Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grainger, the victim of cyberattacks against its computer systems, isolated the source of the intrusions to a single internet protocol (IP) address, coming from a high-rise apartment building where disgruntled former employee Soybel lived. Grainger reported the attacks to the FBI, which obtained a court order under the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. 3121, authorizing the installation of pen registers and “trap and trace” devices to monitor internet traffic in and out of the building generally and Soybel’s unit specifically. The pen registers were instrumental in confirming that Soybel unlawfully accessed Grainger’s system. The district court denied Soybel’s motion to suppress the pen-register evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Soybel’s convictions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The use of a pen register to identify IP addresses visited by a criminal suspect is not a Fourth Amendment “search” that requires a warrant. IP pen registers are analogous in all material respects to the telephone pen registers that the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in 1979. The connection between Soybel’s IP address and external IP addresses was routed through a third party, an internet service provider. Soybel has no expectation of privacy in the captured routing information. The court distinguished historical cell-site location information, which implicates unique privacy interests that are absent here. The IP pen register had no ability to track Soybel’s past movements. View "United States v. Soybel" on Justia Law

Kenosha officers McDonough and Kinzer responded to a 911 call from an apartment building’s manager who reported that there was a woman inside Ferguson’s apartment who was “causing problems” and did not live there. McDonough spoke with Rupp-Kent who was alone inside Ferguson’s apartment and who reported that Ferguson had been violent with her. McDonough observed bruises on Rupp-Kent’s leg and neck and saw the knife Ferguson purportedly pointed at her. McDonough learned that Ferguson was on probation for robbery, had his driving privileges revoked, and drove a Chrysler. He reviewed Ferguson’s booking photo. McDonough, in his squad completing the paperwork, saw Ferguson drive past and followed. The parties dispute the events that occurred as McDonough attempted to arrest Ferguson. McDonough ultimately deployed his taser for five seconds.Ferguson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. McDonough moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained for a jury to decide. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. McDonough and Ferguson offered competing accounts and the dashcam video of the incident did not conclusively support either party’s account. Under one version of the events, Ferguson was not resisting and a reasonable officer would have known that an officer’s substantial escalation of force in response to an individual’s passive resistance violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force. View "Ferguson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The environmental harm at the Indianapolis property developed over at least 50 years. Four adjacent properties have changed hands several times and have been used for manufacturing and industrial businesses that used degreasers and various chemical products. The solvents have degraded over time and have seeped into the groundwater and soil in the surrounding residential area. Investigations showed that vapors emitting from the underground contamination have intruded into homes and a local park. Major acquired the property in 2007 and has not released any hazardous materials.Von Duprin. whose predecessor once owned property in the area, undertook cleanup efforts and sought to recover some of those costs and future remediation costs. Von Duprin sued former and current owners and operators of the properties under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. Current owners or operators of a site where hazardous materials were released may be held liable under CERCLA without having caused a release.The district court found that Von Duprin and two other former or current owners and operators in the area bore responsibility for portions of the environmental harm, then assigned liability among and between all three parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part but vacated the court’s threshold determination under section 107(a) of CERCLA that liability for remediating the environmental harm is divisible—capable of being apportioned on the basis of principles of causation—among and between the parties to this litigation. View "Von Duprin LLC v. Major Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

On October 28, 2016, Jones, was a passenger in an Uber car owned by Langwith and driven by Waterhouse. That car was struck by a vehicle owned and driven by Ramos, a New Jersey resident. Jones, injured in the accident, filed suit in New Jersey two days before the statute of limitations was due to run. After the plaintiff’s attorney failed to effect service of the summons and complaint on any of the defendants within 90 days, the court issued a Notice of Call for Dismissal. Jones then moved to change venue to Indiana, asserting that the Uber driver, a citizen of Indiana, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. The court granted that motion and directed Jones to serve a copy of the venue order on the defendants within five days. His counsel served the venue order on the defendants but still did not serve the summons and complaint. Three months later, Waterhouse moved for dismissal. Nine days later, new counsel for Jones entered an appearance in the Indiana court and began serving the summons and complaint on all of the defendants. The summons and complaint were served on all of the defendants, 238-244 days after the filing of the complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The Indiana district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no good cause for the delay and declining to grant an extension. View "Jones v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Big Shoulders sued the railroads (SLRG), with federal jurisdiction ostensibly based on diversity of citizenship, and requested that the district court appoint a receiver to handle SLRG’s assets. That court did so, which brought the case to the attention of several creditors. One of them, Sandton, intervened and challenged the appointment of the receiver and the district court’s jurisdiction. Sandton alleged that Big Shoulders failed to join necessary parties who, if added, would destroy diversity of citizenship. Meanwhile, other creditors (Petitioning Creditors) filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition on behalf of SLRG in federal bankruptcy court in Colorado. The receiver objected. Because the judicially approved receivership agreement contained an anti-litigation injunction, the district court initially concluded that the bankruptcy petition was void. On reconsideration, however, the district court determined that it did not have the authority to enjoin the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy continued. After Big Shoulders refused to continue to fund the receivership, the district court approved its termination.The Seventh Circuit consolidated several appeals, each of which involved questions of standing or mootness. The court concluded that those justiciability questions required the dismissal of all but Sandton’s appeal. As for Sandton’s argument that diversity jurisdiction is lacking, the court remanded to the district court for an application in the first instance of the “nerve center test” to determine if SLRG and Mt. Hood are citizens of Illinois. View "Sandton Rail Company LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande Railroad, Inc." on Justia Law

Ballard has a long and violent criminal history: the court listed 50 convictions between the age of 17 and his current age, over 50. In 2018, Ballard pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The judge determined Ballard was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 232 months. Ballard appealed, arguing that two prior Illinois attempted residential burglary convictions were not violent felonies after the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause unconstitutional. At his 2019 resentencing, Ballard's guideline range was 33-41 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded.At the third sentencing, in 2020, Ballard's guidelines range was 33-41 months. The government and Ballard both recommended a sentence of 63 months. The judge sentenced Ballard to 92 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the judge failed to justify the 125% variance and failed to consider disparity and mitigation. The judge complied with the remand instructions, addressing the Sixth Circuit’s concerns specifically, in detail. The serious nature of the offense, Ballard’s age, the long and dramatic and dangerous criminal history, the continual recidivism, and the continued need for deterrence and incapacitation for the protection of the public, “overwhelm the relatively minor potential mitigating factors.” View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Chavez and her aunt owned a clothing store on the south side of Chicago where they sold socks and t-shirts out of the front and kilogram quantities of heroin and cocaine out of the back. In 2015, one of their customers started cooperating with federal law enforcement; eventually, Chavez was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). Chavez proceeded to trial where the cooperator’s testimony and videos he had recorded in the store were key pieces of evidence in the government’s case. The jury convicted Chavez; she was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecutor, during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, made a litany of improper statements vouching for the informant’s truthfulness, maligning her defense counsel, and inflaming the jury’s fears, and that she must be resentenced because the district court relied on inaccurate information in determining her sentence. The district court clarified its reasoning in its written statement of reasons, clarifying that the aggravating factor upon which it relied at sentencing was Chavez’s lack of economic need to commit the crime. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Vega, a Hispanic woman, sued the Park District based on its investigation and termination of her employment for allegedly falsifying her timesheets, citing national origin discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII. A jury returned a verdict for Vega on the discrimination claims, but not the retaliation claims, and awarded $750,000. The judge reduced the award to Title VII’s statutory maximum of $300,000, ordered the District to reinstate Vega, pay backpay, provide her with the cash value of lost benefits, and pay prejudgment interest and a tax component. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except for the tax-component award,Vega submitted a fee petition totaling $1,073,901.25, with a 200-page document listing details. Vega’s counsel submitted evidence to support her current hourly rate of $425 for general tasks and $450 for in-court work. The district court granted Vega’s petition in the amount of $1,006,592, noting the District’s “scorched-earth litigation approach.” Vega filed a second fee petition totaling $254,635.69 for work following the first petition. The district court awarded $218,221.69 and granted Vega a tax-component award of $49,224.30. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the award was “rather high for the type of litigation and monetary and equitable relief that Vega achieved,” but that the district court’s analysis and reasoning demonstrate an appropriate exercise of its discretion. View "Vega v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law

Mahran, an Egyptian Muslim, sued Advocate Christ Medical Center, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Mahran, a pharmacist, alleged that Advocate failed to accommodate his need for prayer breaks; disciplined and later fired him based on his race, religion, and national origin; retaliated against him for reporting racial and religious discrimination; and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race, religion, and national origin. The district judge rejected all of the claims on summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge wrongly required Mahran to show that Advocate’s failure to accommodate his prayer breaks resulted in an adverse employment action and that the judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence in evaluating his hostile-workplace claim. Mahran expressly agreed at trial that an adverse employment action is an element of a prima facie Title VII claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s religious practice. He cannot take the opposite position. While the judge should have considered all the evidence Mahran adduced in support of his hostile workplace claim, there was not enough evidence for a jury to find that Advocate subjected him to a hostile work environment. View "Mahran v. Advocate Christ Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 2006, the borrowers concealed, from their lender, their lack of equity in four Chicago properties. All defaulted and the lender went into receivership. As receiver for that bank, the FDIC sued the title insurance company that conducted the closings and an appraisal company that aided the transactions. The FDIC settled with the appraisal company and went to trial against the title insurance company, winning a $1,450,000 verdict, less than the $3,790,695 the FDIC wanted. The court granted deducted $500,000 from the verdict to account for the money the FDIC received from its settlement with the appraisal company.The Seventh Circuit affirmed but remanded with instructions to add the setoff amount back into the judgment. A statute telling courts to award “appropriate” prejudgment interest in FDIC receivership cases that blend federal and state law, 12 U.S.C. 1821(l), gave the district court authority to exercise its discretion and to look to state law for guidance. There was no legal error or abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest. Because of difficult causation issues, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to amend the jury verdict to add more damages. The district court erred in giving the title company a $500,000 setoff. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law