Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Howell was convicted on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to concurrent 96‐month terms. In 2020, the Seventh Circuit vacated one conviction and remanded. The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) permits federal courts to conduct by video teleconference some criminal proceedings that otherwise require the defendant’s physical presence in court, including felony resentencing. The court must make certain findings; the defendant must consent after consulting with counsel.At a video conference status hearing attended by Howell, the court stated that it needed Howell’s consent to issue a CARES Act order for sentencing by video teleconference. The court delayed the resentencing to allow Howell’s counsel to confer with him. The court issued a CARES Act order saying that “Howell moved to proceed with a video‐conference resentencing,” and made the necessary findings. There is no record of that motion. During the hearing, Howell’s counsel acknowledged that she had had the opportunity to speak with Howell about the hearing. Neither Howell nor his counsel objected to the video teleconference hearing. The judge reimposed a 96‐month prison term. Howell had already served 96 months' imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record sufficiently indicated that Howell was informed his consent was required; that he conferred with his counsel; and that the judge, lawyers, and Howell proceeded with the understanding that Howell had consented to the video teleconference. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

Ewing and Webster disputed debts they allegedly owed to debt‐collection companies. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, debt‐collection companies must report such disputes to credit reporting agencies, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(8), but the companies failed to do so. The plaintiffs sued separately, seeking damages. The companies prevailed at summary judgment. Both district courts determined that the companies’ mistakes were bona fide errors.In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit first held that the plaintiffs suffered intangible, reputational injuries, sufficiently concrete for purposes of Article III standing; they have shown that their injury is related closely to the harm caused by defamation. The court affirmed as to Ewing and reversed as to Webster. In Ewing’s case, a receptionist accidentally forwarded Ewing’s faxed dispute letter to the wrong department. The company had reasonably adapted procedures; if its step‐by‐step fax procedures had been followed, the error would have been avoided. Unlike the one‐time misstep in Ewing, a lack of procedures invited the Webster error. Until debtors and their attorneys knew that the collection company no longer accepted disputes by fax, it was entirely foreseeable that it would continue receiving faxed disputes. There were no procedures to avoid the error that occurred. View "Webster v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Correction since 2004. For eight years, he was in solitary confinement, where his mental health deteriorated. Sanders has attempted suicide and engaged in self-harm multiple times. He claims that self-mutilation was a pre-condition for solitary confinement inmates to speak with a mental health person. Sanders filed suit and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Sanders cited the “imminent danger exception.”The district court initially granted his IFP application but later revoked its grant, finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that he was in imminent danger. The Seventh Circuit reinstated his IFP status. Sanders adequately alleged his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional Center would lead him to self-harm. The district court erroneously determined that the allegations were fraudulent and did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Reynolds, born in 1992, graduated from high school and previously worked part-time in retail. Reynolds suffers from migraines, vertigo, and “major depressive disorder, recurrent moderate with anxious distress.” She applied for Social Security disability benefits in 2017. Reynolds testified that she suffers from back pain, vertigo, and migraines, and she cannot stand for more than 10 minutes. Her parents handle household chores. She has migraines every day. She stopped taking some prescription medications for her migraines because of the side effects. Reynolds quit her job at Walmart because of her migraines. Reynolds testified has never gone to an emergency room or crisis center for mental health treatment but suffers from anxiety around “more than five people.” She was taking medication for her mental health conditions.The ALJ concluded that Reynolds was not disabled under the Social Security Administration’s five-step method and that Reynolds had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work with certain non-exertional limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected an argument that the ALJ erred by failing to include a qualitative interaction limitation in the residual functional capacity determination. No medical evidence called for a qualitative interaction limitation; the ALJ was not required to intuit such a limitation from the administrative record. View "Reynolds v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

ATC purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy from Westchester, which provided coverage against liability incurred because of “advertising,” a defined term that included trade dress infringement. BizBox sued ATC for breach of contract and interference with its business expectancies, alleging that ATC manufactured and sold a knock-off trailer using BizBox’s design. ATC sought a declaratory judgment that Westchester owed it a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. Westchester argued that BizBox’s underlying suit was not covered under the insurance policy because BizBox did not allege, in that litigation, an infringement of its trade dress in ATC’s advertising.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. BizBox’s complaint never alleged a trade dress infringement claim against ATC nor an advertising injury and could not be construed to plausibly allege a trade dress infringement claim against ATC. BizBox alleged no facts that can plausibly be construed to show that it asserted that an advertising injury occurred. Westchester, therefore, has no duty to defend or indemnify ATC under the “personal and advertising injury” provision of the Policy. View "Aluminum Trailer Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co" on Justia Law

In 2017, Freydin, a Chicago lawyer, posed a question on Facebook: “Did Trump put Ukraine on the travel ban list?! We just cannot find a cleaning lady!” After receiving online criticism for the comment, Freydin doubled down. People angered by Freydin’s comments went to his law firm’s Facebook, Yelp, and Google pages and left reviews that expressed their negative views of Freydin. Various defendants made comments including: An “embarrassment and a disgrace to the US judicial system,” “unethical and derogatory,” “hypocrite,” “chauvinist,” “racist,” “no right to practice law,” “not professional,” “discriminates [against] other nationalities,” do not “waste your money.,” “Freydin is biased and unprofessional attorney,” “terrible experience,” “awful customer service,” “disrespect[],” and “unprofessional[ism].” None of the defendants had previously used Freydin’s legal services.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Freydin’s suit, which alleged libel per se, “false light,” tortious interference with contractual relationships, tortious interference with prospective business relationships, and civil conspiracy. None of the reviews contained statements that are actionable as libel per se under Illinois law; each was an expression of opinion that could not support a libel claim. Freyding did not link the civil conspiracy claims to an independently viable tort claim. View "Law Offices of David Freyd v. Chamara" on Justia Law

In 2004, Johnson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on his prior convictions, the district court found that he qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him to 275 months in prison. The 2015 Supreme Court “Johnson “ decision held that the so‐called “residual clause” of the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Johnson moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was based on the ACCA’s now‐defunct residual clause.The district court denied his motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding, Johnson’s sentence is proper if he has at least three prior convictions that qualify for enhancement under the provisions of the ACCA which that decision left undisturbed: the “violent felony” and “serious drug offense” provisions. Johnson does have at least three such convictions. He did not challenge that his prior drug and burglary convictions qualified as ACCA predicates; Indiana’s criminal deviate conduct offense is divisible and that the forcible compulsion variety of that offense requires sufficient force and intent to qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The court did not address an escape conviction. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Gooch alleged that correctional officers Young and Wilson falsely informed another inmate that Gooch had stolen from him and directed the inmate to “take action”; the inmate then attacked Gooch with a weapon. When Gooch defended himself, Wilson intervened and instructed Gooch to lie on the floor, where the inmate attacked him again. Gooch asked his correctional counselor for the form on which to file a grievance against the officers. Gooch asserts that his counselor refused to give him the form, stating “you better watch out snitching on staff.” Over the next two days, “multiple guards” walked by his cell, calling him a “rat” and making threats.Three days later, Gooch filed a “Bivens action,” which was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. Exhaustion is not required when the responsible prison officials refuse to give a prisoner the necessary grievance form or thwart a prisoner from filing a grievance through threats or intimidation. Gooch attested that he feared for his life if he continued with the administrative-remedy process. The government did not contest his assertion and failed to meet its burden of showing that remedies were “available” to Gooch. View "Gooch v. Young" on Justia Law

Dai, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa in 2010. She later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the basis of religious persecution. Following a merits hearing, an immigration judge denied relief, finding that Dai was not credible and that her evidence failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. Dai acknowledged discrepancies in her testimony concerning how long she had been practicing her faith and her encounters with the police; she did not provide corroborative evidence. View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law

Osmani fled the Kosovo War and was admitted to the U.S as a refugee in 1999. Osmani was convicted for possession of illegal narcotics in 2019. The government sought to remove Osmani based on a prior conviction for aggravated felony theft, commission of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, and his narcotics conviction. Osmani sought adjustment of status to legal permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1159(a). The bases of inadmissibility may be waived for refugees, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II) “for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” Osmani claimed he had no ties or documentation linking him to Kosovo, would be unable to support himself if removed, and was a member of a persecuted ethnic minority. The government took no position on Osmani’s applications.The IJ granted Osmani an adjustment and waiver, citing Osmani’s relationship with his family and childhood PTSD. Although Osmani submitted documents describing current conditions in Kosovo, the IJ did not address that issue. The BIA agreed that Osmani’s family ties were insufficient to justify waiver and the balance of equities disfavored Osmani, then declined to remand to the IJ to supplement the record, including on conditions in Kosovo. Osmani was removed. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA legally erred by considering arguments the government did not present to the IJ, put Osmani on notice of, or develop any record evidence to support. In declining to remand, the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding. View "Osmani v. Garland" on Justia Law