Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

K.F.C., age 11, signed up for a Snapchat account. Snapchat's terms specify that a person must be at least 13 to have an account. K.F.C. lied about her age. Before she turned 18, K.F.C. sued, alleging that Snapchat’s features amount to facial recognition, which violates the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, K.F.C. acknowledges that she accepted Snapchat’s terms but denies that its arbitration clause binds her although she continued using Snapchat after turning 13.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. An arbitrator, not a court, must decide whether K.F.C.’s youth is a defense to the contract’s enforcement. While even the most sweeping delegation cannot send the contract-formation issue to the arbitrator, state law does not provide that agreements between adults and children are void but treats such agreements as voidable (capable of ratification), so the age of the contracting parties is a potential defense to enforcement. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration is enforceable to the extent any promise is enforceable as a matter of state law, 9 U.S.C. 2. A challenge to the validity (as opposed to the existence) of a contract goes to the arbitrator; K.F.C.’s arguments about her youth and public policy concern the contract’s validity, not its existence. View "K.F.C. v. Snap Inc." on Justia Law

Robinson, whose criminal career began in 1991, pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court granted Robinson an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his offense level but, after Robinson argued that he should not be classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), revoked that reduction. It then found that Robinson was an armed career criminal, subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated his 188-month sentence. On remand, the district court sentenced Robinson to the 180-month statutory minimum.While Robinson’s second appeal was pending, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) addressed the meaning of “use … of physical force against the person of another” in ACCA section 924(e)(2)(B). Robinson argued that his 1992 Illinois conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Robinson’s ACCA status was settled at his initial sentencing proceeding and remains settled after Borden. The mens rea for Illinois’s aggravated-discharge offense is knowledge, not recklessness; Borden is irrelevant to Robinson’s status because his predicate violent offense was not a reckless crime. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

In 2008-2013, IMSS, the agency of the Mexican government tasked with purchasing medical products for Mexican citizens, purchased medical products from Zimmer, a medical device company, headquartered in Indiana and incorporated in Delaware. Zimmer distributes its products in Mexico through an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary. IMSS claims Zimmer orchestrated an international bribery scheme from its Indiana headquarters to facilitate the sale of unregistered medical products and paid around $1 million in bribes to its “Mexican agents” who passed bribes to Mexican government officials.IMSS sued in the Northern District of Indiana, alleging two causes of action under Mexican law (breach of contract and violating the Law of Acquisitions, Leases and Services of the Public Sector) and fraud. for which the relief is the same under U.S. or Mexican law. The district court disagreed with IMSS’s interpretation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and dismissed based on forum non conveniens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Two of IMSS’s claims arise under Mexican law and the remedy for the third is identical in either country. There is no risk IMSS will be deprived of a remedy by litigating in Mexican courts. The court noted the hardship of transporting witnesses from Mexico to the U.S. and that UNCAC is expressly non-self-executing. View "Instituto Mexicano del Seguro v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A putative class of medical providers sued, alleging a conspiracy to drive up the prices of syringes and safety IV catheters (Products). Their first complaint, alleging a hub‐and‐spokes conspiracy ( Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1) between manufacturer, BD, group purchasing organizations, and four distributors, was dismissed because the Providers failed to allege that the distributors coordinated with each other in furtherance of the conspiracy. In an amended complaint, the Providers abandoned their horizontal conspiracy allegations and alleged two vertical conspiracies, one between BD and McKesson and another between BD and Cardinal Health.The district court dismissed, noting that because the named plaintiffs do not purchase the Products directly from Cardinal, they lack “antitrust standing” to sue Cardinal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. . The Providers cannot sue Cardinal under Article III because their injury is not fairly traceable to Cardinal’s conduct; precedent precludes the suit because they do not purchase the Products from either member of the BD‐Cardinal conspiracy. The Providers did not plausibly establish that vertical conspiracies involving just two distributors and BD could influence the prices that the Providers pay, regardless of which distributor they purchase from, and regardless of the fact that there are at least four major distributors. View "Marion Diagnostic Center, LLC v. Becton Dickinson & Co." on Justia Law

An anonymous woman called 911 to report a man carrying a gun, "a 45,” wearing blue jeans, white gym shoes, a black skullcap, and a black coat with fur around the collar. She stated that the man had his hand in his right coat pocket "with a gun in it” and exclaimed that he “just walked into the liquor store.” The call was recorded; the caller’s cell phone number was captured by the system. The dispatcher stated “no number on the callback" and identified the man as black although the caller had not said so. Minutes later, Chicago Police Department officers entered the liquor store. They saw Swinney near the register, wearing a black coat with a fur-trimmed hood, a black skullcap, blue jeans, and white sneakers. The officers patted him down and found a loaded .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol in Swinney’s right coat pocket. In Illinois, it is a crime to carry a firearm on a public street and in any place that is licensed to sell alcohol.Swinney was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an illegal search. The police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop; the anonymous tip reliably reported criminal activity. View "United States v. Swinney" on Justia Law

Schutte retained a law firm to seek compensation for personal injuries. The firm requested electronic copies of Schutte’s medical records. Ciox produced the electronic copies but charged “Per Page Copy (Paper)” charges of $59.23 and an “Electronic Data Archive Fee” of $2.00. A Wisconsin statute lists specific maximum charges for paper, microfiche, or microfilm copies, X-ray prints, and for certification of copies, shipping, and retrieval. The statute is silent regarding charges for electronic copies.Schutte filed a putative class action, claiming that the class includes “several thousand persons and entities.” In addition to compensatory damages, she sought exemplary damages up to $25,000 per claimant, as authorized by Wisconsin law for “knowing and willful” violations. Ciox removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), arguing: Schutte’s proposed class has at least 100 members; there is at least minimal diversity of citizenship between Schutte and the defendants; and based on the complaint’s allegations, the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to remand to state court. Ciox provided a “plausible good faith estimate” that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. The local controversy exception does not apply because the factual allegations in a recent Montana class action against Ciox were “identical” to Schutte’s. View "Schutte v. Ciox Health, LLC" on Justia Law

Lange, who is deaf and communicates primarily in American Sign Language (ASL), sued the cities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (AD”), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, because their police officers did not provide a qualified ASL interpreter for her during four interactions but relied on written communications and on Lange’s children, ages 14 and 17, to act as interpreters. Lange apparently never requested an ASL interpreter. A jury returned a verdict for the cities. The district court then awarded $1,000 in costs to the cities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lange was not prejudiced by the jury instructions. The court acknowledged that the ADA generally prohibits the use of minor children as interpreters but instructed the jury that the police could rely on “the decision of a private citizen to use his or her own child to facilitate her communication.” The court upheld the district court’s decisions in allowing testimony about Lange’s encounters with police other than the four interactions at issue and in awarding a reduced amount of costs to the cities despite Lange’s apparent indigency. View "Lange v. City of Oconto" on Justia Law

At a Speedway convenience store, Weaver tripped on the curb in front of the doorway, fell to the ground, and sustained injuries. Weaver sued for negligence, alleging that Speedway failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. After discovery on liability, a magistrate granted Speedway summary judgment, reasoning that any danger posed by the curb was obvious and that Speedway had no reason to anticipate that Weaver would not protect herself from such a situation. The court cited evidence that, in the last five years, only one other person had reported falling over that curb; Weaver herself had visited the same store multiple times without tripping. Although the company policy to paint the curbs outside store entrances was relevant, a violation of that policy would not by itself establish a breach of Speedway’s duty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although a policy manual may be admissible, it cannot, alone, set the standard for a landowner’s duty of ordinary care. Here, there is no evidence that the area surrounding the curb renders the curb particularly dangerous. Weaver has no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the curb posed any unusual danger to those entering the store in the normal course of doing business. View "Weaver v. Speedway, LLC" on Justia Law

Paschall and Ragland worked as machine operators. During their employment, they experienced what they believed to be instances of sexual and racial harassment. A year after their employment ended, Paschall and Ragland sued their former employer. Paschall alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1-17), and based on her race, (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981). Ragland alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Paschall and Ragland did not produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they satisfied all the elements of their claims. When a coworker is a harasser, the employer is liable only when the employee shows that the employer was negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment. Here, the employer was not negligent in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment. View "Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp" on Justia Law