Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Moore, an Indiana-based insurance broker, advised Mathis, an Alabama surgeon, to replace his Standard disability insurance policy with a MetLife disability-insurance policy with higher limits that had occupational disability coverage, like the Standard policy. The MetLife policy did not actually provide occupational disability coverage but provided total disability coverage only if Mathis was not gainfully employed and provided residual disability coverage only under various limitations. Mathis became disabled in 2017. Neck and arm problems prevented him from performing some of his duties. He underwent surgery but could no longer work at his usual level; his income decreased. He left his practice in March 2018 and began working for a device manufacturer in a nonsurgical capacity. MetLife paid Mathis residual disability benefits, April-August 2017, then determined he was not entitled to residual disability benefits. The policy lapsed.Mathis sued Moore and Source Brokerage for negligent procurement and brought a breach of contract claim against MetLife. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, applying Alabama law, rather than Indiana law. Mathis’s contributory negligence in failing to read the new policy and the Alabama statute of limitations barred the negligence claims. The court rejected the contract claim because Mathis failed to comply with his contractual obligation to submit proof of loss for any period after September 2017. View "Mathis v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law

A store employee overheard his coworker talking with Matthews about a pipe bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they discussed where to place another bomb that Matthews apparently had with him. Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and told Sergeant Becherer that Matthews was a frequent customer and that he knew Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 with a silencer, lived in a trailer behind “the old Fin & Feather Restaurant,” worked on cars in the shed, and had “free reign of the property.” Someone living near the restaurant had called the Sheriff's Office about an explosion. Matthews’s social media posts showed that he possessed explosives. Nothing in the warrant complaint or affidavit explained why Becherer or the State’s Attorney believed Matthews had access to all structures and buildings. The judge heard their testimony and signed the warrant covering all buildings and structures on the former restaurant property. An hour later, a team searched the property and found multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive materials.Matthews, present during the search, was charged with possessing a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to suppress. An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney in preparing the complaint and affidavit, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant, which, although incomplete, was not utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

FKFJ was established to operate Saraya Restaurant & Banquet and Zaman Café in Worth, Illinois. Werner, the Village President at the time, decided to run for reelection the year Saraya opened. FKFJ supported Werner’s political opponent in the election. Around the same time, FKFJ had various disputes with the Village of Worth.FKFJ filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and due process violations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “tapestry of colorful factual threads.” Whatever occurred between FKFJ and the Village, FKFJ has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the disputes are of constitutional import. FKFJ has not presented sufficient argument about any similarly situated entities and cannot satisfy the rational basis prong of a class-of-one equal protection claim. FKFJ had a mere unilateral expectation its license would be renewed. FkFJ failed to establish causation between the protected activity and adverse action for its First Amendment claim. View "FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth" on Justia Law

Hopper was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846, and 841(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced Hopper to 235 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court had committed plain error in the calculation of the drug quantity for which Hopper was responsible. The district court ordered a revised presentence report, which reduced to 1.17 kilograms the amount of “ice” methamphetamine for which Hopper was responsible and assessed an additional criminal history point for a state burglary conviction, the plea for which was entered after the original federal sentencing but before the remand. Hopper submitted a pro se objection, arguing that a jury, not the court, should make the determination that the drugs at issue qualified as “ice” under the Sentencing Guidelines. He did not object to the additional criminal history point. The court rejected his challenge, reasoning that the issue of drug type, as opposed to drug quantity, already had been decided in the first appeal. The court reimposed a sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Hopper’s arguments that the district court committed plain error in both the determination of the drug type and in the assessment of the additional criminal history point for the state burglary conviction. The earlier remand order did not permit reconsideration of Hopper’s argument about the drug type. View "United States v. Hopper" on Justia Law

Andrade owns a Hammond, Indiana apartment building. Hammond inspected and issued a notice that the building was unsafe. After a hearing, the Hammond Board of Public Works ruled in favor of Hammond. The Lake Superior Court reversed because Andrade did not have proper notice of the hearing. A year later, Hammond re-inspected and issued a new notice. The Board scheduled another hearing. Andrade received proper notice; he served the Chief of Inspection a subpoena requesting that he bring to the hearing all “regulations, ordinances, and/or statutes” that the Chief relied upon during the first hearing. Hammond did not comply with the subpoena. The Board ordered Andrade to remedy the unsafe conditions. The Lake Superior Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed; the Indiana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.Andrade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging that the defendants violated and conspired to violate Andrade’s due-process rights by making “intentional false representations of opinion testimony” before the Board, “fail[ing] to comply with a lawfully-issued subpoena without justification,” and pursuing an “unannounced policy to deny subsidized residential units in more desirable neighborhoods.” The district court dismissed Andrade’s complaint, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; appellate review of state-court judgments is reserved exclusively to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Andrade’s claims concern the defendants’ actions separate from any state-court judgment. View "Andrade v. Hammond Board of Public Works" on Justia Law

Inmate Ebmeyer alleged that when the Illinois Department of Corrections Special Operations Response Team, “Orange Crush” performed a facility-wide shakedown, they subjected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and excessive force, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. 1983. He asserted that an unidentified “John Doe” placed him in extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries; Sergeant Oelberg struck him with a baton, squeezed his testicles, and forced him to stand handcuffed and facing a wall in a stress position for more than three hours; and prison officials Yurkovich and Akpore promulgated policies that encouraged the challenged unconstitutional conduct.The court granted summary judgment in favor of Yurkovich, Akpore, and Oelberg for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. After Ebmeyer identified the unnamed defendant as Adam Brock, the court became aware that Ebmeyer had known from the beginning that John Doe’s first name was “Adam,” and issued an Order to Show Cause why it should not dismiss the case with prejudice for Ebmeyer’s failure to disclose that information sooner. The court rejected Ebmeyer’s ensuing explanation and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Brock but otherwise affirmed. Ebmeyer did not establish that the grievance process was unavailable. The court failed to make the necessary findings to support the dismissal sanction. View "Ebmeyer v. Brock" on Justia Law

In 2011-2013, rather than retiring many older semi-tractors and purchasing all new replacements, Schneider bought 61 new tractors, and overhauled 982 existing tractors using new and refurbished parts packaged together in “glider kits.” Schneider’s older tractors were lighter and realized better fuel economy than newer models. Schneider’s tax advisors counseled that Schneider would have to pay the 12% excise tax (26 U.S.C. 4051) if it bought new tractors but a “safe harbor” (4052) permits companies to repair or modify tractors they already own, which have already been taxed. Each glider kit contained a cab, chassis, radiator, front axle, front suspension, front wheels, front tires, front brakes, brake system, and trailer connections; 912 were “powered glider kits” and included a remanufactured engine. The transmission, driveline, rear axle, rear suspension, and rear-wheel hubs—and sometimes the fuel tank, fifth wheel, and rear brakes, were generally reused.The IRS concluded that only six tractors qualified for the safe harbor. Schneider paid $9,387,403.73 plus interest, thensought a refund, which the IRS denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed. That Schneider elected to refurbish its tractors using powered glider kits does not disqualify those tractors from the safe harbor, which does not contemplate any measurement apart from this 75% test. The court remanded for a determination of whether the cost of Schneider’s refurbishments exceeded 75% of the “retail price of a comparable new article.” View "Schneider National Leasing Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

Stark had surgery in 2007 to implant a pelvic mesh device. The surgery was not successful, and she had follow-up surgeries that also were not successful. In 2018, she learned for the first time that her problems with the pelvic mesh device might have resulted from a defect in the product itself. She consulted a lawyer and later that year filed this suit against the manufacturer. The district court concluded that Stark should have realized much earlier that the product might have been defective and granted summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations began to run only when Stark should have realized that her mesh-related complications might have been wrongfully caused by another person. As a general rule, the failure of a medical procedure or product to cure a patient does not necessarily signal that anyone acted wrongfully, particularly when the patient experiences known complications that do not necessarily result from tortious actions. In addition here, Stark’s medical history included Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, which two of her doctors told her could explain her continued problems. The combination of that general principle and her specific circumstances could allow a reasonable jury to decide that this suit was timely. View "Stark v. Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Correctional Officer Decker confiscated items from Stands Alone’s cell. Other officers later entered and removed additional items. Stands Alone was pacing, throwing clothes, and shouting. Decker ordered him to move toward the front of the unit. Instead, he returned to his cell. Decker followed him and warned that she would use pepper spray if he continued to resist. Stands Alone grabbed a fire extinguisher and lifted it to his chest; Decker deployed her pepper spray. Stands Alone discharged the fire extinguisher. Fire suppressant and pepper spray chemicals blew towards Decker, who experienced visual impairment and chemical burns. Stands Alone was charged under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), which penalizes whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with” federal correctional officers. Subsection (b) enhances the penalty for those who “inflict[] bodily injury” on the victim.Stands Alone challenged the indictment as “defective,” arguing that assault is an essential element of section 111; the indictment did not allege “assault” and instead “merely provide[d] that he resisted, intimidated and interfered with” Decker. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of that argument. The government could secure a section 111(b) conviction by demonstrating that Stands Alone forcibly committed at least one of the six acts in section 111(a)(1) against a federal officer. Stands Alone’s interpretation “runs contrary to the textual language, rendering five of the six verbs in subsection (a)(1) superfluous.” View "United States v. Stands Alone" on Justia Law

Continental’s primary insurance companies covered risks such as mass tort and pollution liability and purchased reinsurance policies from Underwriters. For over 40 years, the parties agreed on the methodology for calculating reinsurance obligations. In 2010, Continental outsourced its claims handling to Resolute, which made higher demands for payment from Underwriters under a new methodology. Underwriters objected and sought arbitration. A panel conducted a hearing and found Continental’s new methodology contrary to the parties’ established course of dealings. Concerned that the Final Award was not clear about Underwriters’ future reinsurance liability obligations, Continental asked the Panel to clarify whether the statement “Petitioners have paid the full amount due” related only to past bills or if it was meant to cover past and future billings. The Panel denied Continental’s motion for clarification but added that Underwriters had "fully and finally discharged its past, present and future obligations" for the accounts. Continental argued the award amounted to a sanction and that the Panel lacked the authority to issue sanctions or penalties.Continental then sought confirmation of the Final Award but vacatur of the subsequent Order, citing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 9–10. The district court confirmed everything. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the FAA’s narrow set of reasons that may support a court’s confirmation, vacatur, or modification of an award. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law