Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Cameron Johnson, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm on September 15, 2019. He pleaded guilty to this charge. The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Johnson's three prior robbery convictions under Indiana law. Johnson argued that two of these robberies, committed on January 22, 2009, occurred on the same occasion and thus should not count as separate offenses under ACCA. He also contended that a jury should determine whether the robberies were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected Johnson's argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that did not require a jury to decide the different-occasions question. The court concluded that the robberies were committed on different occasions and sentenced Johnson to fifteen years in prison, the minimum under ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle defendants to have a jury decide whether prior offenses were committed on the same or different occasions. Given this precedent, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred in not submitting the different-occasions question to a jury. The court also found that this error was not harmless, as it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the robberies to be committed on different occasions.The Seventh Circuit vacated Johnson's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Harold Grimes, a coal miner for 34 years, developed black lung disease and later died of lung cancer in 2018. His widow, Susan Grimes, is eligible for survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. The dispute centers on whether Apogee Coal Company, Grimes’s last employer, or the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund should pay these benefits. The Department of Labor’s administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Benefits Review Board assigned financial responsibility to Apogee, with Arch Resources Inc., Apogee’s former parent corporation, bearing the liability. Arch contested this, arguing that the Trust Fund should pay.The district director initially identified Apogee as a potentially liable operator and notified Arch as Apogee’s “Insurance Carrier.” Despite Apogee’s bankruptcy in 2015, the district director and ALJ concluded that Arch, as Apogee’s self-insuring parent, was responsible for the benefits. The ALJ’s decision was based on the premise that Arch’s self-insurance umbrella covered Apogee’s liabilities. The Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision, referencing its prior cases, including Howard v. Apogee Coal Co., which supported the Department’s theory of liability for self-insuring parents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found no statutory or regulatory basis for holding Arch liable for Apogee’s obligations. The court emphasized that neither the ALJ nor the Board identified a specific provision in the Act or its regulations that justified this liability. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to assign Mrs. Grimes’s benefits to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The court noted that future cases might provide additional arguments for such liability, but in this instance, the Trust Fund must pay. View "Apogee Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to Indiana's ballot access laws by the Indiana Green Party, the Libertarian Party of Indiana, and associated individuals. They argue that the requirements for candidates to collect signatures amounting to 2% of the votes cast in the last Secretary of State election, the process for submitting petitions, and the early deadline for submission are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They also challenge the law's indexing of party-level access to the results of the most recent Secretary of State election.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Indiana’s Secretary of State. The district court concluded that the 2% signature requirement and the June 30 deadline for submitting petitions were constitutionally permissible, relying on precedent from the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. The court did not address the burdens created by the county-level submission requirement or the challenge to the indexing of the full slate access option.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Indiana's ballot access requirements do not impose severe burdens on the plaintiffs' rights. The 2% signature requirement, the June 30 deadline, and the county-level submission process were deemed reasonable and justified by the state's interests in preventing voter confusion and ensuring orderly elections. The court also found that the requirement for parties to garner 2% of the vote in the Secretary of State election to maintain full slate access was reasonable, given the alternative petitioning route available to candidates. The court concluded that the state's regulatory interests were sufficient to justify the challenged restrictions. View "Indiana Green Party v. Morales" on Justia Law

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Xengxai Yang robbed a credit union in Appleton, Wisconsin, wearing a black mask and armed with a sawed-off rifle. After his arrest, Yang admitted to the robbery, claiming he wanted to "try something new." He was indicted on multiple counts, including armed bank robbery. Yang initially raised an insanity defense but later withdrew it and entered a plea agreement. However, he subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. A second psychological evaluation suggested Yang's mental conditions impaired his judgment during the crime. The court allowed Yang to withdraw his plea and reassert the insanity defense, but ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.Yang did not appeal his conviction directly but filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, Yang withdrew this claim and instead argued that the court's failure to hold a competency hearing violated his due process rights. The district court denied his motion, finding that Yang had procedurally defaulted his competency claim by not raising it earlier and that he was competent during the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that procedural default bars Yang's competency claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the default. The court concluded that Yang's competency claim was procedurally defaulted and dismissed his petition for collateral relief under § 2255. View "Xengxai Yang v. United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves Jose Ageo Luna Vanegas, a guestworker employed by Signet Builders, Inc., who alleges that Signet overworked and underpaid him in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Signet, incorporated and headquartered in Texas, hires H-2A visa holders for agricultural work, which it claims exempts them from FLSA overtime pay requirements. Luna Vanegas, who built livestock structures in multiple states including Wisconsin, filed a collective action against Signet in the Western District of Wisconsin, seeking to represent similarly situated workers.The district court initially dismissed the case, citing the FLSA’s agricultural exemption, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision. Luna Vanegas then moved for conditional certification to notify other Signet workers nationwide about the collective action. Signet argued that the notice should be limited to workers in Wisconsin, asserting that the court only had specific jurisdiction over claims from that state. The district court allowed nationwide notice but certified the question of whether specific jurisdiction is required for each opt-in plaintiff’s claim. The district court held that such jurisdiction was not required, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that in FLSA collective actions, personal jurisdiction must be established for each plaintiff’s claim individually, whether representative or opt-in. The court rejected the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 could be used to establish nationwide personal jurisdiction in FLSA cases. The court concluded that the district court’s personal jurisdiction is limited to claims that fall within Wisconsin’s specific jurisdiction, and any expansion of jurisdiction would require new Rule 4 service. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Ageo Luna Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

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In late 1996, Jerry Walker was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and other drug-related offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison. Following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Walker sought a sentence reduction in 2020, arguing that his CCE conviction qualified as a "covered offense" under the Act. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially handled Walker's case. After his conviction, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his statutory penalties, suggesting a mandatory 20 years to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). The government argued for a mandatory life sentence under § 848(b), the "Super CCE" provision. The court agreed with the PSR's guideline range of life imprisonment but did not explicitly state whether the sentence was under § 848(a) or § 848(b). In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vacated Walker's conspiracy charge but upheld the CCE conviction and life sentence. In 2020, Walker moved for resentencing under the First Step Act, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that his CCE conviction under § 848(a) was not a "covered offense."The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no clear error in determining that Walker was sentenced under § 848(a). The court held that a conviction under § 848(a) is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, as its statutory penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Therefore, Walker was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walker's motion for First Step Act relief. View "USA v. Walker" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Jasmine Bradley was assessed as incompetent to assist in her defense against criminal charges and was referred to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §4241. She reported to the U.S. Marshal on January 28, 2022, and was released on August 24, 2022, with a report stating she was competent. Bradley then pleaded guilty to ten counts of fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a 198-month sentence. Her conditional guilty plea reserved the issue of whether the seven-month period between reporting and release required dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that dismissal was not mandatory, even though the Bureau exceeded the statutory time limits set by §4241(d). The court found that the statute did not specify a remedy for exceeding the time limits, and thus dismissal was not required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that while §4241(d) sets a four-month limit for evaluating a defendant's competence, it does not specify a consequence for exceeding this limit. The court emphasized that statutory time limits are "time-related directives" and that dismissal with prejudice is not a fitting remedy for delays in restoring a detainee to competence. The court also noted that the Speedy Trial Act excludes delays caused by mental-health examinations and that dismissal of the indictment would not serve the interests of justice. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy for such delays is not dismissal but potentially ordering the release of the detainee while evaluations continue. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

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David Bernardo-De La Cruz, a Mexican national, has lived in the U.S. without legal authorization for nineteen years. He was pulled over for speeding in 2014, which led to his immigration status being questioned. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, citing his long-term residence, good moral character, and the potential hardship his removal would cause his U.S. citizen daughters. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, finding that his removal would not cause an "exceptionally high level of hardship" for his daughters. However, the IJ granted him voluntary departure. Bernardo-De La Cruz appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge (TAIJ) Gabriel Gonzalez upheld the IJ's findings, including the determination that Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters would remain in the U.S. after his removal. The TAIJ acknowledged evidence suggesting that one daughter required special educational services but did not find it sufficient to warrant a different outcome. Bernardo-De La Cruz then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency exceeded its authority in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), the appointment of the TAIJ was unconstitutional, and the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), which limits voluntary departure for noncitizens contesting a removal order, was within the agency's statutory authority. The court also found that TAIJ Gonzalez was lawfully appointed by the Acting Attorney General, not the EOIR Director, thus complying with the Appointments Clause. Finally, the court determined that the IJ and BIA had adequately considered the evidence regarding the hardship to Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters. The petition for review was denied. View "Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

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A Mexican citizen, Alfredo Viveros-Chavez, was found in the United States without lawful immigration status after previously being removed. He was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits noncitizens from reentering the U.S. without authorization. Viveros-Chavez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee due to its discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of racial animus behind the statute’s enactment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the discriminatory-intent framework from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., rather than rational basis review. The court acknowledged that the predecessor to § 1326, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was motivated by racial animus but found little evidence that such animus influenced the enactment of § 1326 in 1952. The court also found the statistical evidence presented by Viveros-Chavez unpersuasive, noting the lack of evidence that the government disproportionately targeted Mexican and Latino individuals for illegal reentry prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 1952 Congress was not motivated by racial animus when enacting § 1326. The court also noted that the statistical evidence provided by Viveros-Chavez was insufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. View "USA v. Viveros-Chavez" on Justia Law