Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Paschall and Ragland worked as machine operators. During their employment, they experienced what they believed to be instances of sexual and racial harassment. A year after their employment ended, Paschall and Ragland sued their former employer. Paschall alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1-17), and based on her race, (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981). Ragland alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Paschall and Ragland did not produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they satisfied all the elements of their claims. When a coworker is a harasser, the employer is liable only when the employee shows that the employer was negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment. Here, the employer was not negligent in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment. View "Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp" on Justia Law

Dash-cam video footage and testimony from Illinois State Trooper Payton indicated that Payton, specially trained in drug interdiction, made observations about Ambriz-Villa’s car which led him to suspect drug trafficking. When Ambriz-Villa’s car crossed onto the road’s shoulder, Payton executed a traffic stop. While processing a warning ticket, Payton questioned Ambriz-Villa. Ambriz-Villa’s unusual responses and excessively nervous and evasive reactions raised Payton’s suspicion. Payton handed Ambriz-Villa the warning ticket. Ambriz-Villa opened the door and began to exit the patrol car. With Ambriz-Villa “halfway out the door,” Payton asked, “Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?” Ambriz-Villa agreed. Payton then asked whether he was involved in any drug activity (which Ambriz-Villa denied) and if he would consent to a search of his car. Ambriz-Villa said yes. Payton asked, “for clarification.” Ambriz-Villa confirmed that he consented to the search of his car. The search uncovered 13 packages of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Ambriz-Villa’s motion to suppress, his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A) and within-Guidelines 168-month sentence. The scope of the stop was not unreasonable and did not violate Ambriz-Villa’s Fourth Amendment rights. Payton’s tone and behavior did not suggest coercion; Ambriz-Villa’s consent was voluntary because a reasonable person in his position would feel at liberty to disregard the questions and walk away.” View "United States v. Ambriz-Villa" on Justia Law

Poole has a degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; it causes severe pain in her lower back and leg after she either stands or sits for a brief time. She lost her job as a cashier because her pain made it impossible for her to stand throughout her full shift. Poole also suffers from a learning disability, anxiety, and depression, all of which impair her ability to concentrate, understand, or remember detailed instructions. Now 46 years old, she has only a “marginal education,” meaning sixth grade or less. Poole sought Supplemental Security Income, 42 U.S.C. 423(d). An ALJ denied her application and dismissed her companion application for disability insurance benefits.The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the ALJ’s decision rested on contradictory findings. . Either Poole can stand for four hours a day and should have been put in the “light” exertional level, or the ALJ correctly found that she belonged in the “sedentary” category and could stand (or walk) at most for two hours a day. The ALJ never said that Poole could perform sedentary work if she could sit or stand at will, so the vocational expert never focused on that potential set of jobs. When an agency decision is so ambiguous that it frustrates judicial review, it cannot be upheld. View "Poole v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Kik Messenger flagged suspected child pornography, involving a girl, about eight years old, engaging in explicit sexual acts with an adult male. Agents traced the files to Boyle’s Decatur home. Boyle admitted that he was the man in the images and had live-streamed his sexual abuse of the girl. A search of Boyle’s cell phone revealed 100 images and videos of other children being sexually abused and exploited. The eight-year-old stated that the sexual abuse started when she was five. Boyle pled guilty in state court to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment.In federal court, Boyle pled guilty based on his production and distribution of visual depictions of that abuse. His Guidelines range was life imprisonment, subject to the cumulative statutory maximum of 230 years. The district court sentenced Boyle to 50 years’ imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence because the sexual assault “was a separate course of conduct” from the production and possession. The court acknowledged the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing objectives and the horrors of Boyle’s own background but stated that Boyle sentenced the child “to a lifetime of nightmares” and immortalized her trauma by live-streaming it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court was aware of the length and gravity of the 90-year cumulative sentences. What mattered most, however, was the atrocity of Boyle’s offense conduct. View "United States v. Boyle" on Justia Law

Officers received a tip from Dropbox, a well-known cloud-storage host, that someone had uploaded child pornography. They tracked the IP address to Hyatt’s home, where he admitted that he had uploaded the files. Hyatt was charged with transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4)(B). Hyatt entered a guilty plea, unaccompanied by any agreement, to the receiving offense. The PSR determined that he had a total offense level of 34, applying five enhancements. Hyatt had 22 criminal history points, leading to a guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment. Hyatt did not object to the calculations but argued that the court should disregard the enhancements for sadistic behavior, prepubescent children, using a computer, and 600 or more images, arguing that they apply to almost everyone charged with child-pornography offenses. He did not mention the two-level “knowing distribution” enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), based on the fact that Hyatt “uploaded 65 files of child pornography on Dropbox.”The Seventh Circuit vacated Hyatt’s 293-month sentence. Hyatt did not waive the right to challenge the enhancement on appeal and the error was prejudicial to him. The court noted the lack of evidence or findings that Hyatt took any steps to make the uploaded files available to others. View "United States v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of attempted homicide, recklessly endangering safety, and aggravated battery based on a drive-by shooting that left one victim seriously injured. Garcia’s post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial claiming that trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses amounted to ineffective assistance. Garcia filed a consolidated appeal and post-conviction order. In the meantime, the state acknowledged that the reckless endangerment counts were lesser-included offenses; the judge modified the judgment, which was affirmed as modified.Garcia filed another post-conviction motion, raising new claims of ineffective assistance. Wisconsin rules require a defendant to raise all available claims for relief in his first post-conviction motion or on direct appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a “sufficient reason.” Garcia needed to allege specific facts that would establish his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, including allegations showing that the defaulted claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues post-conviction counsel chose to present.After Wisconsin courts rejected his petition, Garcia sought federal habeas relief. The district judge rejected the state’s procedural objection but agreed that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the mistakes were not prejudicial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The state appellate court rejected Garcia’s second post-conviction motion based on failure to satisfy the pleading standard for overcoming procedural default. That independent and adequate state procedural basis barred federal review unless Garcia can establish cause for and prejudice from his default. He has not done so. View "Garcia v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas, fraudulently promised victims that they could save their homes from foreclosure or lower their mortgage payments. They targeted monolingual Spanish‐speakers. They charged a $5,000-$10,000 "membership fee" and spent the fees on personal expenses. Their fraudulent entity never prevented a foreclosure. More than 60 homeowners joined, losing almost $260,000.Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas were charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Although Bell consistently refused legal representation, the district court assigned an experienced stand-by attorney. On the eve of trial, Bell moved to retain Joyce, who was newly admitted to the Illinois bar, had never tried a case, and had met Bell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center days earlier, at the behest of Eliades, co‐defendant Rayas’s counsel. Later, Eliades and Joyce denied that Eliades asked Joyce to visit Bell. Conflict attorneys from the Federal Public Defender’s Office discussed the situation with Bell and Rayas separately and held a conflict hearing for Hernandez. Rayas and Hernandez chose new attorneys. Bell insisted on Joyce, signing a waiver in which he acknowledged his right to conflict‐free counsel and the potential conflicts associated with Joyce.Convicted, Bell was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $259,211 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bell’s waiver was knowing and voluntary; he has not demonstrated actual or serious potential for conflict that would have obliged the court to disregard his waiver. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Correction places offenders in restrictive housing when their continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, and others, or the security and orderly operation of a correctional facility. Crouch has been an Indiana inmate for about a decade. In February 2016, Crouch was assigned to disciplinary restrictive status housing due to disciplinary code violations. Crouch spent almost four years in solitary confinement. Throughout this period, Crouch received dozens of classification and status reports. Crouch did not appeal any of these reports; before entering solitary confinement he was aware of the process to appeal and had done so. Crouch also received regular 30-day reviews. Crouch did not appeal those reviews. Inmates also may raise concerns through an offender grievance or a disciplinary appeal; both processes are explained to inmates during orientation and copies of the policies are available at the facilities’ law libraries.Crouch sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Due Process rights because of his “prolonged placement in solitary confinement” which “did not receive meaningful review.” The district court dismissed because Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal claim about prison conditions. View "Crouch v. Brown" on Justia Law

Oluwajana became a lawful U.S. permanent resident in 2011. In 2017, he was convicted of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Charged with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), he was unrepresented throughout immigration court proceedings. Oluwajana timely appealed his removal order and retained counsel.His attorney requested a copy of Oluwajana’s immigration file. The BIA set a date of February 3, 2021, for any brief to be filed. As the date neared, Oluwajana’s counsel still had not received the file. The BIA extended the due date to February 24. While a second extension request was pending, counsel received the file on February 16. Counsel advised the BIA that he could not prepare a brief in time. The BIA denied the second extension request but informed counsel that he could submit a late brief with a motion for its consideration. Oluwajana’s counsel filed the motion and brief, alleging due process violations, on March 8.The BIA rejected Oluwajana’s brief in a “cursory and factually erroneous” footnote and concluded that Oluwajana’s state convictions rendered him removable and that he was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal or other relief. The BIA dismissed Oluwajana’s appeal without directly addressing the arguments raised in his brief. The Seventh Circuit remanded; any reasonable exercise of discretion required acceptance of Oluwajana’s brief. View "Oluwajana v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2017, Anderson began working as a Pre-Fund Underwriting Auditor for NLC, a residential mortgage lender. NLC randomly conducts internal post-funding audits. Anderson exhibited performance deficiencies. Her supervisor, Gourley, counseled her. Anderson received ongoing training. She also experienced health problems and exhausted all of her available sick days on an extended leave. When Anderson returned to work in January 2018, Gourley emailed her, having learned of additional performance issues, and requested that she complete more training. In February 2018, NLC uncovered more errors. In March, Anderson experienced more health issues and took leave (Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601). Anderson asserts Gourley made comments about Anderson’s being “sick a lot” and about needing “a full team. “ During her leave, NLC’s audit system flagged several more errors in Anderson’s loans. In May 2018, HUD notified NLC of additional errors and cited NLC. Gourley recommended that Anderson be terminated for poor performance. Days after Anderson returned to work, NLC terminated her employment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NLC in Anderson’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and for interference and retaliation associated with her FMLA rights. Anderson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either claim. View "Anderson v. Nations Lending Corp." on Justia Law