Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Correctional Officer Decker confiscated items from Stands Alone’s cell. Other officers later entered and removed additional items. Stands Alone was pacing, throwing clothes, and shouting. Decker ordered him to move toward the front of the unit. Instead, he returned to his cell. Decker followed him and warned that she would use pepper spray if he continued to resist. Stands Alone grabbed a fire extinguisher and lifted it to his chest; Decker deployed her pepper spray. Stands Alone discharged the fire extinguisher. Fire suppressant and pepper spray chemicals blew towards Decker, who experienced visual impairment and chemical burns. Stands Alone was charged under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), which penalizes whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with” federal correctional officers. Subsection (b) enhances the penalty for those who “inflict[] bodily injury” on the victim.Stands Alone challenged the indictment as “defective,” arguing that assault is an essential element of section 111; the indictment did not allege “assault” and instead “merely provide[d] that he resisted, intimidated and interfered with” Decker. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of that argument. The government could secure a section 111(b) conviction by demonstrating that Stands Alone forcibly committed at least one of the six acts in section 111(a)(1) against a federal officer. Stands Alone’s interpretation “runs contrary to the textual language, rendering five of the six verbs in subsection (a)(1) superfluous.” View "United States v. Stands Alone" on Justia Law

Continental’s primary insurance companies covered risks such as mass tort and pollution liability and purchased reinsurance policies from Underwriters. For over 40 years, the parties agreed on the methodology for calculating reinsurance obligations. In 2010, Continental outsourced its claims handling to Resolute, which made higher demands for payment from Underwriters under a new methodology. Underwriters objected and sought arbitration. A panel conducted a hearing and found Continental’s new methodology contrary to the parties’ established course of dealings. Concerned that the Final Award was not clear about Underwriters’ future reinsurance liability obligations, Continental asked the Panel to clarify whether the statement “Petitioners have paid the full amount due” related only to past bills or if it was meant to cover past and future billings. The Panel denied Continental’s motion for clarification but added that Underwriters had "fully and finally discharged its past, present and future obligations" for the accounts. Continental argued the award amounted to a sanction and that the Panel lacked the authority to issue sanctions or penalties.Continental then sought confirmation of the Final Award but vacatur of the subsequent Order, citing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 9–10. The district court confirmed everything. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the FAA’s narrow set of reasons that may support a court’s confirmation, vacatur, or modification of an award. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Gloria called 911 seeking medical care for her husband, Steven (age 61), who was experiencing a diabetic emergency at their Milford, Illinois home. Officer Garrett responded and restrained Steven in a prone position, face down on his bed, for several minutes. Steven vomited and lost consciousness. He did not regain consciousness before he died at a hospital 10 days later. Steven had been released from the hospital one week before the 911 call, having suffered a heart attack. Garrett had previously volunteered as an EMT for another city and had earned his certification as a paramedic. Garrett prevented Steven’s niece from giving him orange juice for his blood sugar and used a hold that inflicted pain in an effort to restrain Steven, despite the pleas of family members and Steven’s statement that he could not breathe. Garrett later testified that he believed that Steven was a danger to himself and was acting aggressively and that he did not know Steven had vomited or lost consciousness before EMTs arrived. Steven’s relatives and his treating physician explained that hypoglycemic patients may act confused, “tired[,] sluggish, lethargic,” and possibly “rowdy defensively because they don’t understand what’s going on.”In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Garrett at the summary judgment stage. View "Taylor v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law

In 2016, Chicago and the Barack Obama Foundation selected Jackson Park as the location for the Obama Presidential Center, to consist of a museum, public library, and other spaces for cultural enrichment and education related to the life and presidency of Barack Obama. The Center will occupy about 20 acres of the park and require that Chicago close several nearby roadways. The National Park Service approved the plan on the condition that Chicago expand nearby spaces for public recreation. The Federal Highway Administration approved the construction of new roadways to make up for the roadways to be closed. Those agencies together performed an environmental assessment and concluded that their decisions would have an insignificant effect on the environment and were the least damaging alternatives available; they did not consider whether Chicago could have further reduced environmental harms by building the Center elsewhere.Objectors sought to enjoin the construction of the Center. The district court denied their request for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit declined to enjoin construction pending appeal, having previously affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the constitutional claims. The opponents are unlikely to show that the agencies made a clear error in judgment when weighing the benefits of change against history; the agencies considered the full environmental impact of the Center’s construction. View "Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Molina Healthcare contracted with the Illinois Medicaid program to provide multiple tiers of medical-service plans with scaled capitation rates (fixed per-patient fees that cover all services within the plan’s scope). The Nursing Facility plan required Molina to provide Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) services. Molina subcontracted with GenMed to cover that obligation. Molina received a general capitation payment from the state, out of which it was to pay GenMed for the SNF component. Molina breached its contract with GenMed. GenMed terminated the contract. After GenMed quit, Molina continued to collect money from the state for the SNF services, but it was neither providing those services itself nor making them available through any third party. Molina never revealed this breakdown, nor did it seek a replacement service provider.Prose, the founder of GenMed, brought this qui tam action under both the state and federal False Claims Acts, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Molina submitted fraudulent claims for payments from government funds. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly alleges that as a sophisticated player in the medical-services industry, Molina was aware that these kinds of nursing facility services play a material role in the delivery of Medicaid benefits. View "Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois," on Justia Law

In 2016, Wisconsin charged Carter with drug and firearm offenses. Mid-trial, Carter pleaded guilty to heroin and firearm charges; the state agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. The prosecutor backtracked at sentencing. The court sentenced Carter to nine years’ imprisonment in July 2017. Carter sought to appeal his sentence, contending that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing and that the court imposed the sentence based on inaccurate information. In Wisconsin, a defendant must file, within 20 days of sentencing, a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief. Carter filed such a notice five days after sentencing. The public defender’s office assigned him counsel but the clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts, a step that should have been completed within 60 days. Carter’s counsel successfully filed a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. Over four years Carter had three different public defenders and 14 extension requests by counsel and the court without a ruling on the merits.Carter filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the petition. The “extreme and tragic” delay experienced by Carter excuses him from otherwise applicable statutory exhaustion requirements and shows that Wisconsin’s appellate process, at least with respect to Carter, is ineffective to protect rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. View "Carter v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Smith reportedly left a fight and returned with a gun. After a citizen complained, two Milwaukee police officers on patrol came upon Smith and saw that he matched the description relayed by dispatch. When the officers approached Smith, he fled. The officers followed, believing Smith was armed. Smith was found hiding on a rooftop one block away. When the pursuing officers discovered him, an intense and dangerous standoff took place. After Smith refused numerous orders to cooperate, two other officers (defendants) approached Smith, and believing he was armed, drew their guns. The officers thought Smith was reaching behind an air conditioning unit for a gun; Smith said he was responding to an earlier command to get down on the ground. The defendants shot Smith three times. He survived with serious injuries. Video from the officers’ body cameras captured these events.Smith sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers’ motion, seeking summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Some of the circumstances weighed in favor of the police using deadly force to seize Smith, but in the short time frame before and when the officers shot Smith, factual disputes exist about how much of a threat Smith posed and how actively he was resisting. The qualified immunity decision cannot be separated from those factual disputes. View "Smith v. Finkley" on Justia Law

Chicago requires its police officers to seize, inventory, and store property belonging to an arrested person if that property is not permitted in the Cook County Jail. After 30 days, any property unclaimed by the owner or her authorized representative is deemed abandoned and is sold or destroyed. The plaintiffs brought a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Chicago’s right to seize and inventory the property upon arrest is not at issue and the plaintiffs do not contend that municipalities are not permitted to manage the seized property. The plaintiffs alleged that the notice Chicago furnished was not adequate to alert them to the fact that the police would destroy their personal property if they did not claim it within 30 days.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Chicago did not seize the plaintiffs’ property with an intent to keep it permanently; its motive for the seizures related to safety at the jail, not punishment, The 30-day limit reflected the practical constraints on storage capacity. The detainee knows exactly what has been taken from him and when that confiscation occurred and is told both how to get his property back and how quickly he must do so. The plaintiffs did not show that they were unable to find out the details of the property-recovery process that were disclosed on the police webpage. View "Conyers v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Married since 1967, John and Frances Rogers filed joint federal income tax returns for many years. They underreported their tax obligations many times; the misreporting was the product of a fraudulent tax scheme designed by John, a Harvard‐trained tax attorney. The Seventh Circuit has affirmed the Tax Court’s rulings in favor of the IRS every time.Frances challenged two Tax Court decisions denying her “innocent spouse relief,” 26 U.S.C. 6015. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, having previously affirmed the denial of Frances’s request for innocent spouse relief for the 2004 tax year. The Tax Court took considerable care assessing Frances’s claims, denying them largely on the basis that she was aware of too many facts and too many warning signs during the relevant tax years to escape financial responsibility for the clear fraud perpetrated on the U.S. Treasury. The Tax Court applied the correct standard, with the possible exception of one factual error in its 2018 opinion regarding the couple’s lavish lifestyle but any error was harmless. Frances holds a master’s degree in biochemistry, a law degree, an M.B.A., and a doctorate in education. She assisted in managing her husband’s law firm while he sought treatment for alcoholism; she fired the office manager, maintained accounting records, endorsed and deposited checks, and paid expenses. View "Rogers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law