Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anne and Donald divorced in 1996 after 25 years of marriage. They later reconciled but did not re‐marry, then separated again. Because divorce laws no longer applied, Anne sued Donald in Indiana state court under equitable theories to seek redress for her contributions to the relationship during their second period together. They agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Anne $435,000, half the increase in value of Donald’s retirement savings during their unmarried cohabitation. Donald declared bankruptcy and sought to discharge the arbitrator’s award as a money judgment. Anne argued that the arbitrator had awarded her an interest in specific property so that the award could not be discharged in Donald’s bankruptcy.The bankruptcy court sided with Anne. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in favor of Donald. Anne was awarded a money judgment, not a property interest. The award does not identify a required source of funds or manner of payment but only lists options for satisfying the obligation. The payment of cash would suffice; the award provided for post-judgment interest. The arbitrator’s award said that “this judgment should not be dischargeable in bankruptcy” but that language is not controlling. View "Harshaw v. Harshaw" on Justia Law

Edwards and several accomplices robbed three cellphone stores in northeastern Illinois. Each time, the team would enter around 5:30 p.m. wearing hats and hooded sweatshirts, wait until all the customers had left, announce a robbery, point a gun at an employee, force the employee to assist them, stuff black garbage bags with cellphones, and flee through the back door. Edwards was charged with multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery stemming from the three crimes and brandishing a firearm in connection with two of the robberies. Edwards pleaded guilty to robbing two stores but claimed not to be involved in the third robbery. The government sought to introduce evidence of the two admitted crimes to prove Edwards’s identity through a common modus operandi. The district court admitted the evidence subject to a limiting instruction. After beginning deliberations, the jury sent a note asking if one of the witnesses identified Edwards. The district judge instructed the jury to “rely on your collective memory of the testimony.” The jury convicted Edwards on the remaining charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence from the other two robberies or in declining to provide the jury with a trial transcript in response to its question. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Gibbs and others were indicted for conspiring to possess “500 grams or more of a substance” containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gibbs pleaded guilty. At the plea hearing, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) first asserted that the conspirators had distributed more than 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. The PSR only listed .839 kilograms seized from his car and two .907-kilogram deals Gibbs tried to arrange. Based on the assumption that the conspiracy involved 4.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine, and that the drug was in the pure “ice” form, the PSR calculated an advisory guidelines range of 235–293 months. If Gibbs had been sentenced for a conspiracy involving 2.5 kilograms of ice, his range would have been 188–235 months. Gibbs objected to the PSR’s use of the alleged 4.5 kilos. The AUSA did not provide any evidence. At Gibbs’s sentencing hearing, the AUSA raised new, allegations concerning Gibbs's statements during an unrecorded proffer session. Gibbs’s counsel objected, stating that he had been present at the proffer session and that he did not remember Gibbs making the alleged confession. The AUSA had not been present.The district court overruled Gibbs’s objections and sentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment, The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although sentencing proceedings are more informal than trials, they are not “a free-for-all.” The requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 were not followed; Gibbs was held responsible for far more methamphetamine than the record supported. View "United States v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

The Wades live in a second-floor apartment; the first-floor unit is a short flight of stairs up from ground level. Chicago Police officers were seeking Johnson, a purported heroin dealer. A confidential informant had identified the “second floor” of the Wades’ building as Johnson’s place of operations. Johnson actually lived on the first floor. No officer confirmed Johnson’s address, surveilled the building, or checked whether anybody else was living in the second-floor unit. Officers obtained a warrant for that unit, ascended both staircases, and kicked in the door. Wade was out. A family friend, Dotson, was at the apartment. Dotson’s account differs from police accounts. Dotson alleges that an officer planted narcotics on his person The officers say that upon entering the apartment they found Dotson and Nero inside. Both fled. Officers caught them on the back porch. Video evidence of the events was lost. A thorough search of the Wades’ apartment turned up no drugs. Large quantities of narcotics were discovered in the downstairs unit.The district court rejected the Wades' suit on summary judgment. Dotson’s claims were settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wades have not identified evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to decide in their favor, Given the facially valid warrant and the lack of immediately self-evident ambiguity, the officers were entitled to enter the Wades’ apartment to search. View "Wade v. Ramos" on Justia Law

A John Doe informant stated that Taylor had showed the informant a gun inside Taylor’s apartment. Taylor was a felon. Chicago police officer Hughes secured a warrant to search Taylor’s apartment. On the record, no one knows Doe’s real name, contact information, or why he came forward Doe knew how to get to Taylor’s apartment, but not his address. Hughes made an incorrect guess. Officers entered Taylor’s apartment, which was not the apartment listed on the warrant. Officers found mail addressed in his name from which they learned the correct address. They found a different gun than was described by Doe. Officers found no evidence directly connecting Taylor to the bedroom in which the gun was found. Hughes initiated an alert for Taylor’s arrest. Taylor turned himself in and spent four months in jail before a court found the warrant invalid based on the address error and quashed his arrest. Despite Taylor’s acquittal, the arrest alert remained active. A month later, Taylor was again arrested.Taylor filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendant summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to officers who were not involved in procuring the warrant and affirmed summary judgment for the city on Taylor’s Monell claims relating to the investigative alerts policy and policy with respect to John Doe informants. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hughes and remanded for a determination of damages. Hughes is entitled to good-faith immunity only if he could have “reasonably believed" that the search was authorized by a valid warrant. Hughes told the judge that he knew Taylor’s address; he did not. Hughes stated that there was probable cause to believe drugs would be found in the apartment; there was not. View "Taylor v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2003, Gamboa was convicted of seven counts of drug and firearm crimes. The court found that Gamboa had two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses and was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). After an unsuccessful direct appeal and multiple 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions and 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions, Gamboa sought habeas corpus relief under section 2241, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision, his prior state drug convictions did not constitute felony drug offenses for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)'s sentencing enhancement, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(44). Mathis narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gamboa cannot seek relief under the saving clause gateway to section 2241 because, whether under the categorical approach or a comparison of the straightforward federal definition to the state statute of conviction, the law was not squarely against Gamboa and it would not have been futile for him to raise his arguments in his initial 2255 motion. Precedent did not prevent Gamboa from making an argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible under the categorical approach at the time of his initial 2255 motion. View "Gamboa v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for relief under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court accepted the government's concession that conspiracy to traffic crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) is a covered offense, even if another object of the conspiracy triggered the same statutory penalty range. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act was an error justifying remand and therefore remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion—especially in light of the district court's own characterization that no further analysis was warranted after it found defendant ineligible for relief. View "United States v. McSwain" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USS on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, concluding that USS carried its burden to show that plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at its Midwest Plant. In this case, USS's judgment was premised on the consideration of adequate evidence, as contemplated by the ADA and supporting regulations. Furthermore, USS's imposition of restrictions was based on information pertinent to plaintiff's personal experience with his seizure disorder. Therefore, the assessment USS conducted was sufficiently individualized. The court agreed with the district court that whether plaintiff's seizure disorder was controlled is a material fact about which there is no genuine dispute.Applying the direct threat analysis and weighing factors such as duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm that will occur, and imminence of harm, the court concluded that all the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat. Therefore, USS has shown through undisputed evidence that, if hired for the Utility Person position, plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at the Midwest Plant. View "Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Indictments alleged that the Latin Kings had been involved in multiple acts of murder, arson, robbery, extortion, witness tampering, and the illegal distribution of narcotics. The three defendants were charged with racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Bravo and Denava pleaded guilty while Luczak was convicted.In consolidated appeals, Bravo argued that the district court erred by adding criminal history points for two misdemeanor convictions he had under the Illinois “street-gang contact” statute. Luczak claimed that the district court should not have included, as part of his criminal history, points for a murder he allegedly committed; a jury had acquitted him of that offense, using the reasonable-doubt standard, but the court found at sentencing that his responsibility for the murder was established by a preponderance of the evidence. Denava claimed that the district court failed adequately to consider several mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in counting Bravo’s two misdemeanor offenses toward his criminal history, and that error may have affected his ultimate sentence. The court noted the street-gang contact statute was amended in 2018 in a matter that might render Bravo’s street-gang contacts non-criminal today. There was no error in Luczak’s and Denava’s sentences. View "United States v. Bravo" on Justia Law

Barbee sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. Barbee suffers from Type II diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, and is serving his sentence at a facility that experienced a large outbreak of COVID-19 infections around the time that Barbee filed his motions. He argued that his medical conditions placed him at significant risk of contracting COVID-19 and contended that he had used his time in prison productively, completing a drug abuse program, passing two parts of the GED test, and taking classes. He had one disciplinary incident two years earlier.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Barbee had the burden of establishing extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release and the request must be consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing considerations. The court noted Barbee’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of his most recent offense, the relatively small portion of his sentence that he had served, and that Barbee had received two doses of the Moderna vaccine. Although Barbee argued that he remains at risk as the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve, he did not present any evidence establishing that he is more at risk for an adverse outcome in prison than he would be if released. View "United States v. Barbee" on Justia Law