Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Segid, a citizen of Eritrea, had children there. In 2004, Segid married a U.S. citizen in Eritrea. In 2006, Segid fled Eritrea for Egypt and obtained an immigrant visa without legal counsel. The application asked him to list “ALL Children.” He marked “N/A.” He moved to the U.S. and became a lawful permanent resident. He has three children from his marriage. In 2015, Segid applied for naturalization, listed all six children, and indicated that he had never given false, fraudulent, or misleading information to a government official. At his naturalization interview, the officer confronted him about the discrepancy. Segid responded that he did not list the older children because they were not part of his visa petition, he did not believe he was named on their birth certificates, and he worried for their safety.USCIS denied Segid’s naturalization application, finding that Segid had not established that he was a person of good moral character. Segid sought review under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c). The court found that Segid had admitted that he intentionally omitted the children from his visa application, which was a material misrepresentation to procure an immigration benefit. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Although Segid argued the merits of his eligibility for naturalization before the district court, his primary argument on appeal was that he has stated a claim for relief under section 1421(c) because he met the statute's administrative requirements but a 1421(c) claim focuses on whether the individual should have been granted naturalization. Segid’s brief was silent on this question; he waived the argument. View "Segid v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

FBI agents and Chicago police executed a search warrant at Johnson’s apartment, which authorized them to search for: Firearms, short-barreled, ammunition, paraphernalia for maintaining firearms, any photographs of individuals with firearms, any records of firearms transactions, which have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of the offense of [unlawful use of a weapon by a felon]. The officers did not find firearms or ammunition but, on the back porch attached to Johnson’s apartment, they found over 100 grams of a substance containing heroin and furanylfentanyl, concealed in a cavity at the top of a ceiling beam. Johnson was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), which carries a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment.Johnson’s motion to suppress was denied The district court found the porch to be curtilage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 132-month sentence. The officers’ seizure of the drugs was lawful under the plain view doctrine. The court rejected an argument that furanylfentanyl is not an “analog of [fentanyl]” under the statute; the district court did not plainly err in applying the 10-year enhanced penalty. Johnson qualified as a career offender based on two Illinois convictions for the manufacture and/or delivery of a controlled substance. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Turner made four sales of cocaine and one sale of heroin to an undercover officer. He had a loaded handgun in his waistband. Turner was convicted on six counts of distributing and possessing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Turner’s 924(c) conviction would ordinarily carry a maximum sentence of 10 years but the court found that Turner qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), so he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison. A defendant meets that classification if his “prior criminal record includes at least three convictions for ‘serious drug offense[s]’ or ‘violent felon[ies].’” A “serious drug offense” includes an offense under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Turner had two prior convictions under a Wisconsin drug trafficking statute.Turner argued that the Wisconsin statute sweeps more broadly than the ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense” because the state law makes it a crime to deal in substances that the federal law does not reach. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 20-year sentence. The supposed overbreadth concerns only substances that, as a matter of chemistry, do not exist and cannot possibly exist; “we opt for scientific reality over abstract legal doctrine.” View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Walsh’s had convictions for the murder of a police officer, unlawful use of loaded weapons, burglaries, and armed robbery. He has been in and out of prison since 1965. In 2018, Walsh (age 71) committed an armed bank robbery. Days later, Walsh recruited a getaway driver (an FBI informant), canvassed a different bank, and prepared the same outfit and mask used in the first robbery. Agents arrested Walsh and recovered a loaded revolver. Walsh pled guilty to bank robbery by force or violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d); use of a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A); and unlawful possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Because of the pandemic, the court granted Walsh’s motion to proceed with sentencing by videoconference. At the hearing, the judge announced an intended sentence of 156 months’ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines range. Walsh interrupted, saying, "you mother-fucker," "I’d blow your fucking brains out" "kill your entire fucking family.” Walsh’s profanity-laced rant spans several pages of the transcript. Walsh demanded that his threats appear in the transcript, stating that he wanted to “start the appeal.”The judge terminated the hearing. Walsh then moved for recusal and to withdraw his plea. The court denied both motions, stating there was a “significant possibility” that Walsh’s purpose was a change of judges. The court held additional hearings and sentenced Walsh to life imprisonment; considering section 3553(a)'s factors, the court emphasized the seriousness of Walsh’s conduct, his criminal history and contempt for the law, the serious threat of recidivism, and the public danger he posed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the life sentence was substantively unreasonable and that Walsh’s tirade required recusal. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Inmate Munson developed sensitivity in two teeth because of poorly-fitted partial dentures. In April 2014 he went to the prison’s dental unit. One tooth was extracted. Munson declined a second extraction, so treatment was postponed. Munson’s next regular dental examination had to be rescheduled because of a lockdown. Munson asserts that on July 15, he sent a letter to Dr. Newbold, the prison’s chief dentist, complaining of pain and seeking treatment. Newbold cannot recall receiving the letter, nor did he record any such letter. Because of successive lockdowns, Munson’s regular exam was repeatedly rescheduled. Dr. Henderson saw him on August 5 but Munson left to take a call before treatment began. Munson says he wrote Newbold another letter on September 20. Newbold cannot recall receiving it. In February 2015, Henderson treated the tooth. Munson eventually received new partial dentures after his 2017 transfer.Munson brought Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Dr. Newbold and Wexford, the corporation that provides inmate medical services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The evidence could not support an inference that Munson’s dental problems were a serious medical need, that Dr. Newbold knew of his requests for treatment, or to attribute any delay in treatment to Dr. Newbold. Wexford could not be held liable for damages without evidence that Munson experienced any constitutional harm. View "Munson v. Newbold" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin newspaper owned by Gannett published an article about Batterman and his business, Financial Fiduciaries, describing a judicial proceeding in which several trust beneficiaries successfully removed Batterman as de facto trustee of a $3 million fund. The court concluded that Batterman violated his fiduciary duties. Although the court did not rule on whether Batterman committed criminal acts, it ordered him to pay the beneficiaries’ litigation expenses because his conduct “amounted to something of bad faith, fraud or deliberate dishonesty.” Batterman sent a retraction letter to the newspaper. Weeks later, the newspaper revised the article but did not remove it. Batterman then sued Gannett for defamation. The district court entered judgment for Gannett, finding that the allegedly defamatory statements were substantially true and protected by Wisconsin’s judicial-proceedings privilege, which protects publishers that report court activity.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly ruled that the only plausible defamation claim in Batterman’s complaint pertained to the implication that he committed elder abuse. The other defamatory statements were substantially true and privileged. Mishandling a deceased person’s estate may not always constitute elder abuse, but a reasonable jury could not conclude that observing the relationship between Batterman’s conduct and elder abuse constituted a false statement. View "Financial Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Indianapolis Police Officers went to Mikie’s Pub in Indianapolis. Both officers were off duty and in plain clothes. Bohanon argued with the bartender about his bill. The officers intervened and brutally beat Bohanon in the parking lot. Bohanon sued Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force and that his injuries were caused by the city’s policies, which prohibit off-duty officers with any alcohol in their blood from performing law-enforcement functions subject to a narrow exception. An officer may do so only in an “extreme emergency situation[]” where police “action is required to prevent injury to the off duty [officer] or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony or other serious offense.” Bohanon argued that the city was deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of constitutional violations. A jury awarded Bohanon $1.24 million. The judge granted Indianapolis judgment as a matter of law.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For the city to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must have caused Bohanon’s constitutional injury. The narrow exception in the city’s substance-abuse policy did not present a policy “gap” that made it glaringly obvious that off-duty officers would use excessive force. Because no extreme emergency situation existed at the time of the incident, those policies expressly prohibited the officers’ conduct and were not the “moving force” cause of Bohanon’s injury. View "Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Nine Illinois energy consumers sued their electricity provider, ComEd, and its parent, Exelon, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated for damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging injury from increased electricity rates. These rates increased, they allege, because ComEd bribed former Illinois Speaker of the House Michael Madigan to shepherd three bills through the state’s legislature: the Energy Infrastructure and Modernization Act of 2011 (EIMA); 2013 amendments to that legislation; and the Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016. Although Illinois law still required public utilities to file rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), EIMA implemented statutorily prescribed, performance-based rate increases that limited ICC discretion in reviewing rates and authorized at least $2.6 billion in ComEd spending on smart meters and smart grid infrastructure, costs that were required to be passed on to customers. In 2016, FEJA provided $2.35 billion in funding for nuclear power plants operated, paid for through a new fee for utility customers, and allowed ComEd to charge ratepayers for all energy efficiency programs and for some expenses relating to employee incentive compensation, pensions, and other post-employment benefits.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Paying a state’s required filed utility rate is not a cognizable injury for a RICO damages claim. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co." on Justia Law

Vanegas, a Mexican citizen, was hired by Signet, a nationwide construction company, to work in the U.S. on an H-2A guestworker visa, which authorizes foreign workers to perform “agricultural” work in the U.S. on a temporary basis, if the proposed employer can show that there are too few domestic workers willing and able to do the work and that the use of guest-workers will not undercut local workers’ wages and working conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); 1188(a)(1). Vanegas was assigned to build livestock structures on farms in Wisconsin and Indiana. He routinely worked more than 40 hours a week, but Signet did not pay him extra for his overtime hours.He filed a complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and moved for conditional certification of a collective action on behalf of all Signet H-2A workers who were exclusively assigned to construction work. The district court dismissed, finding that Vanegas was an agricultural worker, exempt from FLSA’s overtime protections, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Work falls within the FLSA agricultural exemption only if it is both “performed by a farmer or on a farm” and if it “does not amount to an independent business.” Regulations establish a fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether work performed on a farm is agricultural or is an independent business. Signet did not prove that the agricultural exemption applies. View "Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

A man grabbed Flowers’s girlfriend in a bar. After a verbal altercation, the bar’s owner asked both men to leave. Flowers protested but left the bar accompanied by a bouncer and Davis, an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard. While Flowers waited in the parking lot for his girlfriend, he and Davis talked. Officer Renfro, another off-duty Springfield police officer employed by the bar, without warning or provocation, grabbed Flowers and slammed him to the pavement face first, knocking out Flowers’ tooth. Renfro then placed Flowers under arrest. Flowers had not verbally or physically threatened the officers and was not showing any indication that he would resist arrest. The only conduct that Renfro claims justified slamming Flowers to the ground was that Flowers questioned the command to leave the bar and turned around to face Davis within one to two feet of him. Flowers disputes that he ever turned to face Davis.Flowers sued the city, Renfro, and Davis under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the officers did not violate Flowers’ civil rights and were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court held that there are genuine issues of disputed fact, material to Flowers’ claim against Renfro; the reasonableness of that use of force would inform a decision on qualified immunity. View "Flowers v. Renfro" on Justia Law