Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joshua Campbell sought to suppress evidence of child pornography found during an unannounced parole check by his parole officers. He argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his parole agreement and the officers' failure to issue Miranda warnings led to the incriminating statements. Campbell contended that the parole agreement compelled his responses under threat of penalty and that he was in custody during the interrogation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Campbell's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the parole agreement did not threaten to penalize Campbell for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parole agreement did not impose a penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment, as it only required Campbell to respond to communications from parole officers, which could include invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Campbell was not in custody during the parole check, as he was in a familiar environment, not physically restrained, and the officers did not display weapons or use force. Therefore, the court concluded that Campbell's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, and the evidence obtained during the parole check was admissible. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Angela Midthun-Hensen and Tony Hensen sought insurance coverage for therapies for their daughter K.H.'s autism from Group Health Cooperative between 2017 and 2019. The insurer denied coverage, citing a lack of evidence supporting the effectiveness of speech therapy for a child K.H.'s age and sensory-integration therapy for autism at any age. The family's employer-sponsored plan only covered "evidence-based" treatments. After several medical reviews and appeals upheld the insurer's decision, the parents sued, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and state law regarding autism coverage.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin ruled in favor of the insurer, finding no violations of state law or ERISA. The plaintiffs then focused on their claim that the insurer's actions violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), which mandates equal treatment limitations for mental and physical health benefits. They argued that the insurer applied the "evidence-based" requirement more stringently to autism therapies than to chiropractic care, which they claimed lacked scientific support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the insurer's reliance on medical literature, which varied in its recommendations based on patient age, was permissible under the Parity Act. The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the insurer's treatment limitations for mental health benefits were more restrictive than those applied to "substantially all" medical and surgical benefits, as required by the statute. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' focus on a single medical benefit was insufficient to prove a violation of the Parity Act. View "Midthun-Hensen v. Group Health Cooperative of South Central, Inc.," on Justia Law

Olalekan Jacob Ponle orchestrated a scheme to defraud businesses by using phishing emails and information from the dark web to access corporate email accounts. He and his co-conspirators sent fraudulent emails to employees, instructing them to wire funds to bank accounts controlled by Ponle. This resulted in the theft of over $8 million from seven companies, with an additional $51 million in attempted but unsuccessful thefts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois charged Ponle with eight counts of wire fraud. He pleaded guilty to one count and acknowledged owing over $8 million in restitution. The court, relying on the United States Sentencing Guidelines, used the intended loss amount to calculate his offense level, resulting in a custodial range of 168 to 210 months. Ponle objected, arguing that "loss" should only include actual loss, not intended loss. The district court disagreed and applied a twenty-two point increase to his offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines includes both actual and intended loss, as clarified by the Sentencing Commission's commentary. The court found that the commentary, which underwent public notice and comment and Congressional review, was authoritative and consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson v. United States. Therefore, the district court correctly used the intended loss amount to calculate Ponle's sentence. View "USA v. Ponle" on Justia Law

Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law

A group of employees sued their employer, Metalcraft of Mayville, for not paying them for time spent working just before or after their shifts. The employees alleged that Metalcraft's timekeeping system, which allowed clocking in up to 15 minutes before and after shifts, did not accurately reflect the time they worked. They claimed that adjustments to their clock-in times were made even when they performed compensable work during these periods.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin decertified the collective action in April 2020, leading to 24 additional cases being filed and consolidated. Nine cases were dismissed for various reasons, and the district court granted summary judgment to Metalcraft in the four selected cases, ruling that the employees' evidence was speculative and insufficient. The remaining 12 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their cases, acknowledging that the summary judgment ruling likely determined their claims. Metalcraft then moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs' counsel, arguing that the lawsuits were frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's denial of sanctions. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had enough factual and legal support for their claims to avoid sanctions. The court noted that FLSA claims can be based on reconstructed memories when an employer's record-keeping is inadequate. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' legal arguments regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act and the de minimis doctrine were not baseless. The appellate court emphasized that the standard for summary judgment is different from the standard for Rule 11 sanctions and that the plaintiffs' failure to win on summary judgment did not make their cases frivolous. Therefore, the denial of sanctions was affirmed. View "Farina v. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, GEFT Outdoor, LLC, challenged an Evansville, Indiana ordinance that distinguishes between on-premises and off-premises signs, arguing it violated the First Amendment. Initially, the district court agreed, but the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, led to a remand. GEFT then focused on the ordinance's permit and variance criteria, claiming the City might consider a sign's message. However, the City does not request message information for permits, and the ordinance's criteria do not involve the sign's message. GEFT's variance application was denied due to non-compliance with size and spacing rules, which GEFT argued was unconstitutional.The district court dismissed GEFT's complaint, finding the ordinance's size and placement rules valid and the variance criteria specific enough to avoid content discrimination. The court referenced Leibundguth Storage & Van Service, Inc. v. Downers Grove, which upheld a similar ordinance. GEFT appealed, but the Seventh Circuit's decision in GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County, which upheld similar variance criteria, further weakened GEFT's position. GEFT argued potential content discrimination, but the court found no substantial invalidity in the ordinance's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that GEFT's facial challenge failed because it did not show that a substantial portion of the ordinance's applications were unconstitutional. GEFT had not contested the size and location rules, effectively conceding their validity. The court noted that GEFT's focus on a variance disqualified it from a facial challenge. The district court's decision was modified to clarify that GEFT lost on the merits, not for lack of standing, and the judgment was affirmed. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Christopher Truett operated a methamphetamine distribution network while incarcerated in the Marion County Jail. He coordinated drug purchases and sales through phone calls, directing his girlfriend to handle the transactions and collect proceeds. Truett and his co-conspirators faced various drug and firearm charges, but he was specifically charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He pleaded guilty and disclosed his mental, cognitive, and memory impairments during the change-of-plea hearing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana did not hold a competency hearing despite Truett's impairments and behavior during the plea hearing. His counsel assured the court of his competence, and Truett actively participated in the proceedings. At sentencing, additional evidence of his impairments was presented, but the court again did not order a competency hearing. The court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report's findings, attributing the entire drug quantity to Truett and sentencing him to 240 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $250 fine. The written judgment included a condition for fine payment not orally pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a competency hearing, as Truett's behavior and counsel's assurances indicated his understanding of the proceedings. The court also found no error in attributing the entire drug quantity to Truett, as he was personally involved in all transactions. Finally, the appellate court affirmed the inclusion of the fine payment condition in the written judgment, deeming it a mandatory condition of supervised release. The court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "USA v. Truett" on Justia Law

Paul Osterman was prosecuted for sex trafficking a child after a detective in Oneida County, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to place a GPS tracker on his truck. The warrant was based on an affidavit that included incorrect information. Osterman argued that these inaccuracies meant the affidavit did not establish probable cause, and he sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held an evidentiary hearing and found that the affidavit did establish probable cause despite the inaccuracies. The court denied Osterman’s motion to suppress, leading to his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the detective acted recklessly by not correcting the affidavit. However, the court independently reviewed the affidavit and concluded that it still established probable cause even without the misstatements. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress. The main holding was that the inaccuracies in the affidavit were immaterial to the probable cause determination, and thus, the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking was admissible. View "USA v. Osterman" on Justia Law