Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Carnell pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), and 846, for conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. The PSR concluded that Carnell’s relevant conduct involved 2.37 kg of pure methamphetamine “ice,” not a mixture, for a base offense level of 36, with a criminal history category of III, and proposed a three-point acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On remand, the district court recalculated both Carnell’s offense level and his criminal history category, increasing the latter from category III to V to account for Carnell’s convictions on two Illinois offenses while the case was on appeal and specifying that Carnell’s federal sentence would be consecutive to any state sentence resulting from several other pending charges. Following a second remand, the court used the guidelines for mixtures and downgraded Carnell’s base offense level to 32, for a new guideline range of 140-175 months, and sentenced Carnell to 165 months to be served consecutively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no error in the district court’s recalculation of Carnell’s criminal-history category. Because the state charges were dismissed, the consecutive sentencing issue was moot. View "United States v. Carnell" on Justia Law

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at Pennsylvania hotels. When he was arrested, Santiago was holding the distinctive firearm that he and his co-defendants used in the robberies. Convicted of three Hobbs Act counts of interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, (robbery), 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft), Santiago was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months' imprisonment on the three Hobbs Act and two felon-in-possession counts. Under then-applicable law, Santiago also received mandatory consecutive 60-month and 300-month terms for the 924(c) counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected Santiago’s section 2241 habeas petition in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, required that his convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon be set aside. Santiago cannot show he was actually innocent of those charges as required to invoke the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In order to use section 2241 to avoid the restrictions on successive 2255 motions, he would need to show that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Santiago v. Streeval" on Justia Law

Ziccarelli began working as a corrections officer in 1989. He was previously fired and was reinstated after litigation. Ziccarelli developed serious health conditions for which he took 10-169 hours of annual leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. In July 2016 he sought treatment for work-related PTSD; by September he had used 304 hours of his allowable 480 hours of annual FMLA leave. To seek permanent disability benefits, he needed to exhaust all his sick leave. Ziccarelli planned to enroll in an eight-week PTSD treatment program. Based on his conversation with the Sheriff’s Office’s FMLA manager, Shinnawi (the contents of which are disputed), Ziccarelli decided to retire.Ziccarelli filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the FMLA. The district court granted the Sheriff’s Office summary judgment on all claims. Ziccarelli appealed only his FMLA claims, arguing that a reasonable jury could find that the Sheriff’s Office interfered with his FMLA rights during his conversation with Shinnawi by discouraging him from using leave and that the Sheriff’s Office constructively discharged him to retaliate against him for calling Shinnawi. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Ziccarelli presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his claim of FMLA interference through alleged discouragement. The court affirmed with respect to the retaliation claim. View "Ziccarelli v. Dart" on Justia Law

Mikulski, a Polish national residing illegally in the United States, initiated a shootout in a public park. Although others shot live rounds, Mikulski shot blanks; no one was injured. After police questioned him about the incident, he instructed his mother (with whom he lived) to hide his gun. Mikulski, who had a prior felony conviction, was apprehended while driving on a suspended license. He eventually pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and was sentenced above the 30-37 month guidelines range to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Mikulski’s argument that the court misapplied a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his efforts to hide the gun. That Mikulski’s instruction to his mother preceded law enforcement’s decision to search the house was irrelevant. The above-guidelines sentence was more than adequately justified considering the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Mikulski" on Justia Law

Hubbert pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), each reflecting a controlled purchase by a confidential source. The quantities purchased ranged from 12.3 to 49.4 grams. The PSR indicated that Hubbert qualified as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines 4B1.1(a), based on Hubbert’s state court convictions for aggravated battery, and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver. Hubbert’s career offender status dictated that he be placed in a criminal history category VI; his 35 criminal history points independently placed him in the same category. Hubbert argued that his previous conviction for possession with intent to deliver was really part of the same course of drug dealing underlying his current conviction, and was not a “prior” offense and that his criminal history category overstated the seriousness of his record.The judge rejected his arguments, noting a five-year gap between the state offense and 2016-2017 controlled buys underlying the federal charges; the charges involved different customers, drug types, and amounts. Hubbert was not charged with a conspiracy that might have been broad enough to encompass both sets of charges. His Guidelines sentencing range was 188-235 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 188-month sentence. At age 37, Hubbert has a criminal history that includes 27 convictions as an adult; the judge acted within his ample discretion. View "United States v. Hubbert" on Justia Law

In 2014, Abebe, a Black woman of Ethiopian origin, began working for Eskenazi Health’s Dental Clinic as a dental assistant. Abebe has had a record of behavior issues throughout her employment; one annual review suggested that she “work on her personal issues that are affecting her interaction with co-workers.” Another review noted that “when she gets upset, her attitude turns to shocking.” Abebe’s 2018 performance review led to Abebe not receiving a merit-based raise, noting three incidents during which Abebe made accusations against co-workers. Abebe contacted the EEOC and alleged for the first time that she had experienced race- and national origin-based discrimination. Abebe claims Eskenazi Health placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan after she spoke to the EEOC. The parties dispute whether the Plan was actually issued or merely discussed. Eskenazi Health decided, a month later, not to impose the Plan.Abebe sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Eskenazi. Abebe cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, nor can she demonstrate that Eskenazi’s reason for the low scores on her performance review was pretextual. Abebe fails to establish a causal connection between her contact with the EEOC and the issuance of the Performance Improvement Plan, nor that issuing the Plan was an adverse employment action. View "Abebe v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County" on Justia Law

Illinois State University charges tuition and multiple fees; the Mandatory Fee covers the cost of on-campus facilities and programs. In 2020, after the Governor declared an emergency because of COVID-19 and issued an order forbidding many in-person gatherings, ISU shifted to distance learning over a video system. ISU remitted some but not all of the Mandatory Fee, telling students that the remainder includes the expense of facilities that must be supported no matter how educational services are provided. Two students filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Constitution does not ensure that states keep all of their promises, any more than it ensures that states observe all of their laws. A violation of a state law or a state contract is a violation of a state entitlement, for which the remedy lies under state law. . ISU lacked authority to violate the Governor’s orders. There was no due process violation because the students were not entitled to hearings. What the students want is substantive–a full refund. A breach of contract does not violate the Constitution. Suing ISU officials in their individual capacities makes no difference; there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. “Plaintiffs’ counsel should count themselves lucky that [those officials] did not seek sanctions for frivolous litigation. View "Thiele v. Board of Trustees of Illinois State University" on Justia Law

Officer Stringer and a confidential informant (Hinkle) appeared before a state court judge and obtained a warrant. Following the ensuing search, Sanford was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession of a firearm as a felon, 922(g)(1). Sanford sought to challenge the warranted search and sought a “Franks” hearing. Sanford presented Hinkle’s Declaration that officers told her that if she did not cooperate they would take away her one-year-old daughter, that she would not be charged with any new offenses, that an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in a misdemeanor case would be “taken care of,” and that she should state that she had not been promised anything for testifying. . The government informed the court that FBI agents had discussed Hinkle’s Declaration with her and that she told them she did not prepare the Declaration and that much of it was false or essentially untrue.After a "pre-Franks" hearing, the district court upheld the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Warrant-issuing judges are aware that confidential informants are likely to have criminal histories; Hinkle admitted to criminal conduct. The district court did not err in determining that a Franks hearing was not necessary based solely on the failure to discuss Hinkle’s “unremarkable” criminal history. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs sued the LLC, for fraud and breach of contract. After Judge Coleman denied their motion to add Carrier (one of the LLC’s members) and D’Aprile (Carrier’s employer) as additional defendants, a jury returned a verdict of $905,000 in the plaintiffs’ favor. Judge Coleman denied the LLC’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, but its motion for a new trial remains pending. The plaintiffs filed a second suit against Carrier and D’Aprile, presenting the same substantive claims; it was assigned to Judge Kness, who dismissed it as barred by claim preclusion, even though the first suit is ongoing.The Seventh Circuit vacated and instructed that the second suit be assigned to Judge Coleman. The plaintiffs “are engaged in judge-shopping.” Local Rule 40.4 in the Northern District of Illinois permits judges to ask for consolidation of related suits before a single judge. The judiciary has an interest, independent of litigants’ goals, in avoiding messy, duplicative litigation. A second suit is unnecessary, whether plaintiffs win or lose in the first. View "Ewing v. Carrier" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state holds exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiffs, who own beachfront property on Lake Michigan’s Indiana shores, believed that their property extended to the low-water mark, and filed suit, alleging that the ruling amounted to a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment–a “judicial taking.” The defendants were Indiana officeholders in their official capacities: the Governor, the Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources Director, and the State Land Office Director.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. None of the named officials caused the plaintiffs’ asserted injury or is capable of redressing it, so the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Pavlock v. Holcomb" on Justia Law