Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Brown pled guilty in the Eastern District of Missouri to unlawfully possessing a firearm and admitted to eight prior state law felony convictions, leading to an enhanced, 262-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief in the Eighth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Brown used 28 U.S.C. 2241 to file a habeas petition in the Seventh Circuit, where he was then confined, contending that Supreme Court precedent leaves him without the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. Brown cited a Seventh Circuit holding (Davenport) that a federal prisoner may seek section 2241 relief in the circuit of confinement where section 2255’s limits on second or successive motions would deny that prisoner even one opportunity to seek habeas relief based on a newly-issued statutory interpretation decision.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Circuit of conviction law (here, the Eighth Circuit) generally applies to Davenport-based habeas petitions. Eighth Circuit precedent clearly leaves Brown with the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit has held that a weapons-exhibiting offense remains a violent felony under section 924(e)’s elements clause, which Supreme Court precedent left untouched. View "Brown v. Krueger" on Justia Law

In 2015, Talignani, a U.S. military veteran, consulted a VA neurosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo neck surgery. Because the VA could not perform a timely surgery, the surgeon suggested Talignani obtain evaluation and treatment at Saint Louis University Hospital. Talignani agreed and expressed a preference for the Hospital because he had previously undergone surgery there. A nurse obtained the VA’s approval to secure treatment for Talignani at a non-VA provider. The VA agreed to pay for “evaluation and treatment rendered pursuant to the non-VA provider’s plan of care.” The VA then sent a request for outpatient services to the Hospital. The Hospital agreed to treat Talignani and asked the VA to conduct several pre-operative tests. In January 2016, Dr. Mercier performed neck surgery on Talignani using the Hospital’s facility and staff. Talignani died shortly after being released.Talignani’s estate alleged he was prescribed excessive pain medication prior to his discharge, which proximately caused his death. An administrative complaint with the VA was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The Act waives sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by “employee[s] of the Government.” The estate’s claim does not involve a government employee. View "Talignani v. United States" on Justia Law

Mandrell, born in 198, pursued her education through one year in college. In 2005-2009, she served in the Coast Guard, which she left with an honorable discharge. While in service she was the victim of a rape by a fellow service member. She developed PTSD and anxiety afterward. The VA found her to be 100% disabled based on a service-related cause and awarded benefits but later revised her level of disability down to 70%. Mandrell’s 2017 application for Social Security disability benefits was denied and the Appeals Council denied her request for review. The district court affirmed.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ failed to connect the residual functional capacity he found with the evidence in the record, and he did not adequately account for her deficits in concentration, persistence, and pace. The ALJ apparently accepted that Mandrell suffered from PTSD as a result of the rape, but dismissed most of the symptoms that accompanied that condition. While the Social Security Administration is not bound by the VA’s assessment of Mandrell’s disability, the underlying medical evidence on which the VA relied is just as relevant to the social‐security determination as it was to the VA. View "Mandrell v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Okada, “a titan of the gambling industry,” hired Bartlit to represent him in a multi-billion-dollar lawsuit against Wynn Resorts. The litigation settled in Okada’s favor for $2.6 billion. Okada refused to pay the $50 million contingent fee specified in the parties’ engagement agreement, which included an arbitration clause. Bartlit initiated arbitration before CPR in Chicago, the agreed-upon forum. Okada participated in the arbitration for over a year.Less than 72 hours before the evidentiary hearing, Okada informed the arbitrators that he would not be attending. The Panel stated that it would proceed without him and that his nonattendance could subject him to default. Okada replied that he rejected the validity of the engagement agreement and was unable to make the journey from Japan to Chicago for undisclosed medical reasons. Okada announced that he would not authorize his attorneys to participate in the arbitration, and canceled all witnesses, reservations, and services. The Panel held him to be in default and found that Okada owed the firm $54.6 million, including a $963,032 sanction for the costs and fees of the proceeding.Okada moved to vacate the award, arguing that he had been deprived of a fundamentally fair proceeding when the Panel decided the case without his participation or his evidence. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his argument. The Panel had several reasonable bases for proceeding without him and there was nothing unfair about the proceeding. View "Bartlit Beck, LLP v. Okada" on Justia Law

Kramer was the U.S. open class offshore powerboat champion but he was also a successful drug lord and money launderer who made millions smuggling vast quantities of marijuana in the 1980s. After his arrest, he tried to escape prison hanging off the skids of a helicopter. He was convicted in Illinois for drug and criminal enterprise offenses and in Florida under RICO; $60 million and $50 million forfeiture judgments were entered against him as part of his sentences.Over a decade later, Kramer asked the district court to find a 2003 settlement agreement invalid and to account for all property seized by the government and return to him the value exceeding $60 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court order that granted an accounting of the amounts collected on his drug conviction forfeiture judgment, determined that approximately $2 million had been forfeited under the 2003 settlement agreement between the government and certain entities, and credited the settlement amount toward Kramer’s drug conviction forfeiture judgment. “Instead of accepting Kramer’s invitation to wade into a complex multidistrict financial assessment involving numerous parties, governmental offices, settlement agreements, and legal proceedings, the district court sensibly limited the accounting to what was owed and collected” toward the drug forfeiture judgment entered in Illinois. View "United States v. Kramer" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's ruling that the costs of plaintiff's attorney disciplinary proceedings imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court were not dischargeable under a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(7). The court explained that, although there are several types of proceedings in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court may order costs, see Wis. S.C.R. 22.24(1), attorney discipline uniquely requires a "finding of misconduct" as a precondition for doing so. The court stated that the structure of Rule 22.24(1m) unambiguously singles out attorney discipline as a penal endeavor, and that conclusion has a statutory consequence under section 523(a)(7). Furthermore, the cost order amounts to compensation for actual pecuniary loss under section 523(a)(7). Finally, the court's conclusion that plaintiff's disciplinary costs are nondischaregable under section 523(a)(7) finds firm support in Supreme Court precedent and the court's own case law. View "Osicka v. Office of Lawyer Regulation" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

Skaggs was charged with 12 counts related to his production and possession of child pornography, based on evidence found in thumb drives seized from him during a warrantless border search at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The district court denied a motion to suppress, convicted Skaggs of all counts. Believing a life sentence was mandatory because of his prior state conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, the court sentenced him to life in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No court has ever required more than reasonable suspicion for a border search An investigation revealed that Skaggs had a prior sexual misconduct conviction; traveled abroad multiple times and was involved with overseas orphanages; posted suggestive pictures on Facebook of himself with young girls; was the director of Ukrainian Angels, whose name appeared to be borrowed from a well-known child pornography website; and was suspected of child sex tourism and traveling to Ukraine to meet minors. Skaggs lied during his customs interview, stating that he had no thumb drives with him. These facts, taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court said it would have imposed a life sentence in any event and discussed the section 3553(a) factors that supported the sentence, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Zimmerman filed a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though “far from clear and very abbreviated,” the complaint seemed to contend that Corrections Officer Bornick had it out for him because of grievances Zimmerman had filed concerning Bornick. Zimmerman also seemed to allege that he had received an undeserved warning from Bornick, who also confiscated about $100 worth of Zimmerman’s property and issued a conduct report that led to 16 days of disciplinary confinement.The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and determined that Zimmerman failed to state a claim; the complaint did not establish a causal relationship between Bornick’s actions and any protected speech. Deciding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Zimmerman’s allegations were thorough, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court was wrong not to dismiss the complaint but absent a clear indication of futility or some extraordinary circumstance, litigants, including prisoners, should have the opportunity to try again by filing an amended complaint. The district court may have held Zimmerman to a pleading standard beyond that required by the Federal Rules and, regardless, should have given him a second try. View "Zimmerman v. Bornick" on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law