Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stanford Clacks, an African American truck driver, was employed by Kwik Trip, Inc. and experienced racial harassment from fellow employees. During his training, Clacks was harassed by two trainers, Tom Roerkohl and Brett Nechkash, who used racial epithets and made derogatory remarks. Clacks reported these incidents to his supervisor, Sean Clements, but did not initially specify the racial nature of the harassment. After completing his training, Clacks continued to face sporadic racial harassment, including receiving a racially charged note from Nechkash. Clacks went on voluntary pandemic leave in March 2020 and later reported the harassment to Kwik Trip’s Human Resources department, prompting an investigation that led to the termination of the offending employees. Kwik Trip offered Clacks his job back or a severance package, both of which he declined.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of Kwik Trip on all claims. The court applied the sham-affidavit rule to exclude parts of an affidavit Clacks submitted in opposition to summary judgment, finding it contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. The court found that Clacks did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims of a hostile work environment and retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the sham-affidavit rule and that Clacks did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims. Specifically, the court found that Kwik Trip took reasonable steps to address the harassment once it was reported and that Clacks did not suffer an adverse employment action as he was offered his job back. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Kwik Trip liable for a hostile work environment or retaliation. View "Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Incorporated" on Justia Law

A former immigration attorney was convicted of conspiring with clients, interpreters, and employees to defraud the U.S. by submitting fabricated asylum applications. The attorney would create false stories for clients, often including fabricated details of persecution, and submit these to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Interpreters assisted by coaching clients to memorize false information and providing fraudulent translations during asylum interviews. Nine former clients testified against the attorney, and the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to defraud the U.S.The attorney's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming undisclosed benefits were provided to witnesses. The district court authorized broad discovery, held a weeklong hearing, and denied the motion. The court found that undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that post-trial benefits did not violate the attorney's rights as they were not promised to witnesses and would not have affected the trial's outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that the post-trial assistance provided to witnesses did not constitute a Brady violation. The court found no evidence of pre-trial promises regarding immigration status and concluded that the undisclosed availability of an "insider" for post-trial assistance was not material to the trial's outcome. The attorney's § 2255 motion was denied. View "Dekelaita v. USA" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old, Donnell Wilson, was convicted of two murders, armed robbery, and criminal gang activity in Gary, Indiana. Wilson and his accomplice, Jonte Crawford, harassed and robbed a teenager before encountering and fatally shooting two brothers affiliated with a rival gang. Wilson was sentenced to 183 years in prison, which was later reduced to 181 years on appeal due to a vacated gang activity conviction.Wilson sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Indiana Supreme Court found his trial counsel effective but agreed his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The court then reduced Wilson’s sentence to 100 years, considering his youth as a mitigating factor.Wilson filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing his 100-year sentence was a de facto life sentence violating the Eighth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found the petition timely but denied relief, stating no clearly established law extended Miller to de facto life sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing the petition was timely but holding that the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Miller’s protections did not extend to Wilson’s 100-year sentence, thus affirming the denial of his habeas petition. View "Wilson v. Neal" on Justia Law

Scott Carlberg was convicted by a jury of four counts of wire fraud for fraudulently obtaining disability benefits from the United States Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Carlberg, who had suffered a traumatic brain injury while working at Soo Line Railroad, applied for occupational disability benefits in 2013 and later for enhanced benefits in 2015. The RRB requires applicants to disclose any non-railroad work and earnings, which Carlberg failed to do accurately. Despite purchasing and operating a tanning salon, Carlberg misrepresented his work activities to the RRB, leading to his prosecution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carlberg’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, which argued that the evidence did not show he intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud or made material misrepresentations. The court found sufficient evidence that Carlberg had concealed his ownership and involvement in the salon, and that his misrepresentations were material to the RRB’s decision to grant him benefits. Carlberg was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $279,655.22 in restitution, representing the full value of the benefits he received.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Carlberg’s appeal, which challenged both the denial of his motion for acquittal and the restitution award. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, as it showed Carlberg engaged in significant physical and mental duties at the salon, which would have disqualified him from receiving benefits. The court also upheld the restitution award, agreeing that the government had proven the full amount of benefits Carlberg received was ill-gotten. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "United States v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

Dijon Foston pleaded guilty to four charges: conspiracy to engage in racketeering, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug offense. The prosecutor dismissed two other charges. Foston was sentenced to a total of 203 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. The sentence was favorable compared to the Sentencing Guidelines range of 262 months.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois accepted Foston's guilty plea. Foston did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, so his appeal depended on showing that accepting the plea was plain error. He argued that the district judge did not properly inform him of the nature of the racketeering charge during the plea colloquy, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Foston was aware of the elements of the racketeering charge before pleading guilty, as the prosecutor described them in open court and Foston submitted a written declaration of his activities. The court noted an internal disagreement within the Seventh Circuit regarding whether a RICO conspiracy requires an agreement to assist enterprise leaders, but concluded that any error by the district judge was not "plain" due to this conflict. Additionally, the court found no prejudice to Foston, as his sentence would not change even if he were acquitted of the RICO charge. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Foston" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as charged. RiverStone appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, stating that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusions. The court agreed that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of the hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court also upheld the NLRB’s decision that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member, as the company followed its disciplinary policy. The court denied both RiverStone and Local 150’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. Additionally, the court denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ’s finding that RiverStone unlawfully disciplined and discharged the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court agreed with the NLRB that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "Grove v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security served Pilar Sandoval Reynoso with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for unlawfully residing in the United States. Sandoval applied for cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, concluding that he did not establish ten years of continuous physical presence, did not show that his qualifying relative children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial, including the discretionary finding.The IJ found that Sandoval had not established ten years of continuous physical presence and had not shown that his children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also determined that Sandoval did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion due to his history of criminal and civil infractions, including multiple illegal entries into the U.S. and a DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Sandoval did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The court also lacked jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s review of the IJ’s decision. Consequently, the court dismissed Sandoval’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder of his petition. View "Sandoval Reynoso v. Garland" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward's presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy and would have disciplined the employee regardless of his union activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB and its counsel, finding that the Board’s waiver argument had a plausible legal and factual basis. View "National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150" on Justia Law

Jonathan Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court. At sentencing, the district court applied two recidivist enhancements based on his 2008 Illinois conviction for aggravated robbery, classifying it as a "crime of violence" and a "serious violent felony." Smith argued that his prior conviction should not qualify as a predicate offense for these enhancements because Illinois law did not require the intentional use of force for an aggravated robbery conviction.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois disagreed with Smith, relying on the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Chagoya-Morales, which held that an Illinois aggravated robbery conviction involves the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." The district court followed this precedent and sentenced Smith to 120 months in prison. Smith appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether the Illinois aggravated robbery statute, under which Smith was convicted, required the use of force directed at another person. The court found that Illinois law necessitated the use of force or the threat of force to deprive someone of property, aligning with the federal definitions of "serious violent felony" and "crime of violence." The court also considered Smith's arguments regarding the applicability of recklessness and the lack of a specific intent requirement but found them unpersuasive. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held that Smith's 2008 conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the sentence enhancements and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law