Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dai, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa in 2010. She later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis of religious persecution. Following a merits hearing, an immigration judge denied relief, finding that Dai was not credible and that her evidence failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. Dai acknowledged discrepancies in her testimony concerning how long she had been practicing her faith and her encounters with the police; she did not provide corroborative evidence. View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law

Osmani fled the Kosovo War and was admitted to the U.S as a refugee in 1999. Osmani was convicted for possession of illegal narcotics in 2019. The government sought to remove Osmani based on a prior conviction for aggravated felony theft, commission of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, and his narcotics conviction. Osmani sought adjustment of status to legal permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1159(a). The bases of inadmissibility may be waived for refugees, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II) “for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” Osmani claimed he had no ties or documentation linking him to Kosovo, would be unable to support himself if removed, and was a member of a persecuted ethnic minority. The government took no position on Osmani’s applications.The IJ granted Osmani an adjustment and waiver, citing Osmani’s relationship with his family and childhood PTSD. Although Osmani submitted documents describing current conditions in Kosovo, the IJ did not address that issue. The BIA agreed that Osmani’s family ties were insufficient to justify waiver and the balance of equities disfavored Osmani, then declined to remand to the IJ to supplement the record, including on conditions in Kosovo. Osmani was removed. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA legally erred by considering arguments the government did not present to the IJ, put Osmani on notice of, or develop any record evidence to support. In declining to remand, the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding. View "Osmani v. Garland" on Justia Law

A felony defendant normally must be present in the courtroom at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(3). The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 134 Stat. 281, permits district courts to conduct felony plea and sentencing proceedings by videoconference if the defendant consents and the judge finds “for specific reasons” that the sentencing “cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice,” In March 2020, just before the CARES Act was adopted, Coffin pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Sentencing was postponed several times.Coffin eventually consented to a sentencing hearing by videoconference under the Act. The district judge confirmed Coffin’s consent on the record and found that further delay would seriously harm the interests of justice, noting several reasons why that was so. The judge asked if there were any objections to his findings. Coffin’s attorney said, “No, thank you.” The judge imposed 60-month concurrent sentences. The Seventh Circuit rejected Coffin’s challenges to the judge’s CARES Act findings as “far too late.” He expressly consented to the videoconference sentencing and confirmed that he had no objection to the judge’s findings under the Act. “That’s a waiver.” View "United States v. Coffin" on Justia Law

Detectives Roseman and Hunt stopped Goodwill for a window tint violation. After asking Goodwill to sit in the squad car, Roseman began the paperwork while both detectives asked Goodwill questions. A canine unit arrived minutes later, before Roseman finished the warning form. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search revealed two kilograms of cocaine. Goodwill, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers unlawfully prolonged the search by asking unrelated questions and conducted the dog sniff without his consent.The district court found that the questioning did not extend the stop and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Roseman needed to check the driver’s license and vehicle information—which involved typing in the motorist’s name and date of birth or driver’s license number plus the vehicle’s registration information—then complete, by hand, the warning—which included the date, time, vehicle information, driver’s information, and the location. Roseman’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the traffic-stop video indicated that he worked expeditiously. Roseman worked on the ticket continuously without any breaks. An officer does not need a driver’s consent to conduct a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop, if it does not prolong the stop. View "United States v. Goodwill" on Justia Law

Kaminski, a Polish-American woman in her fifties, worked for Elite, a temporary employment agency, for about two-and-a-half years. When assigned to a job, Kaminski traveled to and from the site on a bus equipped with security cameras. During her time at Elite, she never received a disciplinary infraction. Nor did anyone ever reprimand her for poor work or for any other reason. In 2019, Elite informed Kaminski that the warehouse where she was working no longer needed her help and discharged her. Kaminski says she called Elite’s human resources department to obtain the names of her former coworkers, but the office declined to supply the information.Kaminski sued Elite for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) and two opportunities to amend. Kaminski failed to allege facts showing a connection between her membership in a protected class and Elite’s decision to terminate her, nor did Kaminski’s complaint identify any similarly situated employees who received more favorable treatment. View "Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc." on Justia Law

Lewis left her car parked on an Alsip street during a snowstorm. She was fined $50 for violating an ordinance that prohibits parking on any “primary snow route” if more than one inch has fallen within 12 hours and requires all primary snow routes to be identified by signs; a three-inch limit applies to “all other public streets not designated as primary snow routes.” The street where Lewis had parked was not posted as a primary snow route.Lewis could have challenged the fine in state court but instead filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alsip violated the Due Process Clause by failing to erect signs on every block of every street telling drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Due Process Clause requires governmental bodies to make laws available to the public, not to ensure that everyone knows all rules. The statute or regulation itself is adequate notice if it is clear. Drivers know that many traffic rules are not set out on signs but still must be obeyed. View "Lewis v. Village of Alsip" on Justia Law

Merrill pressured 12-13-year-old girls to take and send him sexually explicit photographs of themselves. Merrill was indicted for producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); receiving child pornography, section 2252A(a)(2)(A); and possessing child pornography, section 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty to one count each of producing and possessing with respect to one girl. At his plea hearing, Merrill confirmed that he remembered: “soliciting photographs and possessing the types of photographs that are set forth in the plea agreement.” Before the scheduled sentencing hearing, new counsel appeared for Merrill and moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that his former attorneys “never explained what the elements of the production charge were or what the government was required to prove to establish his guilt.”At an evidentiary hearing. Merrill’s former lawyers testified to having explained to Merrill the differences among the three charges and how the evidence established each element of the production charge; each told Merrill that he could be convicted of production based on proof that he had asked the minors to take and send the sexually explicit photographs and that the minors did so at his request.The district judge denied Merrill’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Merrill’s attorneys’ advice was sound, and in any event, he has not shown prejudice from the supposedly erroneous advice. View "United States v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Ruenger applied for Social Security Disability benefits in 2015, alleging that he had limited use of his left arm and mental impairments including anxiety and depression. At a hearing, the ALJ determined that Ruenger had not worked within the claim period, that his mental and physical impairments were severe but did not presumptively establish a disability, and that he had the capacity to perform light work with certain physical and social limitations. At the final step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined—based on a vocational expert’s testimony—that Ruenger could still perform jobs that exist nationwide in significant numbers and denied Ruenger’s application.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision. ALJs cannot afford complete discretion to vocational experts. When a claimant challenges a vocational expert’s job-number estimate, the ALJ must inquire whether the methodology used by the expert is reliable. In this case, the vocational expert enlisted by the agency to estimate the number of jobs suitable for Ruenger omitted crucial details about her methodology, such as the source of her job numbers and the reason she used the equal distribution method; the ALJ nevertheless relied on the expert’s testimony. View "Ruenger v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

After his co-conspirator gave officers details about a plan to defraud a university and about previous fraudulent schemes, Mboule was charged and signed a plea agreement. The agreement provided that Mboule was entitled to a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility and contained an appellate waiver. Mboule participated in a pre-plea proffer session with an FBI agent. Mboule broke his promise to provide complete and truthful information. After a plea colloquy, the district judge accepted Mboule’s plea. At the initial sentencing hearing, the government objected to the PSR’s acceptance-of-responsibility recommendation and presented information about the proffer session. The court also heard testimony from a victim of a different wire fraud that Mboule committed. The district court concluded that Mboule violated his plea agreement.Mboule moved to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that Mboule’s previous trial counsel failed to inform Mboule that he could “enter[] an open plea of guilty.” The court denied the motion, noting that Mboule did not express dissatisfaction with his attorney or a desire to cancel the plea agreement until he saw the consequences of his lies. Mboule was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment, within the guidelines range of 37-46 months. The court advised Mboule of his right to appeal but stated that “[appellate] waivers are generally enforceable.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Mboule has not shown that the plea agreement should be voided in its entirety; the appellate waiver is applicable. View "United States v. Mboule" on Justia Law

For almost 30 years, Prill worked for the Eau Claire, Wisconsin County Highway Department performing physically demanding work, including driving a dump truck and maintaining roads. She suffered from pain in her lower back and knees, which was exacerbated by a car accident and multiple work injuries. Prill retired in 2014 and later filed for Social Security disability benefits alleging she could no longer perform heavy or medium work. Several doctors examined Prill or reviewed her medical records but reached different conclusions about her physical limitations.An ALJ found Prill’s testimony only partially credible, concluding that her report about the severity of her symptoms and the extent of her limitations was inconsistent with other record evidence. The ALJ also weighed the competing medical evidence and gave greater weight to the opinions of consulting physicians who reviewed Prill’s medical records than to the opinion of Prill’s treating physician. The ALJ concluded that Prill had not been disabled since August 2014. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied her request for review. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. The court rejected arguments the ALJ wrongly discounted Prill’s subjective allegations and improperly weighed the differing medical opinions. View "Prill v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law