Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hassebrock, having served his sentence for tax crimes, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of coram nobis. He had argued ineffective assistance, that trial errors undermined the validity of his conviction, and that Congress lacked authority to impose criminal penalties for tax code violations. The court dismissed the petition as an unauthorized successive habeas petition,The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had jurisdiction. The separate judgment requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 applies to coram nobis petitions. The district court here did not file a separate judgment. Hassebrock’s notice of appeal, filed within 60 days of the 150-day window, was, therefore timely. On the merits, the court concluded that although Hassebrock is no longer ‘in custody’ and meets the criterion, he is not entitled to coram nobis relief. The writ is available only in “extraordinary cases” when there is an error so fundamental as to render the conviction invalid, there are sound reasons for the failure to seek relief earlier, and the petitioner continues to suffer from his conviction. Hassebrock could have raised all his arguments either on direct appeal or in his previous section 2255 motion, and he offered no reason for failing to do so. The primary argument he raises in his coram nobis petition—ineffective assistance of counsel—was rejected in his section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Hassebrock" on Justia Law

Perez was a member of the Latin Kings street gang in Maywood, Illinois, and served in several leadership positions in which he ordered or personally carried out acts of violence, including the attempted murder of a former gang member. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and possessing a firearm as a felon, section 922(g)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence to concurrent terms of 336 months and 120 months in prison, respectively—below the advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The judge correctly determined that the RICO violation was “based on” an act of racketeering that is punishable by life imprisonment under state law— discharging a firearm in an attempted murder—a predicate act that raised the applicable maximum penalty from 20 years to life under section 1963(a). Perez’s argument about unwarranted sentencing disparities was waived because at sentencing the judge twice asked Perez’s counsel whether he was satisfied with the court’s explanation of the sentence, and both times counsel failed to mention any section 3553(a)(6) concerns. Waiver aside, a sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range necessarily complies with section 3553(a)(6). View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Cory died in her bed in 2006. Although young, Cory was severely alcoholic, bulimic, and had been sick with flu-like symptoms. An autopsy revealed “marked steatosis of the liver” and no signs of trauma. Investigators verified her husband, Curt’s, timeline and interviewed their three children, who had seen Cory alive before Curt took them to school. Dr. Bowman, who conducted the autopsy, indicated that the cause of death was inconclusive and did not suggest foul play.Seven years later, Detective Gibson, reviewing old files, noticed a photo of Cory’s body and concluded that Curt had suffocated Cory with a pillow the evening before her death was reported. The photos had been taken after Cory’s arms were repositioned. Gibson launched a murder investigation. Coroner Keller joined Gibson’s effort, claiming without corroboration, that Cory’s body had been in full rigor and that the room had smelled bad. The two “searched” for experts until finding Dr. Turner, to whom they provided limited information. Turner prepared a report supporting the suffocation hypothesis. Curt was arrested and spent 21 months in jail, followed by nine months under house arrest. After a mistrial, FOIA requests revealed undisclosed evidence. In 2017, a jury acquitted Curt. Curt sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on fabrication and manipulation of evidence and on violations of his “Brady” right to be provided with exculpatory evidence, and a Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution” claim premised on Curt’s detention, without probable cause. The district court denied the officials’ motions, seeking qualified immunity . The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part, citing lack of jurisdiction over the Fourth Amendment claim. Curt withdrew his Fourteenth Amendment claim as precluded by circuit precedent. View "Lovelace v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff on drug-interdiction duty in central Illinois observed an RV with a dirty license plate traveling on I-72 and followed it, exiting the freeway and pulling into a truck-stop parking lot. The driver, Ahmad, entered the convenience store with one of his passengers. A store employee informed the deputy that the men were acting strangely. The officer asked to speak with them. They agreed. After a few preliminary questions, the deputy asked for Ahmad’s driver’s license and the vehicle's rental agreement. Ahmad produced the documents. The deputy then asked for consent to search the RV. Ahmad agreed. The deputy did not immediately conduct a search but called for a K-9 unit, which arrived minutes later. Ahmad agreed to a dog sniff of the RV. The dog alerted about 15 minutes into the encounter. The deputy searched the RV, where a large quantity of marijuana was discovered.Ahmad moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that his consent to search was involuntary because he had already been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the deputy retained his driver’s license and the RV rental agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The deputy’s brief possession of Ahmad’s license and rental agreement did not transform this otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Ahmad voluntarily consented to both the external dog sniff and the search of the RV. View "United States v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

In 2017, a bankruptcy court discharged Persinger’s debts, under 11 U.S.C. 727. A few months later, Southwest Credit began collection efforts on a pre‐petition debt of Persinger’s, including by acquiring a type of credit information called her “propensity‐to‐pay score.” Alleging that this information had been secured without a permissible purpose, Persinger sued Southwest under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681.The district court granted Southwest summary judgment, holding that Southwest’s compliance procedures were reasonable and met FCRA’s requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that Persinger has standing to sue. Southwest invaded her privacy when it reviewed her credit information but no reasonable juror could conclude that the inquiry into Persinger’s propensity‐to‐pay score resulted in actual damages. If a plaintiff cannot prove actual damages, she may still recover statutory or punitive damages by proving that the defendant willfully violated FCRA. Viewed as a whole, Southwest’s procedures for handling bankruptcy notifications and for ordering bankruptcy scrubs from LexisNexis were reasonable compliance efforts, not willful violations of the FCRA. At the time Southwest ordered the credit score, it was unaware that the debt at issue had been discharged. View "Persinger v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P." on Justia Law

Chicago Police Officers Elizondo and Salgado used their positions to embezzle drugs and cash, some of which they distributed to informants. They encouraged informants to present false information to state judges to obtain search warrants, which yielded more drugs and cash. The FBI's first sting operation failed. After obtaining court authorization to wiretap Elizondo’s phone, the FBI conducted another sting operation and recorded Elizondo and Salgado stealing cash they recovered from an FBI-controlled rental vehicle. Salgado saw law enforcement towing the rental vehicle the next day, and told Elizondo, who instructed Salgado to “relocate” items from Salgado’s home. Both were convicted of conspiracy and theft; Elizondo was also convicted of obstruction of justice for instructing Salgado to destroy or conceal evidence. Elizondo was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. Salgado was sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The wiretap application was not an improper subterfuge search because the government was forthright about the scope of its investigation. The district court followed the applicable steps in its “Batson” inquiry. The trial evidencel on the obstruction charge was sufficient for the jury to infer that Elizondo acted with the intent to prevent the use of evidence in an official proceeding. There was no clear error in the loss calculation at sentencing. View "United States v. Elizondo" on Justia Law

In 2016, Lax raised concerns about discrimination. After notification of his right to file a formal complaint, Lax filed a formal complaint of disability discrimination against his employer (DHS), alleging he had been improperly placed on indefinite suspension and had his security clearance suspended after he checked himself into a hospital for mental health treatment and missed two days of work.DHS's final agency decision, rejecting Lax’s complaint, was sent to Lax’s work email address on July 17, 2019. One minute later, Lax was sent the password to open an attachment, which contained: the final decision, a “Notice of Appeal Rights,” a privacy statement, and a certificate of service. The “Notice of Appeal Rights” stated that Lax had the right to file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving the final decision. Lax concedes that he opened these emails and read them on the day they were sent but claims that he was unable to open the attached document until the next day; government security measures prevented him from accessing his work email account on any non-work device.On October 16, 2019 (91 days after July 17), Lax filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(f)(1). Lax did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances element for equitable tolling. View "Lax v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Buncich, while serving as Sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, received thousands of dollars from local towing companies that received lucrative towing contracts within the county. A jury convicted Buncich of wire fraud and bribery in 2017, and he was sentenced to 188 months in prison. Following an earlier appeal that vacated three counts of conviction, he was resentenced to 151 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in its Sentencing Guideline calculation, that the court failed to explain its guideline findings sufficiently and made other procedural errors, and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court upheld the “benefit calculation” under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2), which requires an offense-level increase if “the value of the payment” or “the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment” exceeded $6,500. The probation officer estimated that the benefit received was $108,650. The combination of the presentence report, the exploration of the benefit-received issue at the two sentencing hearings, and the district court’s resolution in favor of the presentence report’s view are sufficient to permit meaningful review. The sentencing judge understood his obligation to independently decide whether the Guideline sentence achieved the goals of section 3553(a). View "United States v. Buncich" on Justia Law

Wisconsin provides transportation to private-school students, limited to only one school “affiliated or operated by a single sponsoring group” within any given attendance area. The state superintendent decided that St. Augustine, a freestanding entity that describes itself as Catholic but independent of the church’s hierarchy, is “affiliated with or operated by” the same sponsoring group as St. Gabriel, which is run by the Catholic Archdiocese.In 2018, the Seventh Circuit rejected a suit by St. Augustine. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of intervening precedent. The Seventh Circuit then certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the question of how to determine “affiliation” under state law. That court responded: [I]n determining whether schools are “affiliated with the same religious denomination” [i.e., the same sponsoring group] pursuant to Wis. Stat. 121.51, the Superintendent is not limited to consideration of a school’s corporate documents exclusively. In conducting a neutral and secular inquiry, the Superintendent may also consider the professions of the school with regard to the school’s self-identification and affiliation, but the Superintendent may not conduct any investigation or surveillance with respect to the school’s religious beliefs, practices, or teachings.The Seventh Circuit then reversed. The Superintendent’s decision was not justified by neutral and secular considerations, but necessarily and exclusively rested on a doctrinal determination that both schools were part of a single sponsoring group—the Roman Catholic church—because their religious beliefs, practices, or teachings were similar enough. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

Cothron works as a manager at an Illinois White Castle restaurant where she must scan her fingerprint to access the restaurant’s computer system. With each scan, her fingerprint is collected and transmitted to a third-party vendor for authentication. Cothron alleges that White Castle did not obtain her written consent before implementing the fingerprint-scanning system, violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1. She brought a proposed class-action lawsuit on behalf of all Illinois White Castle employees. White Castle argued that a claim accrued under the Act the first time Cothron scanned her fingerprint into the system after the law took effect in 2008, making her suit untimely. Cothron responded that every unauthorized fingerprint scan amounted to a separate violation of the statute, so a new claim accrued with each scan.The district judge rejected White Castle’s “one time only” theory but certified an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court: Do section 15(b) and 15(d) claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, or only upon the first scan and first transmission? View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law