Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Donaldson sought treatment for stress urinary incontinence and anterior pelvic organ prolapse. In 2010, to remedy these conditions, Dr. Schultheis surgically implanted in Donaldson two transvaginal polypropylene mesh medical devices. Both were manufactured by a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. In 2014, Donaldson sought treatment for injuries resulting from erosion of the mesh into her bladder, vagina, and adjacent tissues, causing scarring, bladder stones, and abdominal pain, among other problems. Information sheets packaged with the devices warned of the risks of erosion but Donaldson never saw the warnings and contends that Dr. Schultheis did not inform her of these risks. Dr. Schultheis testified that he was aware of the possible complications and that he believed that the benefits of the devices outweighed the risks. He also testified that, in implanting the devices, he followed all of the manufacturer’s instructions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the manufacturers. Although there is no doubt that Donaldson suffered severe and painful complications after the devices were implanted, she failed to produce sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment in her case for non-specific defects under Illinois product liability law. There was no evidence eliminating abnormal use or secondary causes, or that the device failed to perform as expected. View "Donaldson v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

Cabrera-Ruiz, a Mexican national, has a long history of entries into the U.S., deportations after convictions for crimes of varying severity, and subsequent reentries. In 2018, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrested Cabrera-Ruiz for a suspected drug trafficking offense. Cabrera-Ruiz pleaded guilty to illegal reentry instead and received a time-served sentence. Facing deportation. Cabrera-Ruiz applied for deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.The immigration judge denied Cabrera-Ruiz relief, relying heavily on an adverse credibility determination. The BIA dismissed Cabrera-Ruiz’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. The court noted that Cabrera-Ruiz made four inconsistent statements regarding the drugs, his experiences with Mexican cartels, and his fear of return and once told an Asylum Officer that he did not fear persecution or torture. Arrested for drugs but sentenced only for an immigration offense, Cabrera-Ruiz claims to fear being perceived as a “snitch” and that he has gang tattoos that would draw unwanted cartel and police attention throughout Mexico but Cabrera-Ruiz had previously lived in Mexico with those tattoos. In addition, Cabrera-Ruiz completed an ICE interview without mentioning 27 days of torture that he subsequently claimed. View "Cabrera-Ruiz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Dr. Lewis, a 60-year-old African American woman, alleges that Indiana Wesleyan University discriminated against her when it took away her supervisory responsibilities and ultimately eliminated her position. She brought various claims against the University under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted the university summary judgment on her retaliation claims and concluded that she had waived her age discrimination claim but did not address Dr. Lewis’s race discrimination claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, finding that Lewis waived her age discrimination claim, but remanded the race discrimination claim, as requiring factual development. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Lewis, the facts do not support a causal connection between her protected activity of complaining about discrimination and an adverse employment action of retaliation. View "Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University" on Justia Law

Westray pleaded guilty to a 1998 murder. He received a death sentence which was later commuted to life imprisonment. In a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, he subsequently challenged his confinement, including its duration, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing and on remand when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his claims. The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was presented to the Illinois trial court in Westray’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied without comment. It is therefore presumed that the claim was adjudicated on its merits and AEDPA deference applies. Westray has not shown that but for his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance on remand, he would have been sentenced to a term of years. Westray cannot prove prejudice and his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails. No evidentiary hearing was required. View "Westray v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

Federal officials investigating Jaquez for distributing illegal drugs obtained an order authorized a wiretap on Jaquez’s cell phone and two orders authorizing a pen register that revealed the numbers that Jaquez called or that called him. Federal officials disclosed some of this information to state officials, who used it to prosecute Jaque. He is serving a 36-year sentence. He has not been prosecuted in federal court. Seeking evidence for a collateral attack on his convictions, Jaquez filed a federal court motion, seeking copies of the applications, affidavits, and orders authorizing the pen register and the wiretap. Magistrate Judge Gotsch ordered some of the pen-register papers unsealed. Jaquez did not ask a district judge to review that decision but filed a notice of appeal within 60 days.The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. While 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(3) permits the assignment of duties to magistrate judges, the Northern District of Indiana has not authorized such delegation for wiretap-related matters and neither Jaquez nor the United States consented to the entry of final decision by a magistrate judge. The order was not entered by a district judge, and neither the district court nor the parties used the direct-appeal procedure allowed by 636(c). View "Jaquez v. United States" on Justia Law

CCC and Tractable use algorithms and data generated by repair centers to provide estimates of the cost to repair damaged vehicles. Tractable dispatched its employee to obtain a license for CCC’s software. Using a false name, the employee purported to represent “JA,” a small, independent appraiser. CCC issued a license. The contract forbids assignment of the license without consent and represents that JA is acting on its own behalf, not as an agent for any third party, and forbids disassembly of the software or its incorporation into any other product. Tractable disassembled the software and incorporated some features into its own product. In CCC’s subsequent suit, Tractable moved for arbitration under the agreement between CCC and JA., arguing that “JA” is a name that Tractable uses for itself. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Tractable is not a party to the agreement. CCC could not have discovered that Tractable uses the name “JA.” Contractual meaning reflects words and signs exchanged between the negotiators, not unilateral, confidential beliefs. If a misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms of a proposed contract induces conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one who neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract, his conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.. The identity of CCC’s trading partner was a vital element of the deal. View "CCC Intelligent Solutions Inc. v. Tractable Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, Carnell pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), and 846, for conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. The PSR concluded that Carnell’s relevant conduct involved 2.37 kg of pure methamphetamine “ice,” not a mixture, for a base offense level of 36, with a criminal history category of III, and proposed a three-point acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On remand, the district court recalculated both Carnell’s offense level and his criminal history category, increasing the latter from category III to V to account for Carnell’s convictions on two Illinois offenses while the case was on appeal and specifying that Carnell’s federal sentence would be consecutive to any state sentence resulting from several other pending charges. Following a second remand, the court used the guidelines for mixtures and downgraded Carnell’s base offense level to 32, for a new guideline range of 140-175 months, and sentenced Carnell to 165 months to be served consecutively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no error in the district court’s recalculation of Carnell’s criminal-history category. Because the state charges were dismissed, the consecutive sentencing issue was moot. View "United States v. Carnell" on Justia Law

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at Pennsylvania hotels. When he was arrested, Santiago was holding the distinctive firearm that he and his co-defendants used in the robberies. Convicted of three Hobbs Act counts of interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, (robbery), 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft), Santiago was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months' imprisonment on the three Hobbs Act and two felon-in-possession counts. Under then-applicable law, Santiago also received mandatory consecutive 60-month and 300-month terms for the 924(c) counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected Santiago’s section 2241 habeas petition in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, required that his convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon be set aside. Santiago cannot show he was actually innocent of those charges as required to invoke the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In order to use section 2241 to avoid the restrictions on successive 2255 motions, he would need to show that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Santiago v. Streeval" on Justia Law

Ziccarelli began working as a corrections officer in 1989. He was previously fired and was reinstated after litigation. Ziccarelli developed serious health conditions for which he took 10-169 hours of annual leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. In July 2016 he sought treatment for work-related PTSD; by September he had used 304 hours of his allowable 480 hours of annual FMLA leave. To seek permanent disability benefits, he needed to exhaust all his sick leave. Ziccarelli planned to enroll in an eight-week PTSD treatment program. Based on his conversation with the Sheriff’s Office’s FMLA manager, Shinnawi (the contents of which are disputed), Ziccarelli decided to retire.Ziccarelli filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the FMLA. The district court granted the Sheriff’s Office summary judgment on all claims. Ziccarelli appealed only his FMLA claims, arguing that a reasonable jury could find that the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his FMLA rights during his conversation with Shinnawi by discouraging him from using leave and that the Sheriff’s Office constructively discharged him to retaliate against him for calling Shinnawi. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Ziccarelli presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his claim of FMLA interference through alleged discouragement. The court affirmed with respect to the retaliation claim. View "Ziccarelli v. Dart" on Justia Law

Mikulski, a Polish national residing illegally in the United States, initiated a shootout in a public park. Although others shot live rounds, Mikulski shot blanks; no one was injured. After police questioned him about the incident, he instructed his mother (with whom he lived) to hide his gun. Mikulski, who had a prior felony conviction, was apprehended while driving on a suspended license. He eventually pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and was sentenced above the 30-37 month guidelines range to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Mikulski’s argument that the court misapplied a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his efforts to hide the gun. That Mikulski’s instruction to his mother preceded law enforcement’s decision to search the house was irrelevant. The above-guidelines sentence was more than adequately justified considering the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Mikulski" on Justia Law