Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, 21 people, including Gomez and Hidalgo-Sanchez. were indicted (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846; 18 U.S.C. 2) for their roles in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. DEA agents had monitored phones used by members of the organization and used information obtained from calls to surveil the organization using pole cameras and in-person observation. Gomez, the purported leader of the organization, was in communication with suppliers in Mexico and he oversaw the importation of controlled substances to the Milwaukee area. DEA agents seized four vehicles used to transport the drugs and collected GPS location information for all of the phones used in intercepted calls.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Hidalgo-Sanchez and Gomez, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the propriety of venue in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and the failure of the trial judge to give a limiting instruction to the jury concerning a bill of lading that was admitted into evidence. The government’s use of bolstering testimony about the process of obtaining approval for wiretaps constituted an error, but the error does not warrant reversal. The court concluded there “is more than enough evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

Johnson entered state custody in 2007. His history of prison misconduct led to his transfer in 2013 to serve accumulated segregation (solitary confinement). Johnson suffers from serious mental illness, including depression and bipolar disorder, and he was on crisis watch nine times while in segregation. Mental health professionals regularly monitored his condition and treated him with medication, which was periodically adjusted. Johnson’s misconduct continued in segregation, especially when he refused to take his medication. Many of his violations were serious enough to trigger penalties of 30-90 days of no “yard” access.Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in his pro se complaint that the cumulative yard restrictions (totaling about three years, with 24 months consecutive) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also complained of unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, summertime heat in his cell, excessive noise, and inadequate mental health treatment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Johnson obtained counsel and cited research on the harmful effects of solitary confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson never sought relief for the time he spent in solitary confinement; he sued over his loss of yard access, unhealthy conditions in his cell, and his mental-health treatment. The record is entirely undeveloped on the issue of the effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Claims not raised in the district court are waived. View "Johnson v. Prentice" on Justia Law

Karr was convicted of rape and domestic battery for his assaults on A.P., his former girlfriend. Karr then fired his attorney, hired a new one, and pursued claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Those claims were rejected by the Indiana trial court and on direct appeal. Karr then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. The court rejected an argument that counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate A.P.’s history of medication use, and introduced no evidence about whether Karr used his cellphone during his second assault so that A.P.’s trial testimony could have been impeached. The jury had an ample basis on which to find A.P. credible. There is no reasonable probability that any evidence Karr references would have affected the trial’s outcome. Because Karr did not raise six additional claims in Indiana state court, he procedurally defaulted them. Those procedural defaults are not excusable under a narrow equitable exception delineated by the Supreme Court, which does not apply to “insubstantial defaulted claims such as the ones Karr presents” and does not apply in this procedural posture. View "Karr v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Davis operated a "Ponzi" scheme. His victims lost $5 million. Davis was charged with mail and wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity. Because of the pandemic, non-emergent proceedings, including Davis’ trial, were continued. Parties could request plea hearings held by video or telephone conference under the 2020 CARES Act. The parties negotiated a plea agreement. During a status hearing, Davis’ attorney agreed to conduct a plea hearing by telephone. Davis, telephonically present, did not object. The plea hearing was reset several times; each order indicated that the hearing would proceed telephonically. Davis never objected.At the January 2021 telephonic plea hearing, Davis was present in his lawyer’s office and spoke. The court confirmed that Davis agreed to hold the hearing telephonically. Davis pleaded guilty to mail fraud and signed a plea agreement that included an appellate waiver. The court expressed willingness to hold the sentencing hearing in person. At the sentencing hearing, which proceeded by videoconference, Davis stated that he had agreed to videoconference sentencing. The court sentenced Davis to 160 months imprisonment and to pay $7,171,085 in restitution.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal that argued that the district court erred by holding the plea hearing by telephone. Davis waived his right to appeal all errors, including any errors in the application of the CARES Act, in his plea agreement and in the district court. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Lush started at the NIU College of Law in 2003. Poor academic performance, perhaps due to mental-health struggles, resulted in his dismissal. Lush sued NIU in state court. An Illinois court entered judgment for the defendants. Lush brought additional lawsuits advancing similar claims, which were also rejected. In 2020 Lush sued NIU’s Board of Trustees, individual trustees, and the state under the Americans with Disabilities Act and other federal laws, civil and criminal. Lush sought the recruitment of counsel. After screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the district court entered an order observing that Lush’s claims were precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, were untimely, and fell short of stating any claim for relief. The court denied a new request to recruit counsel and a request to seal the case. Lush voluntarily dismissed the action to avoid potential Rule 11 sanctions. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal from the interlocutory orders for lack of jurisdiction. The voluntary dismissal did not result in an adverse final judgment from which Lush may appeal. The district court denied Lush’s request for counsel because of the futility of allowing another federal pleading on the matters alleged in this most recent complaint. View "Lush v. Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University" on Justia Law

Nieto and Vallodolid led Indiana chapters of the Latin Kings gang and were convicted under RICO (18 U.S.C. 1962(d)) and for drug conspiracy (21 U.S.C. 846); the jury made four special findings—that Vallodolid participated in a 2009 murder, that Nieto played a role in a 2013 murder, and that each defendant was responsible for distributing more than five kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of marijuana. The district court sentenced both men to life, the maximum penalty available.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution committed a “Batson” violation by striking two prospective Hispanic jurors from the venire, that the evidence was insufficient to support the special findings and the drug convictions, and that the district court lacked the legal authority under RICO, to impose a life sentence without first complying with certain state law procedural requirements. Although the government struck a greater proportion of Hispanic than non-Hispanic prospective jurors, the statistical disparity alone is not enough in these circumstances to show purposeful discrimination. The court reasonably accepted the government’s ethnicity-neutral justifications, that one prospective juror’s disagreement with U.S. immigration policy reflected anti-government bias and that another believed the system was biased against people of lesser means. View "United States v. Vallodolid" on Justia Law

As part of an asset-purchase agreement, ISI promised to pay Indigo $2 million with interest on a defined schedule. Guido guaranteed the debt. Under a subordination agreement signed by the parties, a bank is entitled to be paid ahead of Indigo unless ISI meets certain financial conditions designed for the bank’s security.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Indigo’s suit to collect on the guaranty. Indigo is entitled to enforce Guido’s obligation without first trying to collect from ISI but must show that ISI has failed to keep its promise to pay. Indigo’s complaint did not allege that ISI has retired the bank’s loan or met the financial conditions. ISI is, therefore, forbidden to pay Indigo, and is not in default under the note. The guaranty kicks in on ISI’s failure “to timely make payment as required under the Note” and, under Illinois law, “instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are regarded as one contract and will be construed together.” View "Indigo Old Corp., Inc. v. Guido" on Justia Law

Bayon attempted to rob an Indianapolis gas station, then fled the scene in a vehicle. Numerous police officers gave chase. A high-speed pursuit through residential areas ensued. Officer Brink executed a maneuver that resulted in the Traverse spinning and crashing into a tree. Using a loudspeaker, Officer Myers ordered Bayon to exit the vehicle multiple times. Bayon took several minutes to exit the vehicle, saw 10-15 police officers, and heard commands to put his hands up and to show identification. He claims he reached for his wallet. The officers shot him. Three bullets hit Bayon; he fell face-first to the ground. Bayon claims that after he was rolled over, an officer said, “Oh, my God, he doesn’t have a weapon.” The officers claim that Bayon took several aggressive steps toward Myers and reached for something near his waistband. Two officers saw a black, hard object, and thought it was a gun. Another officer pulled “a car jack handle,” out of his pant leg.In Bayon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the facts were in dispute. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The parties’ claims are inseparable from disputed facts. View "Bayon v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Gorss operated a Super 8 Motel as a franchisee of Wyndham. Gorss agreed to furnish the facility in accordance with Wyndham’s standards and to purchase supplies and equipment from approved vendors. Brigadoon sells fitness equipment and is an approved vendor for Wyndham franchisees. Wyndham periodically provided contact information for its franchisees, including fax numbers, to Brigadoon. Gorss also attended trade shows and personally provided contact information to Wyndham-approved suppliers. Gorss received a fax from Brigadoon advertising its fitness equipment. The fax was sent to more than 10,000 recipients. Brigadoon formulated the list of recipients from a variety of sources.Gorss filed a purported class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(c), seeking statutory penalties. The district court declined to certify a class, finding that common issues did not predominate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Gorss’s argument that the court should have required Brigadoon to show with specific evidence that a significant percentage of the class is subject to the “prior permission” defense. Gorss offered no generalized class-wide manner to resolve the permission question. Brigadoon’s claim of permission was not speculative, vague, or unsupported; it was based on a multitude of contracts, relationships, memberships, and personal contacts. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness Inc." on Justia Law