stop, he made a “furtive movement” and that the officers found a bullet in the car. Smith was arrested and detained for seven months in the Cook County Jail. Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014. While on bond, Smith was required to appear in court once per month and to request permission before leaving Illinois. Smith contends his bond conditions diminished his employment prospects and that he experienced financial stress and emotional anxiety. He was acquitted on July 21, 2016. On July 18, 2018, Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit as untimely under a two-year limitations period, rejecting Smith’s argument that his claim accrued when he was acquitted at trial. A Fourth Amendment claim such as Smith’s accrues when he is released from detention. The court also rejected Smith’s contention that his bond conditions constituted an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure, so he was not released from custody until he was acquitted. Requirements to appear in court for a hearing and to request permission before leaving the state, taken together or separately, do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures. View "Smith v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

SFC, an equestrian center hosted off‐site trail‐riding events. SFC and American entered into a “farm-owner” insurance policy that described the insured premises as the farm’s address. The policy provides coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused by an “occurrence” that arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the “insured premises” or operations that are necessary or incidental to the “insured premises.” There is no coverage for the use of a motorized vehicle except a “motorized vehicle” which is designed only for use off public roads and which is used to service the “insured premises.” Ratay, an SFC employee, transported horses, equipment, and a golf cart from the farm to a riding center approximately 15 miles from SFC’s property, and supervised those riding SFC horses while driving the SFC golf cart. Shockley was a passenger in the cart when Ratay chased a horse through a field. Shockley flew out of the vehicle. The cart ran over his leg. Shockley filed suit.The district court entered a declaratory judgment that American has no duty to defend or indemnify SFC. The Seventh Circuit reversed. In Illinois, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. The court noted ambiguities caused by the policy’s competing characteristics as a farm-owner policy and as a commercial general liability policy. The complaint’s allegations sufficiently invoke the policy’s coverage; the golf cart was being used for business purposes. View "American Bankers Insurance Co v. Shockley" on Justia Law

Prosser, a 37-year-old Medicare recipient, suffers from glioblastoma, which causes brain tumors. The five-year survival rate hovers around 5%. Though not curative, Prosser benefits from tumor treating fields therapy (TTF), approved by the FDA in 2011. For most of the day, patients use a device that attaches to the head via adhesive patches that connect to a mobile power supply. The device emits electrical fields to the tumor, which disrupt the division of cancer cells. Early studies show that the device holds promise in prolonging life. TTF therapy is available through a single supplier, Novocure, which rents the device on a monthly basis. The therapy is expensive. Prosser must file a Medicare benefits claim for each period she uses the device. Medicare denied coverage for the treatment period January-April 2018. Though Prosser received the therapy and owed nothing, the denial left Novocure with the bill. Prosser challenged this denial through Medicare’s appeals process before filing suit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Prosser’s claim for Medicare Part B coverage, holding that she has suffered no injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement. Prosser received—and continues to receive—the TTF therapy. She faces no financial liability for the treatment period Medicare denied coverage. Any future financial risk is too attenuated from the denial of the past coverage and far too speculative to establish standing. View "Prosser v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In 1989, the Hamel Fire Protection District and Alhambra Fire Protection District formed a joint venture, “the Service” to provide ambulance service to residents of both districts. In 2012, a Service-operated ambulance collided with a semi-truck. The semi-truck drivers and ambulance passengers were seriously injured. The accident produced three lawsuits that eventually settled. Continental paid all attorney’s fees assessed for Hamel Fire’s defenses. Country Mutual had issued a multiperil commercial lines insurance policy to the Service.. Hamel Fire was the named insured on the Continental policy. Continental defended Hamel Fire in each lawsuit after first tendering them to Country Mutual, which ignored each tender. The ambulance was a covered auto under policies issued by both, which provided primary coverage for owned autos and excess coverage for non-owned autos.Continental sued Country Mutual. The district court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment finding that the Service, and not Hamel Fire, owned the ambulance. Based on that finding, and both policies’ “Other Insurance” clauses, the court determined that Country Mutual owed primary coverage for the costs to defend Hamel Fire in the underlying lawsuits, while Continental only owed excess coverage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the evidence strongly reflects the parties’ intent that Country Mutual’s insured owned the ambulance. The resulting award of attorney’s fees under Illinois law was reasonable. View "Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Country Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Companies that tow or recycle used cars alleged that Milwaukee and its subcontractor, engaged in anticompetitive behavior to self-allocate towing services and abandoned vehicles, a primary input in the scrap metal recycling business. They alleged that an exclusive contract the city entered into with one of the area’s largest recycling providers, Miller Compressing, violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and that the contract provided direct evidence of an agreement to restrain trade. They cited laws that require a city-issued license to tow vehicles from certain areas, that obligate towing companies to provide various notices, and that cap maximum charges imposed on vehicle owners who have illegally parked or abandoned their vehicles, as having been enacted to squeeze them out of the market.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The arrangement between the city and Miller is not per se unreasonable on the basis of horizontal price-fixing. The court also rejected a claim of “bid-rigging.” View "Always Towing & Recovery Inc. v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Avila, a Mexican citizen, has lived continuously in the U.S. since he entered as a minor in 2008. He committed an infraction that led to a disorderly conduct charge in 2019. Days after he pleaded guilty to that charge, he was placed in removal proceedings. A Notice to Appear at a removal hearing must include “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held,” 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). The Notice that Avila received did not comply with that requirement. He later received a “Notice of Hearing” with those details.Avila moved to terminate his proceedings on the ground that the Notice he received was defective. The IJ denied that motion and ordered Avila removed. Although the BIA acknowledged that the Notice was noncompliant, it reasoned that Avila was not entitled to relief because he had not shown that the defects in the Notice prejudiced him in any way. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While the requirements are not jurisdictional but are mandatory claims-processing rules, entitlement to relief does not depend on a showing of prejudice. View "Avila de la Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law

“Teddy” lived in Los Angeles and supplied local distributors with drugs delivered through the U.S. Postal Service. The FBI used a confidential informant to conduct multiple controlled drug purchases from Teddy; obtained court authorization to intercept the phone calls and text messages; and determined that “Porky,” was supplying drugs to Teddy from Mexico. Alvarez-Carvajal, Porky’s father, served as a drug and cash courier in this operation,Alvarez-Carvajal and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Alvarez-Carvajal testified that Teddy gave him money to help Porky during his time in jail and again when Porky was kidnapped in Mexico; while he knew Porky and Teddy were drug dealers, he had no intentional involvement in the drug-distribution conspiracy. Alvarez-Carvajal’s testimony conflicted with that of cooperating witnesses.The jury found Alvarez-Carvajal guilty but did not find that Alvarez-Carvajal had testified falsely; no perjury charges were brought. Applying a two-offense-level increase because Alvarez-Carvajal “stored and allowed [methamphetamine] to be stored at his residence” and another two-level increase for obstruction of justice because Alvarez-Carvajal “testified falsely,” the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Without the enhancements, his range was 235-293 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 240-month sentence. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its Guidelines calculation. View "United States v. Alvarez-Carvajal" on Justia Law

Daza worked as a geologist for INDOT from 1993 until the agency fired him in 2015. In 2017, he sued, citing 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. He alleged that INDOT and its officials had discriminated against him based on race, color, age, and political speech and had retaliated against complaints he made regarding the alleged discrimination.Days after the district court granted INDOT summary judgment in 2018, Daza filed a second action, again alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, age, and political speech, contending that INDOT’s failure to rehire him for the vacancy left after INDOT dismissed him was an independent act of discrimination and retaliation because INDOT filled his position with a young and inexperienced white man. In the first suit, Daza had expressly contended that INDOT’s failure to rehire him and its decision to hire an unqualified replacement proved that INDOT was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in favor of INDOT. Claim preclusion barred the second case. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law