Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Reed unsuccessfully applied for a job at PF, then filed an EEOC age discrimination charge. EEOC found the charge unsupported. Reed sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court returned Reed’s complaint, unfiled, as barred by a 2012 litigation-bar order based on Reed’s history of frivolous suits. The order provided that the court would entertain an application to lift it after two years. The EEOC’s right-to-sue letter had started a 90-day filing period. On day 46, Reed asked the court to vacate the bar order, alleging that Judge Randa, who entered the order, had been biased. A previous assertion that Judge Randa was biased had been rejected. Judge Adelman invited Reed to file an affidavit detailing his finances but the order was sent to an outdated address and was not received until after the 90-day period had expired. Two days later, Reed filed an affidavit of indigence. The judge vacated the filing bar, but denied Reed’s request for equitable tolling and dismissed the PF suit as untimely.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the bar order was of Reed’s own making, that Reed first defied the order then advanced only a frivolous argument, and that Reed could have filed suit in state court. Indigent persons are not entitled to file an endless string of frivolous suits. Reed paid nothing for seven years and forfeited the privilege of litigating in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. View "Reed v. PF of Milwaukee Midtown, LLC" on Justia Law

Mabuneza, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) entered the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee and became a lawful permanent resident in 2001. After a 2006 conviction for petit larceny and a 2016 conviction for aggravated sexual abuse, Mabuneza was placed in removal proceedings.Mabuneza applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he received refugee status because he had faced persecution as a member of the Tutsi ethnic group and that he would be targeted again if he were deported; that he would be viewed as a political dissident for being featured in Chicago Tribune articles describing his family’s experiences as refugees; that he would be detained upon return to the DRC as a traitor; and that he would be seen as a threat due to his sexual abuse conviction. Mabuneza submitted country conditions evidence showing that persons returning to the DRC may face suspicion from the police and be arrested and detained and that the Congolese government sometimes tortures detainees and prisoners for political and human rights activism.The BIA dismissed an appeal from the IJ's denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ did not make any factual or legal error in finding that Mabuneza did not face a substantial risk of torture as a recent deportee. View "Mabuneza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Pineda-Teruel is a citizen of Honduras, where he owns a coffee farm. He entered the U.S. in 2007, was removed to Honduras in 2017, reentered the U.S. in 2019, and was apprehended at the border. Pineda-Teruel applied for withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that the mafia had demanded money from him in Honduras and threatened to kill him but had killed his two cousins who were working at the farm. Pineda-Teruel said that he feared for his life.The IJ denied Pineda-Teruel’s application, finding that he failed to establish past persecution or the likelihood of future persecution if he were to relocate within Honduras and that there was no nexus between Pineda-Teruel’s fear of harm—which was due to the mafia’s belief that he had money from his time in the U.S.—and any claimed status as a member of a statutorily protected social group. The BIA dismissed Pineda-Teruel’s appeal, concluding that his past experiences in Honduras did not rise to the level of past persecution or torture and he had not established a clear probability of torture in the future given that he had successfully relocated within Honduras. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that Pineda-Teruel claimed that the men who threatened him and killed his cousins were now living in the U.S. View "Pineda-Teruel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Turnage, claiming that on September 21, 2016, he fell from an upper bunk at Cook County Jail and suffered a broken ankle, sought damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). He argued that the Jail knew that he has seizures but failed to enforce his lower-bunk permit (which had been issued to reduce his risk of falling).Federal law requires prisoners to pursue administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), prescribed by the institution. The Jail requires prisoners to file grievances within 15 days of an “incident, problem, or event” and to appeal any adverse decision. Turnage filed a grievance on September 27 and filed an immediate appeal after that grievance was denied. The district court dismissed his suit, observing that Turnage could have filed a grievance when he was forced to take an upper bunk.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal. Turnage encountered a “problem” on August 30 but he experienced an “incident” on September 21; these were separate occasions for grievances. A grievance that is timely with respect to an injury satisfies section 1997e(a) when the suit seeks damages for that injury. View "Turnage v. Dart" on Justia Law

Palladinetti and others purchased 30 Chicago-area apartment buildings and resold individual apartments as condominiums. Using a process that Palladinetti helped create, his co-defendants bought the buildings, falsely representing to lenders that they had made down payments. Palladinetti served as his co-defendants’ attorney for the purchases and sales and as the registered agent for LLCs formed to facilitate the scheme. The group recruited buyers for the condominiums and prepared their mortgage applications, misrepresenting facts to ensure they qualified for the loans.Palladinetti and his co-defendants were charged with seven counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and (2), and nine counts of making false statements on loan applications, 18 U.S.C. 1014 and 2. Count one involved a $345,000 mortgage that Palladinetti’s wife obtained for the purchase of a residence. That mortgage application was prepared using the group’s fraudulent scheme in July 2005. The government agreed to dismiss all other counts if Palladinetti were convicted on count one. Because Palladinetti stipulated to almost all elements of section 1344(1), the trial was limited to whether the bank he defrauded was insured by the FDIC when the mortgage application was submitted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The testimony and exhibits demonstrated that one entity was continuously insured, 1997-2008, that on the date the mortgage was executed that entity was “Washington Mutual Bank” and also did business as “Washington Mutual Bank, FA,” and that entity was the lender for the mortgage at issue. View "United States v. Palladinetti" on Justia Law

White, a white supremacist, is now in federal prison. His Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requests concern a conspiracy theory: that the racist movement he joined is really an elaborate government sting operation. Dissatisfied with the pace at which the FBI and Marshals Service released responsive records and their alleged failure to reveal other records, White filed suit.The court granted the agencies summary judgment and denied White’s subsequent motion seeking costs because the Marshals Service alone was delinquent in responding; the 1,500 pages held by that agency were an insubstantial piece of the litigation compared to 100,000 pages of FBI documents. The court stated that “the transparent purpose of White’s FOIA requests and lawsuit was to harass the government, not to obtain information useful to the public.” White then filed an unsuccessful motion to reconsider, arguing that the court should not render a final decision until the FBI had redacted, copied, and sent all the responsive records, which will take more than a decade. White next moved to hold the Marshals Service in contempt for telling the court in 2018 that it would soon start sending him records; by 2020 White had received nothing. The court admonished the agency but determined that no judicial order had been violated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge “carefully parsed White’s numerous and wide-ranging arguments and explained the result." View "White v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In 2019 the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin issued a permit authorizing two transmission companies and an electric cooperative to build and operate a $500 million, 100-mile power line. Environmental groups filed lawsuits in both federal and state courts, alleging that two of the three commissioners had disqualifying conflicts of interest and should have recused themselves.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the commissioners’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The commissioners were sued in their official capacities, so sovereign immunity blocks this suit in its entirety unless it falls within the Ex parte Young exception, which authorizes a federal suit against state officials for the purpose of obtaining prospective relief against an ongoing violation of federal law. The environmental groups seek an order enjoining the permit’s enforcement, prospective relief; they contend that the violation is ongoing as long as the permit remains in force and effect and the commissioners have the power to enforce, modify, or rescind it. Ex parte Young applies.The court, sua sponte, remanded with instructions to stay the case pending resolution of the state proceedings. Both cases raise materially identical due-process recusal claims. The case implicates serious state interests regarding the operation of Wisconsin administrative law and judicial review. Litigating the same questions in both court systems is duplicative and wasteful; comity and the sound administration of judicial resources warrant abstention. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq" on Justia Law

Wood served time in Indiana state prison for methamphetamine‐related offenses. He was released on parole, subject to conditions, including that he was subject to "reasonable" searches, Wood violated his parole by failing to report to his supervising officer. The Parole Board issued an arrest warrant. Agents arrested Wood at his home. Agent Gentry secured Wood with wrist restraints, conducted a frisk search, and noticed Wood repeatedly turning toward his cellphone, which was lying nearby. Gentry picked up the cellphone and handed it to Agent Rains. Wood demanded that his cellphone be turned off and began to physically resist Gentry. Rains felt something “lumpy” on the back of Wood’s cellphone, removed the back cover, and found a packet of a substance which Rains believed to be methamphetamine. Wood admitted the substance was methamphetamine. A later search of the home revealed syringes and other drug paraphernalia.Seven days after Wood’s arrest, an Indiana Department of Correction investigator performed a warrantless search of Wood’s cellphone, which revealed child pornography. The investigator forwarded the information to the FBI, which obtained a search‐and‐seizure warrant for Wood’s cellphone and its contents. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), Wood unsuccessfully moved to suppress the data extracted from his cellphone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Wood’s diminished expectation of privacy and Indiana’s strong governmental interests, the search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

Lovies, wielding a gun, stole Butler’s car as she was filling it with gasoline. Along with three other individuals, including a minor, Lovies kidnapped Butler and took her from Indianapolis to Cincinnati while threatening to kill her. The others accepted plea agreements. Lovies was convicted of kidnapping, carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), 2119, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c( and was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 388 months within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In rejecting Lovies’s Batson challenge, the district court found the prosecutors credible and their explanation for exercising the challenged peremptory strike to be plausible--that the prospective juror kept falling asleep. The court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court’s factual findings were also adequate to support the application of the sentencing enhancements for use of a minor to commit the offense, and for his role in the offense. Any error with respect to the calculation of Lovies’s Guidelines range would be harmless. View "United States v. Lovies" on Justia Law

Plunkett sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant and was charged with distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Convictions for offenses under section 841(b)(1)(C) carry a default statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. After Plunkett pleaded not guilty, the government notified the court under 21 U.S.C. 851 that Plunkett had a 2008 Illinois felony conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine and asserted that the prior conviction qualified as a predicate “felony drug offense” under 841(b)(1)(C) that subjected Plunkett to an increased statutory maximum prison term of 30 years for his federal drug offense.Plunkett’s subsequent plea agreement stated that he qualified as a career offender and that his U.S.S.G. advisory range was 188-235 months’ imprisonment. Plunkett waived his rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence, with limited exceptions. Among these, Plunkett preserved his right to seek collateral review based on any subsequent change in the interpretation of the law declared retroactive that renders him actually innocent of the charges. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Plunkett’s appeal of the denial of his section 2241 collateral attack on his 212-month sentence as barred by the appellate waiver. The court rejected Plunkett's argument that the exception to his appellate waiver refers to the applicable sentence enhancement View "Plunkett v. Sproul" on Justia Law