Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Moreland, convicted of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, unsuccessfully appealed. On August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from that date to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Moreland sought collateral postconviction relief in state court on July 30, 2014. On March 7, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland’s petition for review. All 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled.Moreland filed a federal habeas petition on March 28, 2016, nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed; 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland’s direct review. Moreland’s petition raised claims related to due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreland alleged that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia, and on several occasions, was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Moreland has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. The court rejected claims that the district court should have tolled the time connected with motions for postconviction discovery and for reconsideration. View "Moreland v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Sarter drowned after a vessel capsized in Lake Superior. His employer Roen, which owned the vessel, asked the court to limit its liability to $25,000, its interest in the vessel, under 46 U.S.C. 30505(a) (Limitations Act). It also asked for exoneration from all liability, citing the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims, 4F. A federal court has exclusive jurisdiction of Limitation Act claims, 28 U.S.C. 1333(1), “saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” After a vessel’s owner seeks Limitation Act protection, a plaintiff often files a concession that the federal court’s decision about the owner’s maximum liability will control even if a state court sets a higher figure in a Saving-to-Suitors action. Sarter's spouse made a Limitations Act concession but declined to make a concession concerning total exoneration. The district court declined to enjoin Sarter's state suit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No federal statute entitles a vessel owner to have a federal judge determine exoneration. Under the common law of admiralty, when there is one claimant, or when the total demanded by multiple claimants does not exceed the value set by the Limitation Act, a federal court may permit substantive claims to proceed in state court. When multiple state court claims exceed the likely value of the vessel the federal judge may retain all aspects of the litigation and decide whether the owner is entitled to exoneration. In other situations, it is enough for the federal court to set the maximum amount of recovery that a state court may allow. Sarter is the only plaintiff. The district court can set a maximum level of liability based on section 30505(a). View "Roen Salvage Co. v. Sarter" on Justia Law

Dean, incarcerated since 2012, developed kidney cancer. Seven months after he first presented symptoms, Dean had kidney-removal surgery. The cancer had already spread to his liver, Dean remains terminally ill. Dean sued his doctors and their employer, Wexford, a private corporation that contracts to provide healthcare to Illinois inmates, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Dean cited delays in his diagnosis and treatment, caused by his doctors’ failure to arrange timely off-site care, and on a policy that requires Wexford’s corporate office to pre-approve off-site care.A jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $7 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Dean has endured great suffering, but he did not produce enough evidence to hold any of the defendants liable for violating the Eighth Amendment. Dean’s claim against Wexford hinged on two expert reports from another case that critique the medical care, and process for medical care, that Illinois provides, through Wexford, to its prisoners. Those reports are hearsay, but the district court allowed Dean to use them for a non-hearsay purpose: to prove that Wexford had prior notice of the negative assessments of its review policy. One report postdated all events relevant to Dean and could not have given Wexford prior notice. The other report alone was insufficient to hold Wexford liable under the exacting “Monell” requirements in this single-incident case. View "Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Kurzynowski pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography. He admitted to officers that he spent years in internet chatrooms discussing sexual behavior involving minors and that his sexual interest focused on 10-13-year-old boys. His more recent online conversations explored fantasies of cooking and eating children. In 2015, the district court sentenced Kurzynowski to 96 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Kurzynowski moved for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing his hypertension, diabetes, and obesity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The fact that Kurzynowski is vaccinated precludes a finding that the COVID-19 pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. The district court properly recognized that the need to protect the public, “especially the most vulnerable members, children,” was particularly significant with Kurzynowski because his crimes “were motivated by his depraved sexual appetite toward young children, a pathology for which he has not received medical, psychological, or spiritual treatment.” The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not err or abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kurzynowski" on Justia Law

Vargas received extensive medical care from the Veterans Administration. In his suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–80, he argued that a VA nurse was negligent in failing to order additional tests after receiving the results of urinalysis in October 2015. More testing, Vargas contended, would have revealed that he suffered from a urinary tract infection; failure to diagnose that infection led to a heart attack, which led to extended hospitalization, which led to pain and inflammation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his claims, upholding the district judge’s decision to allow testimony from a board-certified urologist. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert evidence in suits under the FTCA. The district judge was entitled to consider the urologist’s view that the applicable standard of care did not require follow-up testing to look for a urinary tract infection. If even a board-certified urologist would not have seen anything in the test result calling for further lab work, then a nurse practitioner’s identical decision cannot be negligent. Illinois does not hold nurses to the higher standard of specialists. View "Love v. United States" on Justia Law

Believing that Sammons had stolen his girlfriend’s jewelry, Price called the house in Indianapolis where Sammons was staying and announced that he was coming to get the jewelry back—by force, if necessary. In trying to gain entrance, Price fired a revolver several times through the door, hitting Smith in the leg, then dropped the revolver and fled. When police caught him, they found a Taurus pistol. Price pleaded guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The factual basis proffered in support of the plea identifies possessing the Taurus pistol as the crime of conviction. The PSR recommended that the judge add four offense levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense” (shooting into an occupied house). The court sentenced Price to 110 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit remanded based on the district court’s failure to make an essential finding connecting the Taurus pistol to the shooting. The judge did not declare that the sentence is independent of section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), so the error cannot be found to be harmless. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Wilber was convicted of a 2004 murder and was sentenced to life in prison. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in Wisconsin state court, Wilber sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2554, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process when he was visibly shackled before the jury during closing arguments. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision sustaining the shackling order amounted to an unreasonable application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, “Deck v. Missouri.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the trial judge nor the state appellate court ever articulated a reason why Wilber had to be visibly restrained in the jury’s presence, so the shackling decision ran afoul of Deck. Wilber was visibly restrained at a key phase of the trial, when the prosecution highlighted evidence that, in the moments leading up to the murder, Wilber’s behavior was “wild,” “crazy,” “possessed,” and “out of control,” so Wilber was prejudiced by the shackling error. The restraints would have suggested to the jury that the court itself perceived Wilber to be incapable of self-control and to pose such a danger that he must be manacled in order to protect others in the courtroom, including the jurors. View "Wilber v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Reed unsuccessfully applied for a job at PF, then filed an EEOC age discrimination charge. EEOC found the charge unsupported. Reed sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court returned Reed’s complaint, unfiled, as barred by a 2012 litigation-bar order based on Reed’s history of frivolous suits. The order provided that the court would entertain an application to lift it after two years. The EEOC’s right-to-sue letter had started a 90-day filing period. On day 46, Reed asked the court to vacate the bar order, alleging that Judge Randa, who entered the order, had been biased. A previous assertion that Judge Randa was biased had been rejected. Judge Adelman invited Reed to file an affidavit detailing his finances but the order was sent to an outdated address and was not received until after the 90-day period had expired. Two days later, Reed filed an affidavit of indigence. The judge vacated the filing bar, but denied Reed’s request for equitable tolling and dismissed the PF suit as untimely.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the bar order was of Reed’s own making, that Reed first defied the order then advanced only a frivolous argument, and that Reed could have filed suit in state court. Indigent persons are not entitled to file an endless string of frivolous suits. Reed paid nothing for seven years and forfeited the privilege of litigating in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. View "Reed v. PF of Milwaukee Midtown, LLC" on Justia Law

Mabuneza, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) entered the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee and became a lawful permanent resident in 2001. After a 2006 conviction for petit larceny and a 2016 conviction for aggravated sexual abuse, Mabuneza was placed in removal proceedings.Mabuneza applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he received refugee status because he had faced persecution as a member of the Tutsi ethnic group and that he would be targeted again if he were deported; that he would be viewed as a political dissident for being featured in Chicago Tribune articles describing his family’s experiences as refugees; that he would be detained upon return to the DRC as a traitor; and that he would be seen as a threat due to his sexual abuse conviction. Mabuneza submitted country conditions evidence showing that persons returning to the DRC may face suspicion from the police and be arrested and detained and that the Congolese government sometimes tortures detainees and prisoners for political and human rights activism.The BIA dismissed an appeal from the IJ's denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ did not make any factual or legal error in finding that Mabuneza did not face a substantial risk of torture as a recent deportee. View "Mabuneza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Pineda-Teruel is a citizen of Honduras, where he owns a coffee farm. He entered the U.S. in 2007, was removed to Honduras in 2017, reentered the U.S. in 2019, and was apprehended at the border. Pineda-Teruel applied for withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that the mafia had demanded money from him in Honduras and threatened to kill him but had killed his two cousins who were working at the farm. Pineda-Teruel said that he feared for his life.The IJ denied Pineda-Teruel’s application, finding that he failed to establish past persecution or the likelihood of future persecution if he were to relocate within Honduras and that there was no nexus between Pineda-Teruel’s fear of harm—which was due to the mafia’s belief that he had money from his time in the U.S.—and any claimed status as a member of a statutorily protected social group. The BIA dismissed Pineda-Teruel’s appeal, concluding that his past experiences in Honduras did not rise to the level of past persecution or torture and he had not established a clear probability of torture in the future given that he had successfully relocated within Honduras. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that Pineda-Teruel claimed that the men who threatened him and killed his cousins were now living in the U.S. View "Pineda-Teruel v. Garland" on Justia Law