Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In September 2020, Michael Karmo informed a friend that he was traveling to Kenosha, Wisconsin, with firearms during a period of civil unrest. The friend reported this to local police, who then notified the FBI. The FBI, believing Karmo intended to shoot people and loot, requested real-time cell site location information (CSLI) from AT&T under exigent circumstances. Law enforcement located Karmo in a hotel parking lot, where he consented to searches of his vehicle and hotel room, revealing multiple firearms. Later, it was clarified that Karmo did not explicitly state he intended to shoot people and loot.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin reviewed the case. Karmo moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the CSLI collection, arguing that the exigent circumstances form contained false information. He also requested a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of the form. The district court denied his motion, and Karmo subsequently pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the CSLI collection constituted a Fourth Amendment search. It held that law enforcement reasonably believed probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, justifying the warrantless search. The court found that even without the misrepresentation in the exigency form, the totality of circumstances supported a reasonable belief of a public safety threat. The court also determined that a Franks hearing was inapplicable because no judge had made a probable cause determination based on the form. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Karmo" on Justia Law

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Thompson Corrugated Systems, Inc. (TCS) entered into an oral agreement in 2004 to act as the North American sales representative for Engico, S.r.l., an Italian manufacturer of corrugated box machinery. TCS was to receive an 8% commission on sales, later modified to a sliding scale in 2012. Despite low sales, TCS procured two significant sales for Engico in 2005 and 2017. In 2016, Engico attempted to terminate the agreement due to low sales, but TCS resisted, citing market conditions. The parties renegotiated in 2018, agreeing that TCS would remain the representative until 2021 and continue to receive commissions. However, disputes arose over commissions for sales made in 2019 and 2020, leading TCS to sue Engico for breach of contract and other state law claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted partial summary judgment in favor of TCS, finding the 2004 oral agreement valid and enforceable. The court determined that the essential terms of the agreement, including the commission structure, territory, and services, were sufficiently definite. The court also found that the agreement was terminable at will under Illinois law. The remaining claims were left to the jury, which found Engico liable for breach of contract and awarded TCS damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the 2004 oral agreement contained sufficiently definite terms and that the Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of the 2018 agreement. The court concluded that the essential terms of the agreement were clear and that the deposition testimony satisfied the Statute of Frauds’ writing requirement. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thompson Corrugated Systems, Inc. v. Engico S.r.l." on Justia Law

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Darkel Martin, after serving a custodial sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon, began a three-year term of supervised release. The government petitioned to revoke his supervised release, alleging multiple violations, including committing another crime, possessing a controlled substance, and failing to participate in treatment programs. Martin admitted to several violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to twenty months of imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois handled the initial proceedings. The court found Martin had committed several violations of his supervised release conditions. The U.S. Probation Office recommended an advisory Guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four months of imprisonment. The district court sentenced Martin within this range, imposing twenty months of imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Martin argued that the district court erred by not calculating his Guidelines range and improperly relying on certain facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The appellate court found that the district court had considered the Guidelines range and the relevant statutory factors. The court noted that the district court referenced the Guidelines and the Probation Office’s recommendations during the hearing. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court primarily relied on permissible factors under § 3583(e) when sentencing Martin, rather than the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Martin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Jessica Gehner was implanted with a Cook Medical inferior vena cava (IVC) filter in Ohio. She later experienced abdominal pain, and a CT scan in March 2013 revealed that the filter had perforated her IVC. Her doctors recommended the filter's removal, which occurred in April 2013, but a fragment was left behind due to the filter fracturing. Gehner filed a lawsuit in May 2016 against Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical LLC, and William Cook Europe APS, alleging products liability and implied warranty claims. The defendants argued that her claims were time-barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Gehner's claims were time-barred, as she was informed by her doctors in March 2013 that the IVC filter caused her injury, starting the statute of limitations clock. Gehner contended that she was unaware of the defect until 2016 when her mother saw a television commercial about defective IVC filters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under Ohio law, the statute of limitations for product liability claims begins when the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority of an injury related to the product or when the plaintiff should have known of the injury through reasonable diligence. The court found that Gehner was aware of her injury and its relation to the IVC filter by April 2013 at the latest. The court rejected Gehner's argument that the statute of limitations should start when she learned of the defect, noting that awareness of the injury itself was sufficient to start the clock. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Gehner's claims were indeed time-barred. View "Gehner v. Cook Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

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Robert Decker, a federal inmate, requested electronic access to the full, daily editions of the Federal Register from his prison law library. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, prompting Decker to file a pro se lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act. He claimed that the denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive information and petition the government. The BOP argued that its policy was justified by the need to conserve limited resources.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the BOP. The court applied the framework from Turner v. Safley, concluding that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate penological interest in conserving resources. The district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, finding that he was competent to litigate his case despite the challenges of incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in conserving resources. The court noted that the BOP provided access to documents pertaining to the Bureau and the U.S. Parole Commission and allowed inmates to receive print copies of the Federal Register through the mail. The court found that Decker had alternative means to exercise his First Amendment rights, although they were less convenient. The court also upheld the district court’s denial of Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.In summary, the Seventh Circuit held that the BOP’s policy of providing limited electronic access to the Federal Register was constitutionally valid under Turner v. Safley and that the district court did not err in denying Decker’s request for appointed counsel. View "Decker v. Sireveld" on Justia Law

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Jason Beckner, employed by Commercial Air, Inc., was injured while working on a construction site in Zionsville, Indiana. Commercial Air had rented a crane and operator from Maxim Crane Works, L.P. for a day to lift roof trusses. Beckner claimed that the crane operator, Emmitt Pugh, caused his injury through negligent operation. Beckner and his wife sued Maxim Crane for negligence, asserting vicarious liability.The case was initially filed in Indiana state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana based on diversity jurisdiction. Maxim Crane moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act barred the suit because Pugh was a co-employee of Beckner. The district court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment in favor of Maxim Crane, ruling that Pugh was also employed by Commercial Air, making the Worker’s Compensation Act Beckner’s exclusive remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Pugh was an employee of Commercial Air. The court noted conflicting evidence about who controlled Pugh’s work and whether Commercial Air believed it employed Pugh. The court applied both the seven-factor test from Hale v. Kemp and the ten-factor test from Moberly v. Day, concluding that factual disputes precluded summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual issues. View "Beckner v. Maxim Crane Works, L.P." on Justia Law

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Courtney Ealy, an inmate in the Illinois prison system, spent five consecutive months in segregation starting in 2019. During this period, he experienced cold temperatures, dirty cells, and faulty plumbing, which he claimed negatively affected his mental and physical health. Ealy sued several prison officials, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. He also filed multiple motions for recruitment of counsel during the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cameron Watson, David D. Frank, and Angela McKittrick, and denied Ealy's motions for recruitment of counsel. The court found that Ealy had received due process before being placed in disciplinary segregation and that the conditions of his confinement did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship. The court also determined that Ealy was competent to represent himself despite his claims to the contrary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ealy received all the due process he was entitled to, including advance written notice of the charges, an opportunity to be heard, and a written statement of the evidence and reasons for the disciplinary action. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ealy's motions for recruitment of counsel, noting that Ealy's case was not complex and that he appeared competent to represent himself based on his filings. View "Ealy v. Watson" on Justia Law

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Irma Leibas, a correctional officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections (DOC), has pre-existing medical conditions requiring workplace accommodations, including up to three additional breaks per shift. After the DOC denied her request for these accommodations, Leibas sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Leibas’s accommodation and discrimination claims. However, upon reconsideration and after both parties supplemented the record, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Leibas was not a qualified individual under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court examined whether Leibas could perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. The court found that maintaining the safety and security of the DOC is an essential function of a correctional officer. Leibas’s requested accommodation of additional breaks, including rest periods, was deemed unreasonable given the unpredictable and violent environment of the DOC, which requires officers to be able to stand for long periods and respond to emergencies without delay. The court also noted that the DOC’s staffing shortages and the need for continuous coverage further complicated the feasibility of Leibas’s requested accommodations.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Leibas did not provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that she could perform the essential functions of her position with the requested accommodations. View "Leibas v. Dart" on Justia Law

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In 2015, two plaintiffs sued the Chicago Board of Education and various officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights and state law. During a deposition in 2017, a confrontation occurred between plaintiffs' attorney Caryn Shaw and opposing counsel Lisa Dreishmire. Shaw allegedly assaulted Dreishmire, leading to police involvement and a complaint to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Shaw misled the court about the incident, prolonging the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sanctioned Shaw by removing her from the case and ordering "Plaintiffs' counsel" to reimburse the defendants for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Shaw and her co-counsel, Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, appealed the sanctions. The district court's sanctions were based on findings that Shaw intentionally pushed Dreishmire and misrepresented the incident to the court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the sanctions against Caryn Shaw, finding that she had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the potential sanctions. However, the court vacated the sanctions against Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, concluding that they did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to respond. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the fee award against Caryn Shaw. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Vega v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

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Christine Bube and Connie Hedrington, both registered nurses, worked for Aspirus, Inc., a non-profit hospital system. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Aspirus mandated that all employees receive the COVID vaccine, allowing exemptions for religious reasons. Bube and Hedrington applied for religious exemptions, citing their Catholic faith and beliefs about bodily integrity and health. Aspirus denied their requests and terminated their employment in December 2021.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed Bube and Hedrington’s Title VII claim, reasoning that their accommodation requests did not sufficiently tie their objections to specific religious beliefs or practices. The court concluded that their objections were primarily about personal autonomy and vaccine safety, rather than religious beliefs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an employee seeks accommodation because of their religion when their request is plausibly based at least in part on some aspect of their religious belief or practice. Applying this standard, the court found that Bube’s and Hedrington’s requests were indeed based in part on their religious beliefs. The court emphasized that Title VII’s broad definition of religion requires a hands-off approach to defining religious exercise. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bube v. Aspirus Hospital, Inc" on Justia Law