Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seven years into his 15-year sentence for heroin dealing, Brock sought early discharge under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Receiving that relief depended on Brock first identifying a legally cognizable “extraordinary and compelling” reason for ending his sentence early and then convincing the district court the outcome was further justified by an application of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Brock argued, as “an extraordinary and compelling ground to consider a lower sentence,” that his 2005 cocaine conviction was no longer a proper predicate for his 21 U.S.C. 851 sentencing enhancement because the Illinois statute under which he was convicted covers isomers of cocaine omitted from the federal definition of cocaine.The district court denied relief, finding that the compassionate release statute could not be used as a path to a sentence reduction based on a position available to defendants during plea negotiations or trial, direct appeal, or in a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenging a sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Intervening Circuit precedent, even if viewed as announcing new law or a new interpretation of an existing statutory provision, cannot alone constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason authorizing a reduced sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Brock" on Justia Law

Stevenson was injured in the course of his employment while moving a portable ladder in order to clean a component of a Windmoeller printing press. The ladder was supplied with the machine and was necessary to reach an interior printing plate. The ladder caught on the cable attached to the machine, which caused Stevenson to twist and injure his shoulder and back; he required surgery.Stevenson’s product-liability suit argued that the design of the machine, including the placement of the cable near the access door used to service the machine’s interior components, was defective and foreseeably gave rise to his injury. Stevenson asked the court to appoint an engineering expert. Fed. R. Evid. 706 codifies the power of a trial judge to appoint an expert to function as a neutral expert serving the court rather than any party. The district court denied this motion, reasoning Stevenson was really asking for the appointment of an expert to support his case, rather than a neutral expert. Stevenson contends that the month that the court allowed him to respond to a subsequent summary judgment motion was insufficient to hire his own expert, allow related discovery, and file his response.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Windmoeller. Only an advocate expert could have filled the gap in Stevenson’s case. Stevenson could have asked for pre-authorization of the payment for such an expert from a court fund under Local Rule 83.40. View "Stevenson v. Windmoeller & Hoelscher Corp." on Justia Law

Shaw served 10 years in prison for possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a felon, then began a six-year term of supervision. During the first two months, Shaw tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and amphetamine, and was arrested for driving on a revoked license. Two months later, Shaw’s probation officer reported that Shaw had violated the terms of home confinement and submitted a fake paystub. Six months later, Shaw received another citation for driving on a revoked license. A month after that, Shaw was caught driving without a license, while traveling outside the judicial district without permission. The court ordered Shaw to spend five weekends in county jail, where Shaw got into an argument with jail staff, threatened to kill himself, threatened to flood his cell, and made an implied threat against the staff.The district court revoked Shaw’s supervised release and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment—well above the range recommended by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The court did not mention the sentencing factors from 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) but explained that it was sending Shaw to prison to “help” him and give him a chance to access rehabilitative programs. The Seventh Circuit vacated: imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a). View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank employed Chanu and Vorley as precious metals traders. They received training that “market manipulation” was prohibited. The two engaged in “spoofing,” placing orders for precious metals futures contracts on one side of the market that, at the time the orders were placed, they intended to cancel prior to execution. At times they placed opposite orders. The government alleged that they placed such orders with the intent “to create and communicate false and misleading information regarding supply or demand in order to deceive other traders” and entice them to react to the false and misleading increase in supply or demand. After the court rejected Speedy Trial Act motions, the two were acquitted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. 1343. Vorley was convicted of three counts of wire fraud; Chanu was found guilty of seven counts of wire fraud.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manual spoofing violated the wire fraud statute; the defendants’ s actions amounted to a scheme to defraud by means of false representations or omissions and the implied misrepresentations were material. The court upheld the denial of the defendants’ request to modify jury instructions explaining the term “scheme to defraud” and to issue a good‐faith instruction. The court found no legal error in the district court's ends‐of‐justice rationale for excluding time in considering Speedy Trial issues. View "United States v. Chanu" on Justia Law

Mangine, serving a 35- year sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses, sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that the sentencing court mischaracterized him as a career offender and that the error resulted in his ineligibility for a discretionary sentence reduction he would like to pursue under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His previous post-conviction motions under sections 2266 and 2241 had been unsuccessful. He had previously been denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2); Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes. did not change his Guidelines range as originally calculated.The district court denied relief, concluding that such ineligibility does not amount to a miscarriage of justice—thereby precluding Mangine from satisfying the conditions for pursuing post-conviction relief under section 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mangine could no longer be designated as a career offender in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions but that is not what drove his sentence. Even without the designation, his Guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. Mangine did not receive “far greater punishment than that usually meted out for an otherwise similarly situated individual who had committed the same offense.” He did not suffer a miscarriage of justice. View "Mangine v. Withers" on Justia Law

Brooks began working for Avancez in 2018. She alleges that there were statements about her age and being slow. Brooks had problems with coworkers. Shortly before her termination, Brooks stated, in a meeting, that she was a veteran and has PTSD. The others claim that she said “anything can happen,” which they interpreted as a threat. Brooks denies making a threat. Brooks refused to sign a disciplinary form and wrote a letter, complaining of age discrimination, a hostile work environment, and harassment by co-workers that was causing her PTSD to “go into relapse.” A month later, Brooks received a three-day suspension for bypassing a quality-control system meant to detect errors in products. Following a subsequent incident, a coworker claimed that Brooks threatened her by saying “we can take it outside.” After an investigation, Brooks was terminated “for disrespectful and disruptive conduct and attitude and for insubordination for failing to sign personnel meeting notes.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her claims of discrimination based on age and disability (PTSD). Brooks has not provided evidence that the stated reason for her discharge is a pretext for illegal discrimination. View "Brooks v. Avancez" on Justia Law

Jody arrived at the Indiana University Health emergency room with severe abdominal pain. Doctors determined she needed emergency surgery to remove a dying portion of her intestine. Because they believed (incorrectly) that the problem stemmed from earlier gastric bypass surgery, they transferred her to another facility to be operated on by the bariatric surgeon who had performed the bypass. Jody died two days later. Her husband sued, alleging that IU’s failure to operate on Jody violated its obligation under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act to “stabilize” Jody when it decided to transfer her without first performing the laparotomy and removing the ischemic portions of her intestine, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1)(A).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. The Act authorizes pre-stabilization transfer where one of two triggering conditions is satisfied and the transfer is “appropriate.” No reasonable jury could conclude that IU did not satisfy both requirements. A physician certified that “[b]ased upon the information available to [him] at the time of transfer, … the medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another facility outweigh the increased risks to [Jody] … from undertaking the transfer.” The court cited the “Treatment Act’s narrow purpose as an anti-dumping law rather than a federal cause of action for medical malpractice.” View "Martindale v. Indiana University Health Bloomington, Inc." on Justia Law

Fairway, co-owned by Johnson, who is African-American and Native-American, contracted with FedEx to deliver packages. FedEx later assigned Fairway's contract to another company. Johnson's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleged racial discrimination and breach of contract. A second complaint was voluntarily dismissed. According to FedEx, an arbitration settlement was reached, under which Johnson released all claims against FedEx. Johnson disputes that she was a party to any settlement.Johnson filed another suit against FedEx, claiming racial discrimination and that FedEx blocked a contract assignment to her as an individual and prevented an assignment to BN, a company of which she was the majority shareholder. The court dismissed her suit, rejecting Johnson’s argument that as Fairway’s business contact, she qualified as a party to the contract. Johnson was granted two weeks to amend her complaint, according to precise directions concerning the need for proof that Johnson asked FedEx to approve an assignment to Johnson. Johnson's amended complaint replaced herself as the plaintiff with a corporation, DJM, asserting she “was to be the majority shareholder” of DJM. The complaint did not allege that FedEx had blocked an attempted assignment to Johnson individually but alleged that FedEx blocked an assignment to DJM.The court dismissed, noting the “four-year statute of limitations for Johnson’s Section 1981 claim ha[d] elapsed.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Given this procedural history, the district court could have done more than admonish Johnson.” FedEx could have been awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees. View "DJM Logistics, Inc. v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc." on Justia Law

Tribune and Sinclair announced an agreement to merge. Tribune abandoned the merger and sued Sinclair, accusing it of failing to comply with its contractual commitment to “use reasonable best efforts” to satisfy the demands of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the FCC, both of which could block the merger. Sinclair settled that suit for $60 million; the settlement disclaims liability. While the merger agreement was in place, investors bought and sold Tribune’s stock. In this class action investors alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose that Sinclair was “playing hardball with the regulators,” increasing the risk that the merger would be stymied.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The principal claims, which rest on the 1934 Act, failed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Questionable statements, such as predictions that the merger was likely to proceed, were forward-looking and shielded from liability because Tribune expressly cautioned investors about the need for regulatory approval and the fact that the merging firms could prove unwilling to do what regulators sought, 15 U.S.C. 78u–5(c)(1)..With respect to the 1933 Act, the registration statement and prospectus through which the shares were offered stated all of the material facts. The relevant “hardball” actions occurred after the plaintiffs purchased shares. “Plaintiffs suppose that, during a major corporate transaction, managers’ thoughts must be an open book." No statute or regulation requires that. View "Arbitrage Event-Driven Fund v. Tribune Media Co." on Justia Law

Illinois moved its Medicaid program from a fee‐for‐service model, where a state agency pays providers’ medical bills, to one dominated by managed care, where private insurers pay medical bills. Most patients of Saint Anthony Hospital are covered by Medicaid, so Saint Anthony depends on Medicaid payments. Over the last four years, it has lost roughly 98% of its cash reserves, allegedly because managed‐care organizations have repeatedly and systematically delayed and reduced Medicaid payments to it. Saint Anthony sued, arguing that Illinois officials owe it a duty under the Medicaid Act to remedy the late and short payments.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that Saint Anthony has alleged a viable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1396u‐ 2(f) and may seek injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the state official who administers the Medicaid program in Illinois. Illinois has tools available to remedy systemic slow payment problems—problems alleged to be so serious that they threaten the viability of a major hospital and even of the managed‐care Medicaid program as administered in Illinois. If Saint Anthony can prove its claims, the chief state official could be ordered to use some of those tools to remedy systemic problems that threaten this literally vital health care program. View "Saint Anthony Hospital v. Eagleson" on Justia Law