Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Glick, without a written agreement, provided home daycare for Clayton’s infant daughter, Kenzi, for $25 per day, paid in cash at the end of the week. On January 29, 2018, Kenzi died while in Glick’s care. The coroner’s office indicated that her death resulted from bedding asphyxia after being placed prone on a couch cushion covered with a blanket to nap. The Glicks’ Liberty Mutual insurance policy, covered personal liability for “bodily injury” except for liability “[a]rising out of or in connection with a ‘business’ engaged in by an insured.” A separate endorsement stated: If an “insured” regularly provides home daycare services to a person or persons other than “insureds” and receives monetary or other compensation for such services, that enterprise is a “business.” Mutual exchange of home daycare services, however, is not considered compensation. The rendering of home daycare services by an “insured” to a relative of an “insured” is not considered a “business.”Liberty Mutual denied coverage. In Clayton’s wrongful death lawsuit, the district court granted Liberty Mutual summary judgment and expressly declared Liberty Mutual has no duty to defend or indemnify Glick in the underlying lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Clayton’s claim “did not even potentially fall within the scope of coverage.” View "Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Inmates who were housed by three Illinois Department of Corrections centers between April-July 2014, alleged that the prison-wide shakedowns conducted violated their constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The shakedowns involved uniformed tactical teams called “Orange Crush” that operated according to a uniform plan, which involved a loud entry, strip searches, handcuffing, and other procedures involving allegedly humiliating physical contact. The inmates allege that the planning and execution of the shakedowns violated the Eighth Amendment because it was designed to inflict pain and humiliation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed class certification. The plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement because they alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to a common policy and implemented the same or similar procedures at each institution and that the challenge was to the constitutionality of that common plan as enacted. The claims require resolution of key common factual and legal questions, specifically: “whether Defendants developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that had the effect of depriving the putative class members of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; whether the shakedowns were executed in the manner Defendants contend or as Plaintiffs claim; whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the putative class members of their constitutional rights through the shakedowns; and whether the Defendants knew of, approved, facilitated and/or turned a blind eye to the alleged unconstitutional shakedowns.” Those questions do not require individualized consideration. View "Ross v. Gossett" on Justia Law

RiverStone operates quarries in three midwestern states. Under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), RiverStone contributed to the Fringe Benefit Funds for certain employees, based on hours worked by the members of the bargaining unit. The CBA expired in May 2016. Nothing in the agreement imposes on RiverStone an obligation to make contributions after the agreement. RiverStone sought a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to make contributions to the employees’ pension fund on behalf of individuals hired after the CBA expired. The Funds filed a counterclaim.The district court granted RiverStone summary judgment, holding that RiverStone did not have a contractual duty to contribute to the Funds on behalf of the new employees and that it lacked jurisdiction to evaluate noncontractual sources of liability, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) so the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute is over an obligation that does not arise under any contract. Once a CBA has expired, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1145, does not confer jurisdiction on the district court to determine whether the employer’s failure to make post-contract contributions violated the NLRA. View "RiverStone Group, Inc v. Midwest Operating Engineers Fringe Benefit Funds" on Justia Law

In March 2020, to prevent the spread of Covid-19, Illinois Governor Pritzker ordered all persons living in the state to stay at home except to perform specified “essential activities” and ordered “non-essential” businesses to cease all but minimum basic operations. Childcare providers were permitted to continue operating only with an emergency license to care for the children of essential workers. Michigan’s Governor Whitmer issued a similar order. Both states lifted those restrictions by June 2020. West Bend denied claims by childcare centers under their all-risk commercial property insurance policies.The policies cover the actual loss of income and expense due to the suspension of an insured’s operations “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property”. The loss or damage must be caused by “[d]irect physical loss.” Lost income and extra expenses are covered when a civil authority prohibits access to insured premises because of damage at nearby property. The policies cover income lost and expenses incurred when an insured’s operations are temporarily suspended by government order "due to an outbreak of a ‘communicable disease’ … at the insured premises.”The district court concluded that the Centers had not plausibly alleged that COVID-19 caused physical loss of or damage to their property—or to nearby property— or that government shutdown orders were due to an outbreak at their premises. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that other circuits have reached the same conclusion. View "Paradigm Care & Enrichment Center, L.L.C. v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lumpkin was convicted of various drug crimes. Wisconsin courts denied his appeal and post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his federal habeas corpus petition, in which Lumpkin argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin court’s determination that he suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance in cross-examining a key witness was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, Even if Lumpkin’s trial counsel had impeached the witness so thoroughly that she could be deemed completely unreliable and her testimony could be set aside entirely, there existed overwhelming other evidence incriminating Lumpkin. During his arrest, officers uncovered from Lumpkin’s pockets three different types of drugs, separated into nearly thirty individual plastic bags plus more than $1100 in cash, all in small bills. The testimony of another witness and text messages provided overwhelming evidence proving that Lumpkin possessed drugs with an intent to deliver them. View "Lumpkin v. Hermans" on Justia Law

Jennings, who was not a medical professional, ran Results Weight Loss Clinic in Lombard, Illinois. Jennings paid Mikaitis, who was working full‐time for a hospital in Lockport, Illinois cash to secure a Drug Enforcement Agency registration number for the clinic and to review patient charts. Over the next two years, Jennings ordered over 530,000 diet pills (controlled substances) for over $84,000 using Mikaitis’s credit card and DEA number. Mikaitis appeared at Results weekly to get $1,750 cash and review four to eight charts. Results also gave drugs—in person and by mail— to many patients whose charts he never reviewed. A nurse practitioner who worked at the clinic later testified she noticed almost immediately that Jennings was unlawfully distributing drugs. Jennings paid Mikaitis about $98,000 cash, in addition to reimbursement for drug costs.Mikaitis was tried on 17 counts. He denied knowing about illegal activity. The district judge issued a deliberate avoidance (ostrich) instruction. Convicted, Mikaitis was sentenced to 30 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence demonstrated that Mikaitis subjectively believed that there was a high probability he was participating in criminal activity and that he took specific, deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact. Mikaitis was a medical professional with corresponding duties. The jury was free to conclude the red flags were obvious to him. View "United States v. Mikaitis" on Justia Law

Under rules adopted and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin lawyers must join and pay dues to the State Bar of Wisconsin. Active membership in the association is “a condition precedent to the right to practice law” in the state. This regulatory regime, often called an “integrated, mandatory[,] or unified bar,” authorizes the State Bar to use membership dues to aid the courts in the administration of justice, conduct a program of continuing legal education, and maintain “high ideals of integrity, learning, competence… public service[,] and high standards of conduct” in the bar of the state.Attorney File contends that requiring him to join and subsidize the State Bar violates his First Amendment free speech and associational rights. Recognizing that Supreme Court precedent forecloses this claim (Keller v. State Bar of Cal. (1990)), File argued that the Court’s more recent cases—particularly “Janus” (2018)--implicitly overruled Keller. The district court rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Keller “may be difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s more recent First Amendment caselaw, but on multiple occasions and in no uncertain terms, the Court has instructed lower courts to resist invitations to find its decisions overruled by implication.” View "File v. Kastner" on Justia Law

In 2001, Williams was convicted of conspiring to sell more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; distributing more than 50 grams of crack, 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); and distributing more than five grams of crack, 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Sentenced to life imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2 and the statutory maximum 40-year term for Count 3, Williams sought a reduced sentence three times based on retroactive guidelines amendments, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). By 2014, Williams’s guidelines range had dropped to 235 from 293 months. The judge lowered his sentence to 360 months.Williams filed his fourth sentence-reduction motion under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act's lower statutory penalties for crack offenses. The new ranges for Counts 1 and 2 were 60-480 months; Count 3 carried a maximum sentence of 240 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (b)(1)(C) (2021). Judge Moody acknowledged Williams’s youth at the time of the offense, lack of significant criminal history, and near-perfect disciplinary record, but relied on the “reprehensibility of the crimes” without calculating new statutory ranges. He apparently assumed that the 2014 sentence conformed with new statutory maximums.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The procedural requirements—calculating new penalties before deciding on the motion—apply to all First Step Act motions. The statutory ranges for all of Williams’s convictions changed between 2014 and the 2019 motion; the judge misstated the statutory penalty for Count 3. Williams was deprived of the benefit of any anchoring effect that the new ranges could have had on Judge Moody’s decision, which affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceeding. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Nieto, a leader of a Gary, Indiana gang, planned to rob Martinez’s home, believing he would find marijuana. Hendry, Cherry, and Fitzpatrick, also gang members, agreed to participate. Cherry brought an assault rifle and a handgun from the home he shared with Fitzpatrick. Martinez was watching television with his fiancée and two friends when they arrived. A fight ensued. Martinez shot Cherry at least twice in the abdomen; an uninvolved friend of Martinez was fatally shot while his toddler-aged daughter looked on.Fitzpatrick was convicted of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and murder resulting from the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), (j). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of his 432-month sentence. It was reasonable for the jury to find it unlikely that Fitzpatrick or his co-conspirators would have endeavored to carry out a dangerous operation requiring armament if the reward was merely marijuana for recreational use and to conclude that Fitzpatrick was capable of understanding that the goal of the robbery was at least, in part, to acquire drugs for resale. The judge adequately explained the sentence. View "United States v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

Major pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement to three charges stemming from his activities dealing heroin and fentanyl. Major was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court’s factual findings were erroneous and caused it to calculate an incorrect Sentencing Guidelines range and that his designation as a “career offender” overstated his past criminal conduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s findings that Major sold the drugs that caused a death, that he had obstructed justice by trying to influence a co-defendant’s testimony, and that he had not accepted responsibility. Major was convicted of two prior offenses that qualify him for the career offender designation: a previous felony drug conviction and a conviction for aggravated kidnapping in 1993. The court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Major as a career offender and imposing a Guidelines sentence of 240 months in prison. View "United States v. Major" on Justia Law