Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chicago offers public-school teachers higher pay if they earn extra college credits. Graham sought a higher salary under this program in July 2015, only to have her application ignored. She tried again in September and was fired on the ground that her application had been backdated, which the Board of Education considered fraud. A hearing officer ordered her reinstated with back pay. Graham alleges the Board did not honor this decision in full, published a declaration that she is a fraudster, and refused to consider her for open positions. Graham sued, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by discriminating against her on account of sex and race and of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by depriving her of pension and health benefits.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint does not identify other employees who received better treatment from the school system but It is enough for a plaintiff to assert that she was treated worse because of protected characteristics. The school system’s plans are exempt from ERISA. Because the state not only funds the charter schools but also approves their establishment and continued existence, it is not appropriate to treat them as private institutions subject to public regulation. View "Graham v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

McGill was convicted of possessing child pornography. He completed his prison sentence and began serving supervised release. McGill has a history of violating the terms of his supervised release. McGill failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program, when he was asked whether he had sexual contact with a minor.Probation Officer Williams conducted a home visit, entered McGill’s bedroom, and observed a black cell phone that he recognized as McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone. McGill attempted to block the officer’s view of the second cell phone, stating that it was an old phone that no longer worked. At Williams’s request, McGill handed over the white phone. Williams claims that he was able to power on the phone, saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. Williams delivered the phone to the FBI, which obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. McGill was again charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).The district court denied McGill’s motion to suppress, accepted a conditional plea, and sentenced McGill to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams was lawfully present in McGill’s house, the unmonitored phone was in plain view, and, under the circumstances, the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Williams had reasonable suspicion to believe that the cell phone was evidence a criminal act. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law

In each of the consolidated appeals, the defendant, having been imprisoned for drug crimes, violated the conditions of his original term of supervision. Each appeared in front of the same judge at a revocation hearing. Acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), (h), the district court ordered each to be returned to prison and to serve an additional period of supervised release afterward; the court imposed the term of supervised release mandated by statute as part of the original sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal criminal sentence may, and sometimes must, be a period of supervised release to follow the offender's time in prison, 18 U.S.C. 3583(a); statutes often confer discretion on the district court, but there are instances in which they specify the required duration or range. Those rules, however, pertain to the initial sentence. The picture is different for a person who has completed his term of incarceration, has begun serving supervised release, and violates the conditions of his supervised release. If his probation officer moves for revocation of supervised release, a term of supervised release that was mandatory for initial sentencing does not remain a mandatory part of any new sentence after revocation. Revocation operates under different rules. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

Retirement System contends that Zebra defrauded investors by making bad predictions during a corporate consolidation with a division of Motorola. The consolidation proved more onerous than anticipated, leading to expenditure of an additional $200 million and a decline in Zebra’s share price. A purported class action under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), asserted that Zebra CEO Gustafsson and CFO Smiley duped investors by knowingly issuing false statements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Retirement System failed to state an adequate section 10(b) claim and did not satisfy the pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The Securities Act does not impose a duty of total corporate transparency; nor does the Act demand perfection from forecasts, which are inevitably inaccurate. Some cited statements were non-specific puffery. The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference” that defendants spoke with intent to deceive (scienter), 15 U.S.C. 78u–4(b)(2)(A). Executives possess only limited information about the internal operations of other corporations. Gustafsson and Smiley would have known comparatively little about Motorola’s operations until consolidation was underway. While retrospective statements are held to a higher standard Retirement System challenged only statements made before or during integration. View "City of Taylor Police and Fire v. Zebra Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

Bilek received unauthorized robocalls concerning health insurance that allegedly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Illinois Automatic Telephone Dialing Act (47 U.S.C. 227; 815 ILCS 305/30(a)(b)). Bilek sued on a vicarious liability theory, claiming that Federal contracted with Innovations to sell its insurance; Innovations hired lead generators to effectuate telemarketing; and the lead generators made the unauthorized robocalls that form the basis of Bilek’s claims. Bilek cited three agency theories: actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Bilek’s complaint. Expressing no view on whether Bilek will ultimately succeed in proving an agency relationship between the lead generators and either Federal or Innovations, the court concluded that Bilek alleged enough at the pleading stage for his complaint to move forward. Bilek alleges more than a barebones contractual relationship, and did enough to plead that the lead generators acted with Federal’s actual authority. Bilek alleged that Federal authorized the lead generators, through Innovations, to use its approved scripts, tradename, and proprietary information to solicit and advertise its insurance; Bilek received a robocall, and after pressing 1, he spoke to a lead generator who used this proprietary information to quote Federal’s insurance. View "Bilek v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Zylstras purchased their RV from a non-party dealership for $91,559.15. A one-year warranty covered portions of the RV manufactured by DRV. “Written notice of defects subject to warranty coverage must be given to the selling dealer or DRV … within 30 days after the defect is discovered.” The owner is required to take the RV to the selling dealer or factory for repair. Each DRV vehicle is custom-built for the purchaser. The Zylstras took the vehicle in for punch-list items and for warranty repairs. During a subsequent long trip, Zylstra discovered that the black waste tank valve was leaking and that sewage had been leaking into the insulation throughout the RV's underbelly. He could not find a DRV authorized dealer but an independent mobile technician came and completed the repair. After the leak, the Zylstras stopped using the RV out of concern for their health. They contend that it is not, and never has been, fit for its ordinary purpose of recreational use.They filed a complaint alleging breach of express and implied warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), and violation of state consumer protection laws. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of DRV. Even in the light most favorable to the Zylstras, DRV never had a reasonable opportunity to repair the defects as required under the warranty. View "Zylstra v. DRV, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a) generally requires that covered workers be paid extra for overtime work, but it exempts from that requirement some retail and service employees who are paid bona fide commissions. Brex auto repair technicians claimed that Brex’s complex payment plan is not a true commission so that under the Act they are paid hourly wages and are entitled to overtime pay. To arrive at a technician’s take-home pay, “Brex starts with the total cost charged to customers for each technician’s weekly repairs and applies a series of divisions, multiplications, and additions, some of which are redundant.” The hourly wage has a floor that applies even if the mechanic’s hourly production is anemic during a particular pay period, which is one and a half times the applicable state minimum wage, rounded up. The alternative wage floor is triggered in only 16 percent of paychecks; 84 percent of Brex paychecks are paid on the commission scale.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Brex based on the bonafide commission exemption. Undisputed evidence showed that there was substantial hourly and weekly variation in pay and that the guarantees are “computed in accordance with a bona fide commission payment plan or formula under which the computed commissions vary in accordance with the employee’s performance on the job.” View "Reed v. Brex Inc." on Justia Law

Fredrickson spent time at several Illinois penal institutions, where he received services to manage his serious mental health problems, which included anxiety, depression, and the effects of long-term drug dependence. While in custody at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center, he died by suicide.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of Fredrickson’s Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to his risk of harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Individual defendants (a social worker and a corrections officer) may have been negligent but there was no evidence that they were subjectively aware that Fredrickson was experiencing a mental health crisis and at risk of suicide. Wexford (the provider of prison health services) employees could have done more to ensure better continuity of care for Frederickson, as he transferred across three facilities but there was not sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to find “systemic and gross deficiencies” in Wexford’s procedures or lack thereof. View "Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Evans approached his girlfriend’s house after a fight with While. White appeared with a loaded gun, raised the gun, and tried to strike Evans. Evans blocked the blow, but the gun fired. The bullet struck Evans in the abdomen and grazed the leg of Evans’s girlfriend. White was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). White’s criminal history included 12 previous Illinois convictions, including delivery of crack cocaine (2003), attempted armed robbery (2004), aggravated fleeing (2007), and delivery of crack cocaine near a church (2008). The district court designated White as an armed career criminal, subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on his three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense”: the 2008 drug delivery, the attempted armed robbery, and the aggravated fleeing.The Seventh Circuit rejected his 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenge to his 30-year sentence. The sentencing court relied on a previous conviction that no longer supports the enhancement. For that inapplicable conviction, the district court substituted the 2003 cocaine delivery. Reasonable jurists may debate whether a court may substitute one predicate conviction for another for a sentencing enhancement and whether an Illinois cocaine conviction may serve as a predicate offense. White’s petition fails, nonetheless. He had fair notice that the substitute conviction could be used as a predicate offense; waiver and procedural default also foreclose his challenge. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

Robl, an unlicensed and uninsured asbestos abatement contractor, undertook asbestos removal and disposal in Minnesota and Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud for falsely holding himself out as a licensed and insured asbestos abatement contractor and to knowingly releasing asbestos into the ambient air by burning asbestos-containing material in burn piles and in burn barrels at his home. The district court sentenced Robl to 144 months in prison and entered judgment, noting that it had not yet determined a restitution amount. At Robl’s request, the court canceled the initial restitution hearing until after the disposition of his pending direct appeal. Robl dismissed his initial appeal with prejudice.The district court then set a new restitution hearing. After a telephonic status hearing, at which Robl was not present but was represented by counsel, the hearing was again canceled. The district court subsequently ordered restitution of $94,031.41. Robl challenged the court’s jurisdiction to order restitution and the award amount and argued that the court denied him his rights to be present and to speak as guaranteed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 43(a) and 32(i)(4). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had jurisdiction under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A to enter the order and committed no error in adjudicating the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Robl" on Justia Law