Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ATC purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy from Westchester, which provided coverage against liability incurred because of “advertising,” a defined term that included trade dress infringement. BizBox sued ATC for breach of contract and interference with its business expectancies, alleging that ATC manufactured and sold a knock-off trailer using BizBox’s design. ATC sought a declaratory judgment that Westchester owed it a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. Westchester argued that BizBox’s underlying suit was not covered under the insurance policy because BizBox did not allege, in that litigation, an infringement of its trade dress in ATC’s advertising.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. BizBox’s complaint never alleged a trade dress infringement claim against ATC nor an advertising injury and could not be construed to plausibly allege a trade dress infringement claim against ATC. BizBox alleged no facts that can plausibly be construed to show that it asserted that an advertising injury occurred. Westchester, therefore, has no duty to defend or indemnify ATC under the “personal and advertising injury” provision of the Policy. View "Aluminum Trailer Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co" on Justia Law

In 2017, Freydin, a Chicago lawyer, posed a question on Facebook: “Did Trump put Ukraine on the travel ban list?! We just cannot find a cleaning lady!” After receiving online criticism for the comment, Freydin doubled down. People angered by Freydin’s comments went to his law firm’s Facebook, Yelp, and Google pages and left reviews that expressed their negative views of Freydin. Various defendants made comments including: An “embarrassment and a disgrace to the US judicial system,” “unethical and derogatory,” “hypocrite,” “chauvinist,” “racist,” “no right to practice law,” “not professional,” “discriminates [against] other nationalities,” do not “waste your money.,” “Freydin is biased and unprofessional attorney,” “terrible experience,” “awful customer service,” “disrespect[],” and “unprofessional[ism].” None of the defendants had previously used Freydin’s legal services.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Freydin’s suit, which alleged libel per se, “false light,” tortious interference with contractual relationships, tortious interference with prospective business relationships, and civil conspiracy. None of the reviews contained statements that are actionable as libel per se under Illinois law; each was an expression of opinion that could not support a libel claim. Freyding did not link the civil conspiracy claims to an independently viable tort claim. View "Law Offices of David Freyd v. Chamara" on Justia Law

In 2004, Johnson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on his prior convictions, the district court found that he qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him to 275 months in prison. The 2015 Supreme Court “Johnson “ decision held that the so‐called “residual clause” of the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Johnson moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was based on the ACCA’s now‐defunct residual clause.The district court denied his motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding, Johnson’s sentence is proper if he has at least three prior convictions that qualify for enhancement under the provisions of the ACCA which that decision left undisturbed: the “violent felony” and “serious drug offense” provisions. Johnson does have at least three such convictions. He did not challenge that his prior drug and burglary convictions qualified as ACCA predicates; Indiana’s criminal deviate conduct offense is divisible and that the forcible compulsion variety of that offense requires sufficient force and intent to qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The court did not address an escape conviction. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Gooch alleged that correctional officers Young and Wilson falsely informed another inmate that Gooch had stolen from him and directed the inmate to “take action”; the inmate then attacked Gooch with a weapon. When Gooch defended himself, Wilson intervened and instructed Gooch to lie on the floor, where the inmate attacked him again. Gooch asked his correctional counselor for the form on which to file a grievance against the officers. Gooch asserts that his counselor refused to give him the form, stating “you better watch out snitching on staff.” Over the next two days, “multiple guards” walked by his cell, calling him a “rat” and making threats.Three days later, Gooch filed a “Bivens action,” which was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. Exhaustion is not required when the responsible prison officials refuse to give a prisoner the necessary grievance form or thwart a prisoner from filing a grievance through threats or intimidation. Gooch attested that he feared for his life if he continued with the administrative-remedy process. The government did not contest his assertion and failed to meet its burden of showing that remedies were “available” to Gooch. View "Gooch v. Young" on Justia Law

Dai, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa in 2010. She later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis of religious persecution. Following a merits hearing, an immigration judge denied relief, finding that Dai was not credible and that her evidence failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. Dai acknowledged discrepancies in her testimony concerning how long she had been practicing her faith and her encounters with the police; she did not provide corroborative evidence. View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law

Osmani fled the Kosovo War and was admitted to the U.S as a refugee in 1999. Osmani was convicted for possession of illegal narcotics in 2019. The government sought to remove Osmani based on a prior conviction for aggravated felony theft, commission of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, and his narcotics conviction. Osmani sought adjustment of status to legal permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1159(a). The bases of inadmissibility may be waived for refugees, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II) “for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” Osmani claimed he had no ties or documentation linking him to Kosovo, would be unable to support himself if removed, and was a member of a persecuted ethnic minority. The government took no position on Osmani’s applications.The IJ granted Osmani an adjustment and waiver, citing Osmani’s relationship with his family and childhood PTSD. Although Osmani submitted documents describing current conditions in Kosovo, the IJ did not address that issue. The BIA agreed that Osmani’s family ties were insufficient to justify waiver and the balance of equities disfavored Osmani, then declined to remand to the IJ to supplement the record, including on conditions in Kosovo. Osmani was removed. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA legally erred by considering arguments the government did not present to the IJ, put Osmani on notice of, or develop any record evidence to support. In declining to remand, the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding. View "Osmani v. Garland" on Justia Law

A felony defendant normally must be present in the courtroom at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(3). The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 134 Stat. 281, permits district courts to conduct felony plea and sentencing proceedings by videoconference if the defendant consents and the judge finds “for specific reasons” that the sentencing “cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice,” In March 2020, just before the CARES Act was adopted, Coffin pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Sentencing was postponed several times.Coffin eventually consented to a sentencing hearing by videoconference under the Act. The district judge confirmed Coffin’s consent on the record and found that further delay would seriously harm the interests of justice, noting several reasons why that was so. The judge asked if there were any objections to his findings. Coffin’s attorney said, “No, thank you.” The judge imposed 60-month concurrent sentences. The Seventh Circuit rejected Coffin’s challenges to the judge’s CARES Act findings as “far too late.” He expressly consented to the videoconference sentencing and confirmed that he had no objection to the judge’s findings under the Act. “That’s a waiver.” View "United States v. Coffin" on Justia Law

Detectives Roseman and Hunt stopped Goodwill for a window tint violation. After asking Goodwill to sit in the squad car, Roseman began the paperwork while both detectives asked Goodwill questions. A canine unit arrived minutes later, before Roseman finished the warning form. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search revealed two kilograms of cocaine. Goodwill, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers unlawfully prolonged the search by asking unrelated questions and conducted the dog sniff without his consent.The district court found that the questioning did not extend the stop and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Roseman needed to check the driver’s license and vehicle information—which involved typing in the motorist’s name and date of birth or driver’s license number plus the vehicle’s registration information—then complete, by hand, the warning—which included the date, time, vehicle information, driver’s information, and the location. Roseman’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the traffic-stop video indicated that he worked expeditiously. Roseman worked on the ticket continuously without any breaks. An officer does not need a driver’s consent to conduct a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop, if it does not prolong the stop. View "United States v. Goodwill" on Justia Law

Kaminski, a Polish-American woman in her fifties, worked for Elite, a temporary employment agency, for about two-and-a-half years. When assigned to a job, Kaminski traveled to and from the site on a bus equipped with security cameras. During her time at Elite, she never received a disciplinary infraction. Nor did anyone ever reprimand her for poor work or for any other reason. In 2019, Elite informed Kaminski that the warehouse where she was working no longer needed her help and discharged her. Kaminski says she called Elite’s human resources department to obtain the names of her former coworkers, but the office declined to supply the information.Kaminski sued Elite for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) and two opportunities to amend. Kaminski failed to allege facts showing a connection between her membership in a protected class and Elite’s decision to terminate her, nor did Kaminski’s complaint identify any similarly situated employees who received more favorable treatment. View "Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc." on Justia Law

Lewis left her car parked on an Alsip street during a snowstorm. She was fined $50 for violating an ordinance that prohibits parking on any “primary snow route” if more than one inch has fallen within 12 hours and requires all primary snow routes to be identified by signs; a three-inch limit applies to “all other public streets not designated as primary snow routes.” The street where Lewis had parked was not posted as a primary snow route.Lewis could have challenged the fine in state court but instead filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alsip violated the Due Process Clause by failing to erect signs on every block of every street telling drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Due Process Clause requires governmental bodies to make laws available to the public, not to ensure that everyone knows all rules. The statute or regulation itself is adequate notice if it is clear. Drivers know that many traffic rules are not set out on signs but still must be obeyed. View "Lewis v. Village of Alsip" on Justia Law