Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mansfield entered an open guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. His PSR recommended an imprisonment range of 188-235 months and listed 26 “[o]ther [a]rrests” in 1992-2013, involving at least 49 charges, including domestic battery and battery resulting in bodily injury, resisting law enforcement, felony intimidation, neglect of a dependent, and drug possession charges culminating in two 2013 felony charges for “Dealing in Cocaine or Narcotic,” and three 2013 felony charges for “Possession of Cocaine or Narcotic.” The disposition for 48 charges was “Dismissed,” “No Action Taken,” or “Unknown.” A 1999 criminal trespass charge was listed as “Not guilty.”Mansfield sought a downward departure but never challenged the accuracy of the PSR or the inclusion of Mansfield’s arrest history. Mansfield raised no objections at the sentencing hearing. The court referenced the parties’ statements, the sentencing memorandum, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting the presence of young girls at the drug bust, past leniency, evidence of Mansfield’s desire to improve, and the potential effects of COVID-19 on Mansfield’s health, with a two-sentence reference to Mansfield’s arrest history. The court pronounced a sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment. Mansfield raised no objections.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mansfield waived his challenge to the court’s consideration of his arrest history. Even if this point was not waived, a substantial history of arrests, especially if they are similar to the offense of conviction, can be a reliable factor to consider at sentencing. View "United States v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

In 2010, Leszanczuk executed a mortgage contract, securing a loan on her Illinois residence. The mortgage was insured by the FHA. After Carrington acquired the mortgage, Leszanczuk contacted Carrington by phone in December 2016 to make her December payment. Leszanczuk asserts that Carrington told her that her account was not yet set up in their system and that her account was in a “grace period.” In early 2017 Carrington found Leszanczuk to be in default and conducted a visual drive-by inspection of Leszanczuk’s property. Carrington charged Leszanczuk $20.00 for the inspection and disclosed the fee in her March 2017 statement. Leszanczuk claims Carrington knew or should have known that she occupied her property because of the phone conversation and Carrington mailed monthly mortgage statements to the property’s address.Leszanczuk sued Carrington for breach of the mortgage contract and for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, on behalf of putative nationwide and Illinois classes. She alleged that a HUD regulation limits the fees Carrington may charge under the contract and that the inspection fee was an unfair practice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The mortgage contract expressly permits the disputed fee. Leszanczuk has failed to adequately allege that the inspection fee offended public policy, was oppressive, or caused substantial injury. View "Leszanczuk v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ludwig hiking group purchased vehicle passes from the ranger station in Oregon's Mount Hood Wilderness, federal land administered by the Forest Service, which provides parking areas and trail access. As the hikers crossed the Sandy River on a wooden seasonal bridge installed by the Service, a logjam ruptured, sending a wave of water and debris at the bridge. Ludwig was thrown into the river and drowned.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government in a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671. Oregon statutes create immunity for a landowner from tort claims for any death that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes unless the owner charges for that recreational use; tort immunity applies if the owner charges only a “parking fee of $15 or less per day.” The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act allows the Service to charge a standard amenity fee for an area that contains designated parking; a permanent toilet facility; a permanent trash receptacle; picnic tables; and security services. The Forest Service requires Ramona Falls visitors to purchase a $5 "National Forest Recreation Pass" to park; it tells users to “DISPLAY IN VEHICLE.” The Service does not require a pass or collect fees from hikers, bikers, and horseback riders who do not park a vehicle. It does not matter that the Service included other amenities; the charge was, ultimately, for parking. View "Ludwig v. United States" on Justia Law

From 2010-2017, Issa stole from Weston (his employer), Weston’s family members, and other individuals from whom he solicited money for phony investments. As Weston’s Chief Financial Officer, Issa wielded power of attorney for Weston and exercised almost total control over the family’s considerable assets. Through forgery and fraud, Issa transferred tens of millions of dollars in Weston assets to his own accounts. Issa bought at least 25 residential properties, two private planes, four yachts, and 60 firearms with money that he stole, totaling $77,494,657.Issa pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Issa agreed that his offense level should be “increased by 2 levels, pursuant to Guideline 3A1.1(b)(1) because [Issa] knew or should have known" that at least one victim was a vulnerable victim. Issa knew of Weston’s mother’s illness and that another victim was recently widowed. The district court allowed the Westons to make oral statements at sentencing,. In pronouncing the sentence, the district court noted “the very personal nature of the offense,” and the suggestion that Issa named his children after the Westons to ingratiate himself. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Issa’s 200-month sentence, below the 235–293 months Guidelines range, rejecting arguments that the district court violated Issa’s due process rights by admitting and relying upon the victims’ sentencing submissions and applying a vulnerable victim enhancement. View "United States v. Issa" on Justia Law

In 2015, Alverez, Verejano‐Contreras, and Bacallao‐Fernandez created 647 fake credit cards and made $52,631.15 in fraudulent purchases. Verejano‐Contreras absconded and is a fugitive. Bacallao‐Fernandez pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony, was sentenced to 12 months’ probation, and was ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution. The restitution was imposed on a joint and several basis with his co‐defendants.Alverez was convicted of three counts of access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a), and 10 counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. Alverez was sentenced to 60 months’ incarceration, a below‐guideline sentence. The court ordered Alverez to pay over $50,000 in restitution. Inconsistencies in the sentencing records regarding the amount of restitution and the number of victim payees created confusion regarding that order. The judgment further specified that Alverez was jointly and severally liable for the restitution with her Bacallao‐Fernandez. It also set forth a payment plan.The government conceded to a remand, then agreed that the second restitution order must be vacated and remanded. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded. The restitution order did not address Alverez’s argument for joint and several liability, nor her apparent indigency. On remand, the district court in its discretion may elect to hold a sentencing hearing before entering a revised restitution order. View "United States v. Alverez" on Justia Law

Hassebrock, having served his sentence for tax crimes, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of coram nobis. He had argued ineffective assistance, that trial errors undermined the validity of his conviction, and that Congress lacked authority to impose criminal penalties for tax code violations. The court dismissed the petition as an unauthorized successive habeas petition,The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had jurisdiction. The separate judgment requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 applies to coram nobis petitions. The district court here did not file a separate judgment. Hassebrock’s notice of appeal, filed within 60 days of the 150-day window, was, therefore timely. On the merits, the court concluded that although Hassebrock is no longer ‘in custody’ and meets the criterion, he is not entitled to coram nobis relief. The writ is available only in “extraordinary cases” when there is an error so fundamental as to render the conviction invalid, there are sound reasons for the failure to seek relief earlier, and the petitioner continues to suffer from his conviction. Hassebrock could have raised all his arguments either on direct appeal or in his previous section 2255 motion, and he offered no reason for failing to do so. The primary argument he raises in his coram nobis petition—ineffective assistance of counsel—was rejected in his section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Hassebrock" on Justia Law

Perez was a member of the Latin Kings street gang in Maywood, Illinois, and served in several leadership positions in which he ordered or personally carried out acts of violence, including the attempted murder of a former gang member. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and possessing a firearm as a felon, section 922(g)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence to concurrent terms of 336 months and 120 months in prison, respectively—below the advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The judge correctly determined that the RICO violation was “based on” an act of racketeering that is punishable by life imprisonment under state law— discharging a firearm in an attempted murder—a predicate act that raised the applicable maximum penalty from 20 years to life under section 1963(a). Perez’s argument about unwarranted sentencing disparities was waived because at sentencing the judge twice asked Perez’s counsel whether he was satisfied with the court’s explanation of the sentence, and both times counsel failed to mention any section 3553(a)(6) concerns. Waiver aside, a sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range necessarily complies with section 3553(a)(6). View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Cory died in her bed in 2006. Although young, Cory was severely alcoholic, bulimic, and had been sick with flu-like symptoms. An autopsy revealed “marked steatosis of the liver” and no signs of trauma. Investigators verified her husband, Curt’s, timeline and interviewed their three children, who had seen Cory alive before Curt took them to school. Dr. Bowman, who conducted the autopsy, indicated that the cause of death was inconclusive and did not suggest foul play.Seven years later, Detective Gibson, reviewing old files, noticed a photo of Cory’s body and concluded that Curt had suffocated Cory with a pillow the evening before her death was reported. The photos had been taken after Cory’s arms were repositioned. Gibson launched a murder investigation. Coroner Keller joined Gibson’s effort, claiming without corroboration, that Cory’s body had been in full rigor and that the room had smelled bad. The two “searched” for experts until finding Dr. Turner, to whom they provided limited information. Turner prepared a report supporting the suffocation hypothesis. Curt was arrested and spent 21 months in jail, followed by nine months under house arrest. After a mistrial, FOIA requests revealed undisclosed evidence. In 2017, a jury acquitted Curt. Curt sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on fabrication and manipulation of evidence and on violations of his “Brady” right to be provided with exculpatory evidence, and a Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution” claim premised on Curt’s detention, without probable cause. The district court denied the officials’ motions, seeking qualified immunity . The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part, citing lack of jurisdiction over the Fourth Amendment claim. Curt withdrew his Fourteenth Amendment claim as precluded by circuit precedent. View "Lovelace v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff on drug-interdiction duty in central Illinois observed an RV with a dirty license plate traveling on I-72 and followed it, exiting the freeway and pulling into a truck-stop parking lot. The driver, Ahmad, entered the convenience store with one of his passengers. A store employee informed the deputy that the men were acting strangely. The officer asked to speak with them. They agreed. After a few preliminary questions, the deputy asked for Ahmad’s driver’s license and the vehicle's rental agreement. Ahmad produced the documents. The deputy then asked for consent to search the RV. Ahmad agreed. The deputy did not immediately conduct a search but called for a K-9 unit, which arrived minutes later. Ahmad agreed to a dog sniff of the RV. The dog alerted about 15 minutes into the encounter. The deputy searched the RV, where a large quantity of marijuana was discovered.Ahmad moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that his consent to search was involuntary because he had already been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the deputy retained his driver’s license and the RV rental agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The deputy’s brief possession of Ahmad’s license and rental agreement did not transform this otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Ahmad voluntarily consented to both the external dog sniff and the search of the RV. View "United States v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

In 2017, a bankruptcy court discharged Persinger’s debts, under 11 U.S.C. 727. A few months later, Southwest Credit began collection efforts on a pre‐petition debt of Persinger’s, including by acquiring a type of credit information called her “propensity‐to‐pay score.” Alleging that this information had been secured without a permissible purpose, Persinger sued Southwest under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681.The district court granted Southwest summary judgment, holding that Southwest’s compliance procedures were reasonable and met FCRA’s requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that Persinger has standing to sue. Southwest invaded her privacy when it reviewed her credit information but no reasonable juror could conclude that the inquiry into Persinger’s propensity‐to‐pay score resulted in actual damages. If a plaintiff cannot prove actual damages, she may still recover statutory or punitive damages by proving that the defendant willfully violated FCRA. Viewed as a whole, Southwest’s procedures for handling bankruptcy notifications and for ordering bankruptcy scrubs from LexisNexis were reasonable compliance efforts, not willful violations of the FCRA. At the time Southwest ordered the credit score, it was unaware that the debt at issue had been discharged. View "Persinger v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P." on Justia Law