Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Anderson began working as a Pre-Fund Underwriting Auditor for NLC, a residential mortgage lender. NLC randomly conducts internal post-funding audits. Anderson exhibited performance deficiencies. Her supervisor, Gourley, counseled her. Anderson received ongoing training. She also experienced health problems and exhausted all of her available sick days on an extended leave. When Anderson returned to work in January 2018, Gourley emailed her, having learned of additional performance issues, and requested that she complete more training. In February 2018, NLC uncovered more errors. In March, Anderson experienced more health issues and took leave (Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601). Anderson asserts Gourley made comments about Anderson’s being “sick a lot” and about needing “a full team. “ During her leave, NLC’s audit system flagged several more errors in Anderson’s loans. In May 2018, HUD notified NLC of additional errors and cited NLC. Gourley recommended that Anderson be terminated for poor performance. Days after Anderson returned to work, NLC terminated her employment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NLC in Anderson’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and for interference and retaliation associated with her FMLA rights. Anderson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either claim. View "Anderson v. Nations Lending Corp." on Justia Law

Price had been convicted of felony aggravated battery. A gunshop employee ran a background check after Price placed an order, then contacted ATF Agent Clancy, and gave Price an inoperable magazine shell. Price purchased ammunition. Price later complained the magazine did not fit “his firearm.” Clancy impersonated a store employee for Price’s return and contacted the Indiana Department of Correction. Parole officers arrived at the store and searched Price's vehicle, as authorized by his parole agreement. They found a (stolen) loaded pistol. Clancy and the parole officers drove Price to his residence. The officers searched, discovered ammunition, and notified Clancy. Clancy obtained and executed a search warrant for the home, a van parked in the driveway, and an outbuilding. Officers found a firearm and ammunition. A rifle was found in the van.Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Price unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrantless parole searches violated the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers acted as a “stalking horse” for the ATF, allowing Clancy to circumvent typical warrant and probable cause requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parole officers complied with the parole agreement; they had reasonable cause to believe Price had violated his parole conditions. The court also rejected arguments that there was insufficient evidence that Price had constructively possessed the guns and challenges to sentencing enhancements for multiple firearms, a stolen firearm, and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

In 2009, Grotts applied for Social Security disability benefits, citing depression and low functional capacity. She had previously worked as a caretaker for a child with disabilities and he cared for her own child. Her case was remanded four times. Five times, an ALJ concluded that Grotts was not disabled. The final ALJ found that she could still perform light work with some restrictions and because a significant number of jobs fitting that description existed in the national economy.The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints about her symptoms, in its evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, and in its residual functional capacity determination. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinion evidence and its RFC determination. The ALJ did not patently err in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints. View "Grotts v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

When she began work, Campbell signed a contract with Keagle, the bar’s owner; it included an arbitration clause. After a dispute arose, the district judge denied Keagle’s motion to refer the matter to arbitration, finding several parts of the arbitration clause unconscionable: Keagle had reserved the right to choose the arbitrator and location of arbitration. Campbell had agreed not to consolidate or file a class suit for any claim and to pay her own costs, regardless of the outcome. The judge did not find that the contract was one-sided as a whole. Keagle accepted striking the provisions found to be unconscionable but sought to arbitrate rather than litigate.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to name an arbitrator, reasoning that the mutual assent to arbitration remains. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, provides that, absent a contrary agreement, the arbitration takes place in the same judicial district as the litigation; “who pays” may be determined by some other state or federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which Campbell’s suit rests. The chosen arbitrator can prescribe the procedures. Under 9 U.S.C. 5, “if for any … reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator" the court shall designate an arbitrator. View "Campbell v. Keagle Inc" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Antonio and his brother guilty of first-degree homicide and a related firearms charge. The charges arose from the 2006 shooting death of a rival gang member. Antonio was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, without the possibility of release. Wisconsin courts affirmed Antonio’s conviction and denied his post-conviction petitions. Antonio sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his claim of self-defense, in advising him not to testify in support of that defense, and in neglecting to prepare him to testify, and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the ineffective assistance claim on appeal.The district court denied Antonio’s petition, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting these claims was not an unreasonable application of “Strickland.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Antonio made the decision not to testify; his attorney warned Antonio that testifying could undermine his self-defense argument by allowing exploration of his actions that indicated guilt, including setting fire to his vehicle and fleeing the state, and would place in his hand the gun that was responsible for the fatal shooting. The court noted that Antonio’s testimony was not essential to his claim of self-defense. View "Shannon v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that Hyles committed sexual abuse and assault at Hammond, Indiana's First Baptist Church, and its affiliated school, Hyles-Anderson College, in the late 1970s and that the institutions conspired to conceal the abuse. One plaintiff alleged that she paid fees and tithes to the institutions while being abused as a teenager. In 2020, they filed a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had not alleged the injury to “business or property” required for RICO’s civil cause of action, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries during the exercise of a property right (while expending money to participate in Church-related activities) that had an “indirect, or secondary effect” on the value of the property right. That is insufficient to satisfy the business or property element of a civil RICO claim. They contend that the institutions misappropriated their funds by using them to fund a sham investigation in the 2010s but did not describe how money paid in the 1970s could plausibly have been used to fund a phony investigation decades later. The allegations are too “speculative and amorphous” to permit their RICO claim to proceed. View "Ryder v. Hyles" on Justia Law

Asbury came to a controlled buy with 82.2 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine. He was charged with distributing at least 50 grams of the drug, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). The indictment alleged that Asbury had a prior conviction for a serious drug offense. The PSR, “reflecting reports from others,” proposed holding Asbury responsible for 15,819.3 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, plus 82.2 grams of the pure drug. When the judge asked whether the prosecution had any additional evidence, he was told that it did not. Rather than nail down the factual basis for the additional drug-quantity allegations, the court addressed whether the distribution of drugs other than those directly involved in the offense could be considered as relevant conduct, then adopted the PSR, raising Asbury’s offense level from 30 to 36, then added two levels for perjury, resulting in a guidelines range of 360 months to life. Had the offense level been 32, his range would have been 210-262 months. Because of Asbury’s prior conviction, his statutory minimum sentence was 180 months. The court addressed 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, stating that any error in Asbury’s offense level, “would not affect my sentence," and imposed a 360-month sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in calculating Asbury’s relevant conduct. The judge’s brief statement did not establish that the guideline error was immaterial. View "United States v. Asbury" on Justia Law

In 2014, Shorter pleaded guilty to possessing a stolen firearm, which he used to threaten a person who, unbeknownst to Shorter, was a U.S. Marshal. The district court sentenced him to 117 months’ imprisonment. In December 2020, with approximately one-and-a-half years remaining on his prison term, Shorter sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that his hypertension and sickle cell disease made him more susceptible to a severe COVID-19 infection. The government noted that Shorter did not suffer from sickle cell disease, but only carries the sickle cell trait.The district court denied the motion, finding Shorter’s medical conditions did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate release and noting his serious criminal record. On appeal, Shorter argued that the fact that his hypertension was well-treated did not sufficiently address whether his condition increases his COVID-19 risk, that the district court ignored evidence that people with sickle cell trait are more susceptible to COVID-19, and that the court failed to consider his postconviction conduct. After the parties completed briefing, the Bureau of Prisons transferred Shorter to home confinement, scheduled to end in May 2022. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. View "United States v. Shorter" on Justia Law