Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Some jobs at Walmart Distribution Center #6025, required workers to handle boxes weighing 30 pounds or more. Walmart's “Temporary Alternate Duty” Policy (TAD) offered light duty to those workers injured on the job who wanted to keep working and earning their full wages while complying with any relevant medical restrictions. Walmart says it designed the TAD Policy to reduce overall costs, including for Workers' Compensation, while improving employee morale. During the relevant time period, Walmart did not offer light duty, under the TAD Policy or otherwise, to pregnant workers or to workers who were injured off the job. Pregnant workers with lifting or other physical restrictions related to pregnancy had to go on leave. After hotly-contested discovery and related sanctions, the court granted Walmart summary judgment in the EEOC's suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Walmart offers evidence that the purpose of the TAD Policy is to implement a worker’s compensation program that benefits Walmart’s employees while limiting the company’s “legal exposure” and costs of hiring people to replace injured workers; compliance with a state workers’ compensation scheme is a neutral reason for providing benefits to employees injured on the job but not pregnant employees.The court upheld the imposition of discovery sanctions. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

The NPWU previously represented the plaintiffs, Parsec employees, participating in the NPWU’s retirement multiemployer defined-contribution plans. A lawsuit brought by the Department of Labor settled, requiring the Severance Plan to pay back loans and approving the Plan’s administrators and its third-party accounting firm, Krol. Parsec employees later voted to decertify the NPWU and elect the Teamsters as their new bargaining representative. The Teamsters told Parsec employees that their retirement accounts would roll over to the Teamsters’ plan. NPWU stated that the retirement accounts would become inactive but remain under NPWU control. After the election, Parsec stopped contributing to the NPWU plan and began contributing to the Teamsters’ plan. Parsec employees’ accounts became inactive but remained under NPWU control. Plaintiffs alleged excessive expenses, undisclosed payments to NPWU officers and their relatives, and high salaries. Plaintiffs requested copies of documents, to which they were entitled under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Plans responded but did not provide certain documents, including a “summary plan description” for the 401(k) Plan, which did not exist. Plaintiffs sent several letters requesting that the Plans roll over their accounts to the Teamsters’ plan. The Plans refused.Plaintiffs filed a putative class action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Plans terms did not require rollover and the allegations failed to show that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties. View "Dean v. National Production Workers Union, Local 707" on Justia Law

Wisconsin assessed property taxes on lands within four Ojibwe Indian reservations. The tribal landowners have tax immunity under an 1854 Treaty, still in effect, that created the reservations on which they live. Supreme Court cases recognize a categorical presumption against Wisconsin’s ability to levy its taxes absent Congressional approval. The parcels in question are fully alienable; their current owners can sell them at will because the parcels were sold by past tribal owners to non-Indians before coming back into tribal ownership. Wisconsin argued that the act of alienating reservation property to a non-Indian surrendered the parcel’s tax immunity. No circuit court has considered whether the sale of tax-exempt tribal land to a non-Indian ends the land’s tax immunity as against all subsequent tribal owners, nor does Supreme Court precedent supply an answer.The district court ruled in favor of the state. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Once Congress has demonstrated a clear intent to subject land to taxation by making it alienable, Congress must make an unmistakably clear statement to render it nontaxable again but these Ojibwe lands have never become alienable at Congress’s behest. Congress never extinguished their tax immunity. The relevant inquiry is: who bears the legal incidence of the tax today--all the relevant parcels are presently held by Ojibwe tribal members. View "Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Muhammad of being a felon in possession of a firearm and stealing firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer. Muhammad was sentenced as an armed career criminal and ordered to pay $10,421.66 in restitution to the firearms dealer and its insurer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.On collateral review, the district court vacated Muhammad’s sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2241, finding that he was improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal. Muhammad was resentenced to time served plus supervised release. Relying on the restitution amount in the revised PSR and the parties’ statements that Muhammad had not made any restitution payments, the court also ordered Muhammad to pay $10,421.66 in restitution. While an appeal was pending, the parties learned that Muhammad paid $433.32 toward his restitution judgment while incarcerated. The district court updated the record on appeal to reflect that Muhammad now owes $7,993.63 in restitution. The $2,228.03 reduction included $433.32 Muhammad paid, $200 his codefendant paid, and $1,794.71 from a Treasury Department offset. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court declined to correct any error, given that Muhammad concedes that he originally owed $10,421.66 in restitution and that there is no disagreement that he should receive credit for his payments. View "United States v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

After the public health department for the City of Madison and Dane County, Wisconsin issued a COVID-19 mask mandate, an owner of Helbachs Café posted a sign: “Mask Free Zone. Please remove mask before entering” and then took it down about 30 minutes later. Over the next few days, Madison’s public health officials cited Helbachs several times for violating its COVID-19 orders and set a hearing to revoke Helbachs’ food and drink license for cumulative violations. The dispute caught the public’s attention and the landlord decided not to renew Helbachs’ lease.Helbachs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The local citations were later dismissed, and the revocation hearing was not pursued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Helbachs has standing to bring this First Amendment retaliation claim because the record shows that Helbachs suffered injury-in-fact beyond the revoked citations and the threatened, but aborted, hearing. However, Helbachs’ First Amendment claim fails under “Monell” because the defendants’ actions were not part of a larger pattern or practice of retaliation. View "Helbachs Cafe LLC v. City of Madison, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Rogers, with a friend, A.W., went to a Rural King store where the video surveillance system recorded Rogers as he handled firearms, including a Mossberg shotgun. Minutes later, A.W. provided her ID, filled out Form 4473, and paid for the shotgun. A week later, Rogers and A.W. went to another Rural King: Rogers approached the counter alone and inspected several firearms, including a Sig Sauer rifle. A.W. later purchased the rifle. Law enforcement received a tip that Rogers and A.W. were purchasing firearms with fraudulently-obtained gift cards. Officers reviewed the Rural King security footage and concluded that A.W. was purchasing the firearms for Rogers. During an interview, A.W. denied knowing the location of the Sig Sauer. Rogers, interviewed by the same officer, stated that the rifle was under the couch in A.W.’s home. Rogers was charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.At trial, it became evident that two Mossberg shotguns were involved, one that Rogers handled, and another retrieved by the manager from storage and sold to A.W. The defense argued impossible to ascertain whether the grand jury intended to accuse Rogers of possessing the gun that he had handled at the counter or the gun purchased by A.W. The prosecution proceeded on a theory of joint possession of the purchased Mossberg. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Alight provides recordkeeping services for employee healthcare and retirement benefit plans, some of which are governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 The Department of Labor investigated Alight, following a discovery that Alight processed unauthorized distributions of plan benefits due to cybersecurity breaches, and sent Alight an administrative subpoena duces tecum, seeking documents in response to 32 inquiries, including broad demands, such as “[a]ll documents and communications relating to services offered to ERISA plan clients.” Alight produced some documents but objected to several inquiries, citing its duty to keep certain information confidential. The Department petitioned for enforcement of the subpoena. Alight produced additional materials but redacted most of the documents to remove client identifying information, preventing the Department from discerning potential ERISA violations. Alight asked the court to quash or limit the subpoena and permit redactions. Alight’s legal consultant projected full compliance would require “thousands of hours of work.” The Department clarified or narrowed its requests.The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order granting the Department’s petition to enforce the subpoena with some modifications. The court rejected Alight’s arguments that the subpoena is unenforceable because the Department lacks authority to investigate the company because it is not a fiduciary under ERISA, or cybersecurity incidents generally; that the subpoena’s demands are too indefinite and unduly burdensome, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying Alight’s request for a protective order to limit production of certain sensitive information. View "Walsh v. Alight Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. View "Dunn v. Neal" on Justia Law

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Finite owns 90.9% of Orient #1, an abandoned Illinois coal mine; the other 9.1% belongs to Royal. In 2004, Keyrock's predecessor acquired an interest in Orient #1 to extract coal mine methane from its section of the property, drilled wells, and, in 2007, obtained a vacuum permit from the Illinois Department of Natural Resources. Finite discovered the pump’s use in 2018 after a test revealed that coal mine methane had been drained extensively from Orient #1. Finite unsuccessfully petitioned the Department for compulsory unitization of the parties’ properties, to require Keyrock to share its methane production with Finite.Finite sued, alleging conversion, trespass, accounting, and common law unitization, and sought to enjoin the use of a vacuum pump. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that, under the rule of capture (gas that migrates is subject to recovery and possession by the holder of the gas estate on the property to which the gas migrates), the methane could not be owned until extracted regardless of whether extraction occurred by means of a vacuum pump. Finite’s claims hinged on ownership, so the rule of capture foreclosed Finite’s claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Absent illegality, the Department’s issuance of the permit suggests that the use of the vacuum pump to extract methane did not violate Finite’s correlative rights (imposing a duty on owners not to waste natural resources intentionally or negligently as to injure their neighbor).. View "Finite Resources, Ltd. v. DTE Methane Resources, LLC" on Justia Law