Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In 1996, Boim, age 17, was shot and killed by Hamas terrorists while studying abroad in Israel. His parents sued several American nonprofit organizations for their role in funding Hamas and secured a $156 million judgment under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a). Those organizations then shut down, leaving the Boims mostly unable to collect. In 2017, they filed a new lawsuit against two different American entities and three individuals, alleging that these new defendants are alter egos of the now-defunct nonprofit organizations, liable for the remainder of the $156 million judgment. The district court allowed limited jurisdictional discovery, decided the new entities and individuals were not alter egos of the defunct nonprofits, and then dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The district court’s finding on the alter ego question constituted a merits determination that went beyond a proper jurisdictional inquiry. Because the Boims’ new lawsuit arises under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the district court possessed federal jurisdiction and should have allowed the case to proceed on the merits, consistent with the ordinary course of civil litigation. View "Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine" on Justia Law

In 1937-2006, Johnson operated a Goshen, Indiana manufacturing plant that used chlorinated volatile organic compounds in a degreasing process. Some of the chemicals reached the groundwater. TCE, a carcinogen, is part of the breakdown process. Johnson, under the supervision of Indiana’s Department of Environmental Management, began cleanup while the plant was still operating, ensuring that houses using wells were connected to the city’s water mains, pumping and treating groundwater, and determining that the municipal water supply did not come from the contaminated plume. TCE did appear in the air above the plume, so houses were treated to prevent the gas from entering.Plaintiffs sued under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a), The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Johnson, finding that Johnson was not in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, prohibition, or order. The risk from the TCE is currently neither imminent nor substantial. View "Schmucker v. Johnson Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as it applies to offenders who have relocated to Indiana from other states. A 2006 SORA amendment applied its requirements to any “person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” Indiana does not require any person to register if the offense occurred prior to SORA, provided that person remains a resident of Indiana. Under the amendment, persons with pre-SORA convictions who relocate to Indiana from another state where registration was required must register in Indiana, even if Indiana would not have required them to register had they committed their offenses in Indiana and never left.The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. SORA does not violate the right to travel because it does not expressly discriminate based on residency, as consistently required by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs’ ex post facto claim is likewise precluded by precedent. SORA is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to surmount Indiana’s nonpunitive intent for the law. Because the district court did not address whether SORA passes rational basis scrutiny under an equal protection analysis, the court remanded for consideration of the equal protection claim. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

For years, Beltran was a high-level lieutenant in the Sinaloa Cartel drug-trafficking organization. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Beltran had never previously been arrested. Although his plea declaration referenced a single transaction involving 46 kilograms of cocaine, his lawyer agreed that Beltran was involved with the movement of hundreds of kilograms of controlled substances in multiple transactions with the sons of El Chapo.The government proposed that Beltran was responsible for more than 450 kilograms of cocaine and 10 kilograms of heroin. The probation office and the court concurred. The court applied sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm, bribery, criminal livelihood, and leader or organizer of criminal activity but rejected enhancements for the use of violence; maintaining a stash house, and obstruction of justice. From an adjusted offense level of 48, the court subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines “range” was life imprisonment. Beltran’s argued that the Mexican authorities who effected his arrest tortured him before turning him over, overriding the section 3553(a) concerns. The judge referenced an article that had not been disclosed to the parties, indicating that Mexican law enforcement suffered hundreds of deaths at the hands of drug cartels, and expressing his “personal hurt” as a person of Mexican descent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 28-year sentence, expressing “complete confidence that none of the discussed factors affected the selection of Beltran’s sentence.” View "United States v. Beltran-Leon" on Justia Law

GMC, a 15-year-old girl, ran away from her foster home and was arrested for shoplifting. She did not provide her real name or age to the police Her friend picked her up from jail, accompanied by Vines, who began prostituting GMC. He posted ads online, including on the website Backpage, and arranged for FMC to meet with customers to engage in sex acts. She gave the money paid for those acts to him. Vines was aware that GMC was a minor. GMC was taken into custody by law enforcement and was evaluated at an emergency room, where an examination determined that she had injuries “too numerous to count.” GMC told officers what had happened.Vines was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c); sex trafficking of a child, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sections 1594(c), 1591, transportation of a minor, section 2423(a); and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, section 1952(a)(3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment, with supervised release for life, and ordered to pay $13,500 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of an expert witness that related to the credibility of GMC; denying his motion to suppress GMC’s identification of Vines through a Facebook photo; and denying motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of Vines’s iPhone and of his Facebook and iCloud accounts. View "United States v. Vines" on Justia Law

A False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), “qui tam” lawsuit against SuperValu claimed that SuperValu knowingly filed false reports of its pharmacies’ “usual and customary” (U&C) drug prices when it sought reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid. SuperValu listed its retail cash prices as its U&C drug prices rather than the lower, price-matched amounts that it charged qualifying customers under its discount program. Medicaid regulations define “usual and customary price” as the price charged to the general public. The district court held that SuperValu’s discounted prices fell within the definition of U&C price and that SuperValu should have reported them but held that SuperValu did not act with scienter.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, joining other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court’s 2007 “Safeco” interpretation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s scienter provision applies with equal force to the False Claims Act’s scienter provision. There is no statutory indication that Congress meant its usage of “knowingly,” or the scienter definitions it encompasses, to bear a different meaning than its common-law definition. SuperValu did not act with the requisite knowledge. SuperValu’s interpretation of “usual and customary price” was objectively reasonable under Safeco. View "Yarberry v. Supervalu Inc." on Justia Law

Wyatt victimized six women, each of whom acted as prostitutes under Wyatt’s abusive supervision in 2011-2014. He pleaded guilty to interstate sex trafficking 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). Under 18 U.S.C. 1593, Wyatt was subject to mandatory restitution to the victims for the full amount of their losses. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. Following negotiations between the parties, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, the district court entered an order requiring Wyatt to pay $12,750 to Adult Victim 1, $45,200 to Adult Victim 3, and $37,125 to Adult Victim 5, totaling $95,075.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wyatt’s arguments that the district court improperly delayed the restitution determination, did not rely on a statutorily required “complete accounting” of the victims’ losses (and relied on improper evidence), deprived him of counsel during the restitution process, and improperly ordered restitution outside of his presence. The amount of restitution was not ascertainable on the record at the time of sentencing; the court based its determination of the amounts on materials sufficient to make a reasoned restitution award. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

Healthcare revenue cycle management contractors manage billing and behind-the-scenes aspects of patient care, from pre-registering patients to reviewing and approving documentation upon release. Reid Hospital contracted with Dell, a revenue cycle management contractor. Their contract limited both sides’ damages in a breach of contract action in the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence. Dell sold much of its portfolio to Conifer in 2012 while Dell was still losing money on the Reid contract. Conifer began reducing staff and neglecting duties; there was a slowdown throughout the revenue-management cycle and in processing patients’ discharge forms, leading to longer hospital stays that third-party payors refused to reimburse fully. After two years, Reid took its revenue operation back in-house. Reid's consultant found significant errors in Conifer’s work. Reid sued for breach of contract, claiming that Conifer’s actions caused the hospital to lose tens of millions of dollars. The court granted Conifer summary judgment, reading the contract as defining all claims for lost revenue as claims for “consequential damages,” prohibited absent “willful misconduct.”The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if lost revenue is often considered consequential, this was a contract for revenue collection services and did not define all lost revenue as an indirect result of any breach. Lost revenue would have been the direct and expected result of Conifer’s failure to collect and process that revenue as required under the contract. The parties did not intend to insulate Conifer entirely from damages. View "Reid Hospital and Health Care, Inc. v. Conifer Revenue Cycle Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Onfido provides biometric identification software that is incorporated into its customers’ products and mobile apps for verifying users’ identities. Onfido partnered with OfferUp—an online consumer marketplace—to verify users’ identities. Sosa verified his identity with OfferUp using the technology provided by Onfido—the app’s TruYou feature. To complete the verification process, Sosa uploaded a photograph of his driver’s license and a photograph of his face. Sosa alleges that Onfido then used biometric identification technology without his consent to extract his biometric identifiers and compare the two photographs.Sosa brought class action claims against Onfido under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. Onfido moved to stay the case and to compel individual arbitration based on an arbitration provision in OfferUp’s Terms of Service. The district court rejected each of Onfido’s nonparty contract enforcement theories and denied Onfido’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Onfido failed to establish that there was an outcome-determinative difference between Illinois and Washington law, and the district court properly applied Illinois law—the law of the forum state—to determine that Onfido failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of the Terms of Service or that it could otherwise enforce the contract’s arbitration provision either as an agent of OfferUp or on equitable estoppel grounds. View "Sosa v. Onfido, Inc." on Justia Law