Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lanahan was a longtime employee of Cook County’s Department of Public Health responsible for managing federal grants. After her retirement, Lanham filed a qui tam suit, alleging various violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1), arising out of the use of federal grants. Lanaham claimed she repeatedly warned Cook County it was seeking federal reimbursement for unincurred expenses, for example by estimating the time dedicated to federal service after the fact and pinning the salary allocations submitted for reimbursement to the CDC to pre-performance budget estimates and failing to segregate federal reimbursement funds from unaffiliated Cook County revenue.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The court noted the lack of specificity about false claims and statements and the complaint’s use of conclusory statements. The complaint alleged, for example, that Cook County failed to segregate government funds but did not allege that the county was not entitled to those funds. View "Lanahan v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Peoples led a gang that robbed four Indiana banks in 1997-1998, brandishing an assault rifle. At least once, he pointed the gun at tellers and threatened to kill them. Peoples stole getaway cars; twice he burned them. A jury convicted Peoples on multiple counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(d)), using a firearm during a felony (section 924(c)) and to commit a felony (844(h)), and maliciously destroying a vehicle by fire (844(i)). The four 924(c) convictions required the imposition of consecutive minimum sentences totaling 65 mandatory years. The two 844(h) convictions required a sentence of at least 30 consecutive years. Peoples was sentenced to almost 111 years.In prison, Peoples has successfully completed many classes and received no disciplinary infractions. Peoples, at substantial risk to his own safety, took steps to save another person’s life in prison. Nine correctional officers supported his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which cited his rehabilitation and the reality that, under the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c), he would face a much shorter sentence today for the same armed bank robberies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. In a compassionate release motion, the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction, but that reason cannot include, alone or in combination with other factors, consideration of the First Step Act. Peoples otherwise failed to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting early release. View "United States v. Peoples" on Justia Law

Allen earned a Ph.D. in physics from Yale University in 1965 and embarked on a successful career in the aerospace industry. He retired in 2004 and granted a financial power of attorney to his daughter, Key, when he and his wife experienced declining health and he could no longer manage their finances. For several years Key used the power of attorney to make withdrawals from Allen’s investment accounts held by affiliated investment firms (Brown). Five years later Allen revoked the power of attorney and sued Brown, raising contract and fiduciary-duty claims under Maryland law. He alleged that Key’s withdrawals (or some of them) were not to his benefit and that the investment companies should not have honored them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Maryland Court of Appeals has clarified that a plaintiff may plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty even when another cause of action (like breach of contract) is available to redress the conduct. . Still, the power of attorney shields Brown from liability for breach of fiduciary duty just as it does for breach of contract. Brown had no fiduciary obligation to refuse to carry out transactions authorized by the power of attorney. View "Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC" on Justia Law

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. View "United States v. Protho" on Justia Law

Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Yegger, whose five children include FT, who was seven years old and had special needs. The Bureau of Child Welfare had received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger’s children, who were eventually placed with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup. A pediatric nurse practitioner observed five genital lesions on FT. A pediatrician later observed genital and anal lesions; an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes. In a recorded interview with a forensic interviewer, FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson. Wilson was charged with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child, which requires at least three qualifying acts “within a specified period of time.” The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, which requires only a single qualifying act. The jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense. The judge referred to “overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults” and sentenced Wilson to 37 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for habeas relief. Wisconsin courts reasonably rejected his arguments that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient. View "Wilson v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

During a decade as a member of USA Gymnastics, J.J. was one of the hundreds of gymnasts sexually assaulted by Larry Nassar, the organization’s physician. In response to the claims based on Nassar’s conduct, USA Gymnastics filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court set a deadline for filing proofs of claim. USA Gymnastics mailed notices to all known survivors who had filed or threatened to file lawsuits, had reported abuse, had entered into a settlement agreement, or had received payment as a result of an allegation of abuse--more than 1,300 individuals. USA Gymnastics also emailed copies of the notice to more than 360,000 current and former USA Gymnastics members, and placed information about the bar date on its website, social media pages, in USA Today, and in gymnastics journals, podcasts, and websites J.J. did not receive actual notice and filed her proof of claim five months late.The bankruptcy court treated her claim as untimely. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. J.J. argued that she was entitled to actual notice; she claimed USA Gymnastics should have known that she was a potential claimant because it needed to retain medical records under Michigan law and should have known that she had seen Nassar for medical care. The court found no evidence that USA Gymnastics had these records; J.J.’s argument that Michigan law required retention of any relevant documents “is dubious.” View "Jane Doe JJ v. USA Gymnastics" on Justia Law

A southern Illinois outpatient surgery clinic accused the area’s largest hospital system and its largest health insurer (Blue Cross) of violating federal and state antitrust laws by entering into contracts that designate the hospital but not the clinic as a Blue Cross preferred provider (in-network provider). A district judge granted judgment in favor of Blue Cross, reasoning that insurers are customers and cannot be liable for the practices of sellers with market power. The clinic and the hospital agreed that a magistrate judge could handle the rest of the case and enter a final judgment, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). Discovery followed. After reviewing a special master’s report, a magistrate granted the hospital summary judgment on the ground that the clinic had not been injured.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that Blue Cross had not consented to a magistrate having final authority. However, Blue Cross received a district judge's decision and impliedly consented to the magistrate by submitting documentation. Neither federal nor state law prohibits preferred provider agreements; the agreements are not exclusive dealing or tie-in arrangements. The clinic "scarcely tries to show that it has been injured by reduced output or higher prices," nor does it allege that there is any historical link between the hospital’s insurance-contracting practices and either prices or output. View "Marion HealthCare, LLC. v. Southern Illinois Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Goliday’s Indianapolis home, recovering drugs and a loaded handgun. Goliday arrived during the search, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted that the drugs and gun were his. Goliday stated that he had bought two ounces of heroin every week for the last year from the same supplier, then resold smaller amounts. He pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs—one count each for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and, based on his statement, to conspiring to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin. Without the conspiracy charge, he would have faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years; the conspiracy charge, enhanced by Goliday’s prior conviction, carried a statutory minimum of 15 years.At sentencing, when the court asked Goliday if the facts relating to the conspiracy charge were accurate, Goliday indicated that his statement about how much he purchased was only intended to implicate his supplier. However, he subsequently agreed to the judge's recitation of the charge.The Seventh Circuit vacated his 15-year sentence. Goliday’s statements suggested he did not understand how a conspiracy offense differed from just buying and selling drugs. The district court did not resolve the confusion and should have ensured that Goliday understood the nature of the charged conspiracy offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea. View "United States v. Goliday" on Justia Law

A 2015 Wired magazine article described a controlled hack of a Jeep Cherokee driven by one of the magazine’s journalists. Cybersecurity researchers exploited a vulnerability in the Jeep’s “uConnect” infotainment system, designed by Harman, for installation in vehicles manufactured by FCA (formerly Chrysler). FCA immediately issued a recall and provided a free software update to patch the vulnerability. Federal regulators supervising the recall determined that the patch eliminated the vulnerability. Other than the Jeep in the Wired test, no other vehicle was successfully hacked.Four plaintiffs sued FCA and Harman on behalf of every consumer who had purchased or leased a 2013–2015 Chrysler vehicle equipped with the uConnect infotainment system, asserting federal and state warranty and consumer-fraud claims. The plaintiffs argued that although the alleged defect never manifested again after the Wired hack, they paid more for their vehicles than they would have if they had known about the cybersecurity vulnerability. After discovery closed, faced with a factual challenge to standing, the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence in support of their claimed overpayment injury.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. When litigation moves beyond the pleading stage and Article III standing is challenged as a factual matter, plaintiffs cannot rely on mere allegations of injury; they must provide evidence of a legally cognizable injury in fact. These plaintiffs continued to rely on allegations and legal arguments. View "Flynn v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law