Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being fired from the CTA, Miller and McGuire (both Caucasian) sued their former employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal (42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Illinois state law. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Despite receiving two extensions, however, Miller and McGuire failed to respond. Finding no persuasive excuse for this failure, the district court denied their third extension and took up the motion without a responsive pleading. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence did not support the claims and granted CTA summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension, and evidence of basic elements of a retaliation claim was lacking. Miller and McGuire could not avoid summary judgment based on the suspicious timing of their discharges alone unless, “[a]t minimum,” they first produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Bonds (a CTA officer) knew of their EEO complaints. They did not. Undisputed evidence showed that CTA had legitimate (nonracial) reasons for terminating Miller and McGuire’s employment and these reasons were not pretextual. View "Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Based on his perception that Cole was following another vehicle too closely, Illinois Trooper Chapman stopped Cole. The initial stop lasted 10 minutes. Chapman spent about six minutes questioning Cole, then told Cole that he would get a warning but that, for safety reasons, they had to go to a gas station to complete the paperwork. Chapman testified later that he had already decided that he was not going to release Cole before searching the car. Chapman requested a drug-sniffing dog and learned that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier. At the gas station, Cole’s answers became contradictory; 30 minutes after the stop, Chapman told Cole that he could not leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. The dog arrived 10 minutes later and alerted. Chapman found several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin in a hidden compartment. The Seventh Circuit initially reversed the denial of Cole’s motion to suppress. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial. Travel-plan questions ordinarily fall within the mission of a traffic stop but, like other police inquiries during a traffic stop, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Here they were reasonable. The trooper inquired about the basic details of Cole’s travel, and his follow-up questions were justified given Cole’s less-than-forthright answers. The stop itself was lawfully initiated, and the trooper developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before moving to the gas station for the dog sniff. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a) Clanton alleged that nurse practitioner Jordan, an employee of the U.S. Public Health Service, failed to educate him about his severe hypertension or to monitor its advancement; his hypertension developed into Stage V kidney disease so that Clanton required dialysis and, at the age of 35, a kidney transplant. The district court rejected the government’s comparative negligence argument as to Clanton and awarded Clanton nearly $30 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit upheld the damages calculation but remanded for the court to assess Clanton’s comparative negligence under Illinois’s reasonable-person standard, noting that Clanton had external clues that he was seriously unwell, such as two employment-related physicals which showed dangerously high blood pressure.On remand, the court again concluded that comparative negligence was inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court made findings as to what an objectively reasonable person would understand as to hypertension and found that a reasonable person would not understand the potential for damage absent any symptoms, and therefore would not understand the need to take medication or see a medical provider when asymptomatic. Based on those findings, the court held that Clanton’s actions were not inconsistent with the due care that would be expected of a reasonable person. The government did not challenge whether the fact-findings and conclusion were supportable; the court properly identified and applied the standard. View "Clanton v. United States" on Justia Law

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) asked the Southern District of Indiana to oversee a multidistrict litigation docket to coordinate discovery and other pretrial proceedings in thousands of medical product-liability suits, alleging that Cook’s inferior vena cava (IVC) filters were defective. The court and the parties agreed to a procedure by which new plaintiffs could join the MDL by filing directly in the Southern District of Indiana rather than filing in their home districts and waiting for the judiciary’s administrative machinery to transfer their cases to the MDL in Indiana. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuits directly in the Indiana MDL rather than filing in the states where they lived and had their IVC filters implanted.Cook moved to dismiss both cases based on Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The plaintiffs’ home states (South Carolina and Mississippi) have three-year statutes. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suits. The unique facts of this case indicate that Cook implicitly consented to using choice-of-law rules for these plaintiffs as if they had filed in their home states. It was not fair to allow Cook to change positions retroactively to dismiss these plaintiffs’ cases that had been timely filed under the “law of the case.” View "Looper v. Cook Inc." on Justia Law

DEA obtained a search warrant for Perryman’s Indianapolis home. Agents arrived at the property, read Perryman his Miranda rights, then searched the home. In the master suite, they found fentanyl, baggies, a digital scale, and a loaded AR-15 rifle, three to four steps away from the fentanyl, along with men’s shoes and clothes. Perryman’s girlfriend, Moore, lived elsewhere but had signed the lease for the home. Moore said that the drugs, money, and gun were not hers. The agents read Perryman his Miranda rights for a second time. He agreed to talk. He admitted that the drugs were his, then provided the agents with the name of his drug supplier but said the rifle “belonged to a girlfriend.”Perryman was indicted for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, 922(g)(1). The court excluded questioning concerning the disciplinary record of Sergeant Jones, who participated in the search of Perryman’s home. Jones’ 15-year-old disciplinary offense resulted in a reprimand and stemmed from an unrelated investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Perryman’s convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and, under the Confrontation Clause, to the exclusion of evidence relating to Jones’ disciplinary record. View "United States v. Perryman" on Justia Law

Under a 2014 policy, United pilots only accrued sick time during the first 90 days of military leave. Moss, a pilot and a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, sued, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, which requires employers to provide employees on military leave any seniority-based benefit the employee would have accrued but for the military leave. He claimed that sick time is a seniority-based benefit that should have continuously accrued or sick-time accrual was available to pilots on comparable periods of leave.The district court granted United summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For a benefit to be seniority-based, the benefit must be a reward for length of service. Sick leave is not such a reward but is "a future-oriented longevity incentive." United’s sick-time accrual policy contains a work requirement and is in the nature of compensation, not a reward for long service. . View "Moss v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

BGC secured a $3.1 million mortgage loan from Romspen for the Arlington commercial property. Following a Foreclosure Judgment but before the sale of the property, the parties negotiated an agreement. Romspen agreed to forbear from exercising remedies for 60 days and to reinstate the loan and extend the maturity date for two years. BGC agreed to make a $1.6 million payment on the loan. Meanwhile, BGC learned that Romspen had filed a lien against BGC’s 1907 property. BGC had planned to refinance the 1907 Property to make the payment on the Arlington property required by the Forbearance Agreement. Romspen agreed to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to remove the lien. When BGC failed to provide proof of a refinancing plan for the Arlington Property, Romspen refused to remove the lien on the 1907 Property.After the foreclosure sale of the Arlington Property, BGC sought to file a counterclaim alleging that Romspen had breached the Forbearance Agreement. Romspen sought an order confirming the sale of the property. The Seventh Circuit confirmed the denial of BGC’s motion and the sale of the Arlington Property. Romspen did not breach the Forbearance Agreement because it made “commercially reasonable efforts” to remove the lien on the 1907 Property. Romspen was on solid ground in requesting some concrete proof of BGC's refinancing efforts before agreeing to remove the lien. View "Romspen Mortgage L.P. v. BGC Holdings LLC - Arlington Place One" on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Davises took out a mortgage on their residence in 2005. After they defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy, Jerome Davis, a licensed attorney who represented himself, received a bankruptcy discharge. The bankruptcy court later held that the discharge did not extend to the debt Davis owed CitiMortgage. Rather than appeal, Davis first attempted to remove CitiMortgage’s foreclosure action to federal court, alleging that CitiMortgage’s efforts to obtain a personal deficiency judgment contravened his bankruptcy discharge. He then filed a separate suit alleging unfair debt collection practices against CitiMortgage. Davis lost in each of those proceedings. CitiMortgage was awarded attorney fees and costs, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) when the court remanded the foreclosure proceeding for lack of federal question jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit dismissed Davis’s appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to review the remand order. Davis waived his arguments challenging the attorney fees and costs award. The court upheld the dismissal of Davis’s suit against CitiMortgage; all of Davis’s claims center on his contention that the debt owed CitiMortgage was subject to his 2018 discharge. The court took judicial notice that the bankruptcy court had held the opposite in Davis’s adversary proceeding. View "Davis v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Dollar General contracts separately with Capstone and CHEP for work at its Marion, Indiana distribution center. Dollar General owned certain power equipment at the distribution center, including all pallet jacks. Capstone and CHEP employees were permitted to use Dollar General’s jacks. Dollar General personnel were responsible for maintaining the jacks. Capstone and CHEP employees who had an issue with a jack were to take it to the Dollar General maintenance shop and fill out a “red tag.”Capstone employed Seekins to unload trucks at the distribution center. Seekins lost his left foot as a result of an accident involving a jack and sued CHEP. Seekins alleged that the jack had possibly been used by a CHEP employee before Seekins and that CHEP’s alleged failure to remove the jack from service meant that CHEP effectively supplied it to Seekins.The district court entered summary judgment, holding that CHEP did not owe Seekins a duty of care under Indiana negligence law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. CHEP was not a “supplier” as that term is used in the Indiana statute. The sharing of equipment owned, controlled, and maintained by a third company does not create a duty of care. View "Seekins v. CHEP USA" on Justia Law