Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

In 2009, Grotts applied for Social Security disability benefits, citing depression and low functional capacity. She had previously worked as a caretaker for a child with disabilities and he cared for her own child. Her case was remanded four times. Five times, an ALJ concluded that Grotts was not disabled. The final ALJ found that she could still perform light work with some restrictions and because a significant number of jobs fitting that description existed in the national economy.The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints about her symptoms, in its evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, and in its residual functional capacity determination. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinion evidence and its RFC determination. The ALJ did not patently err in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints. View "Grotts v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

When she began work, Campbell signed a contract with Keagle, the bar’s owner; it included an arbitration clause. After a dispute arose, the district judge denied Keagle’s motion to refer the matter to arbitration, finding several parts of the arbitration clause unconscionable: Keagle had reserved the right to choose the arbitrator and location of arbitration. Campbell had agreed not to consolidate or file a class suit for any claim and to pay her own costs, regardless of the outcome. The judge did not find that the contract was one-sided as a whole. Keagle accepted striking the provisions found to be unconscionable but sought to arbitrate rather than litigate.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to name an arbitrator, reasoning that the mutual assent to arbitration remains. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, provides that, absent a contrary agreement, the arbitration takes place in the same judicial district as the litigation; “who pays” may be determined by some other state or federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which Campbell’s suit rests. The chosen arbitrator can prescribe the procedures. Under 9 U.S.C. 5, “if for any … reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator" the court shall designate an arbitrator. View "Campbell v. Keagle Inc" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Antonio and his brother guilty of first-degree homicide and a related firearms charge. The charges arose from the 2006 shooting death of a rival gang member. Antonio was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, without the possibility of release. Wisconsin courts affirmed Antonio’s conviction and denied his post-conviction petitions. Antonio sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his claim of self-defense, in advising him not to testify in support of that defense, and in neglecting to prepare him to testify, and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the ineffective assistance claim on appeal.The district court denied Antonio’s petition, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting these claims was not an unreasonable application of “Strickland.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Antonio made the decision not to testify; his attorney warned Antonio that testifying could undermine his self-defense argument by allowing exploration of his actions that indicated guilt, including setting fire to his vehicle and fleeing the state, and would place in his hand the gun that was responsible for the fatal shooting. The court noted that Antonio’s testimony was not essential to his claim of self-defense. View "Shannon v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that Hyles committed sexual abuse and assault at Hammond, Indiana's First Baptist Church, and its affiliated school, Hyles-Anderson College, in the late 1970s and that the institutions conspired to conceal the abuse. One plaintiff alleged that she paid fees and tithes to the institutions while being abused as a teenager. In 2020, they filed a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had not alleged the injury to “business or property” required for RICO’s civil cause of action, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries during the exercise of a property right (while expending money to participate in Church-related activities) that had an “indirect, or secondary effect” on the value of the property right. That is insufficient to satisfy the business or property element of a civil RICO claim. They contend that the institutions misappropriated their funds by using them to fund a sham investigation in the 2010s but did not describe how money paid in the 1970s could plausibly have been used to fund a phony investigation decades later. The allegations are too “speculative and amorphous” to permit their RICO claim to proceed. View "Ryder v. Hyles" on Justia Law

Asbury came to a controlled buy with 82.2 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine. He was charged with distributing at least 50 grams of the drug, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). The indictment alleged that Asbury had a prior conviction for a serious drug offense. The PSR, “reflecting reports from others,” proposed holding Asbury responsible for 15,819.3 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, plus 82.2 grams of the pure drug. When the judge asked whether the prosecution had any additional evidence, he was told that it did not. Rather than nail down the factual basis for the additional drug-quantity allegations, the court addressed whether the distribution of drugs other than those directly involved in the offense could be considered as relevant conduct, then adopted the PSR, raising Asbury’s offense level from 30 to 36, then added two levels for perjury, resulting in a guidelines range of 360 months to life. Had the offense level been 32, his range would have been 210-262 months. Because of Asbury’s prior conviction, his statutory minimum sentence was 180 months. The court addressed 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, stating that any error in Asbury’s offense level, “would not affect my sentence," and imposed a 360-month sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in calculating Asbury’s relevant conduct. The judge’s brief statement did not establish that the guideline error was immaterial. View "United States v. Asbury" on Justia Law

In 2014, Shorter pleaded guilty to possessing a stolen firearm, which he used to threaten a person who, unbeknownst to Shorter, was a U.S. Marshal. The district court sentenced him to 117 months’ imprisonment. In December 2020, with approximately one-and-a-half years remaining on his prison term, Shorter sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that his hypertension and sickle cell disease made him more susceptible to a severe COVID-19 infection. The government noted that Shorter did not suffer from sickle cell disease, but only carries the sickle cell trait.The district court denied the motion, finding Shorter’s medical conditions did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate release and noting his serious criminal record. On appeal, Shorter argued that the fact that his hypertension was well-treated did not sufficiently address whether his condition increases his COVID-19 risk, that the district court ignored evidence that people with sickle cell trait are more susceptible to COVID-19, and that the court failed to consider his postconviction conduct. After the parties completed briefing, the Bureau of Prisons transferred Shorter to home confinement, scheduled to end in May 2022. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. View "United States v. Shorter" on Justia Law

Dixon pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment, raising his base‐offense level by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because he had a previous conviction for a “crime of violence,” an Iowa conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon. According to the charging document in the Iowa court, Dixon had shot at a vehicle with multiple occupants and continued firing at them as they fled.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A conviction under the Iowa statute requires that the defendant placed someone in “reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” The court applied the categorical approach and stated that the only way a defendant uses a dangerous weapon to put someone in fear of serious injury is by threatening physical force. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In May 2007, SunTrust hired Birch to perform a portfolio valuation on a property located in Indiana. The Birch report valued the property at $3.23 million. PNC Bank provided financing for the mortgage loan; both PNC and SunTrust accepted the report. In October 2007, the owner sold the property to a SunTrust affiliate subject to a $2.3 million loan PNC extended to SunTrust. The loan was later acquired by Regent. After consulting with independent appraisal experts, Regent hired a law firm and employed a certified appraiser, Potter, to evaluate the original Birch report. Potter’s report detailed several deficiencies in Birch’s 2007 appraisal.Regent filed a federal complaint, with state law claims, but soon moved to dismiss the complaint. Birch then filed its own lawsuit against Regent for malicious prosecution. Regent counterclaimed for attorney’s fees under the Indiana frivolous litigation statute. The district court dismissed both claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Birch cannot establish the elements of a successful malicious-prosecution claim, but its lawsuit was not frivolous under Indiana law. Regent did not act maliciously in commencing the underlying action; it had probable cause based on advice from outside counsel, a detailed report by a certified appraiser, and justifiable reliance on the report. View "Birch Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent Bank" on Justia Law

Cortez sued Cook, alleging that she was injured by an Inferior Vena Cava Filter, implanted in her in 2006 for the prevention of pulmonary embolisms. Cortez’s action was part of consolidated multidistrict proceedings. Accordingly, Cortez filed a Short‐Form Complaint that incorporated counts from the Master Consolidated Complaint for Individual Claims, alleging product liability, negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and violations of Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act.Cook argued that the product liability claims were filed beyond the time period in the statute of repose of Cortez’s home state, Oregon. Cortez countered that the Oregon statute incorporates Indiana law because the product was manufactured there, which allows for equitable tolling of the limitations period, and that the complaint sufficiently alleged entitlement to tolling based on fraudulent concealment. She alleged that Cook knew the product was defective and, through affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, actively concealed significant risks, continuing to promote the Filter as safe and effective even though inadequate clinical trials had been performed.The district court dismissed the claims, finding the allegations insufficient to demonstrate fraudulent concealment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying Indiana law. Because these product liability claims are subject to a statute of repose, and fraudulent concealment cannot extend the time to file claims for such a statute, the claims are untimely. View "Cortez v. Cook Inc." on Justia Law