Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Haas believes that Jews are responsible for crimes against humanity, that Israel is “the biggest racist organization on the planet,” and that anyone who supports Israel or Jews is a traitor who deserves to die. After posting death threats against former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley on her Instagram page, Haas was visited by diplomatic security officers. He reiterated his violent message during that conversation and then posted vile, anti-Semitic statements on a Russian social media website. An FBI agent questioned him about the new threats, but Haas made threats against the agent via texts and voicemails. He was convicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce and for the threats against the FBI agent and was sentenced to 51 months in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Only a multiplicity challenge to the indictment was properly preserved. The allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 115 is the individual threat, not some broader scheme or plot to threaten. After a “fact-intensive inquiry,” the court concluded that the individual threats were properly charged separately. Contentions that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the indictment was constructively amended, and that some counts were improperly grouped for sentencing, were all forfeited and do not undermine the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Haas" on Justia Law

After passengers in a car shot two people, the police approached a car matching the description given by witnesses. The car sped away but crashed into another car. Three men, including Burnett, got out and ran. At least one passenger carried a gun. Police pursued two of the men and caught Burnett; they found two different brands of ammunition in his pockets, matching that found in two loaded guns tossed during the foot chase. Police later determined that the gun in the alley where police arrested Burnett and the gun from the backseat of the car were fired during the shooting. Burnett pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), reasoning that, even if Burnett did not personally possess the three guns, all three were attributable to him as relevant conduct because they were used as part of joint criminal activity and Burnett had aided and abetted the others in possessing them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Burnett’s 110-month sentence. The district court could permissibly infer that, even if not fired, the gun was still involved in the broader events around the shooting. The district court could reasonably infer that Burnett intended to aid his associates based on his continued participation in the crime during and after the shooting. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Menghistab, then a lawful U.S. permanent resident, pleaded guilty to rape in Indiana state court in 2011. The Department of Homeland Security began the process of removing him to Ethiopia. Because of his rape conviction and resulting sentence, Menghistab was barred from seeking asylum, discretionary withholding of removal, and waiver of removability. He was eligible only to apply for deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture. An immigration judge denied him that relief. The BIA affirmed.Ethiopia refused to issue Menghistab a travel document. He was released from custody in 2013 and continued to live in the United States until, in 2020, Ethiopia agreed to issue the travel document. The Department detained Menghistab pending removal. He moved to reopen his case, citing the changed circumstances in Ethiopia occasioned by the 2020 outbreak of civil war in the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia. The Tigray War has resulted in widespread attacks on civilians. Ethnic Eritreans, such as Menghistab, have suffered particularly severe human‐rights violations. The Board denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.The Seventh Circuit remanded. A new hearing is needed to address the materiality of the war with respect to Menghistab’s risk of torture and whether Menghistab is an Ethiopian citizen. View "Menghistab v. Garland" on Justia Law

An FBI informant provided a cell phone number for Lewis, a distributor in a drug-trafficking operation. The government obtained a tracking order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Cell-site location information (CSLI) from Lewis’s cell phone provider showed that his phone was within a 1,099-meter radius of Greenwood, Indiana. From there, officers searched parking lots and hotels where a deal might take place. Officers eventually saw a woman resembling Lewis’s wife enter a room at a hotel, drop off a duffel bag, and drive away in a car registered in Lewis’s name. After a drug-sniffing dog alerted at the room, officers obtained a search warrant. The team executed the warrant the same day. Inside the room, officers found Lewis, $2 million in cash, and 19.8 kilograms of cocaine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lewis’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court rejected his arguments that the dog sniff violated his reasonable expectation of privacy or, in the alternative, that the application for the section 2703(d) order lacked probable cause. Lewis lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel's exterior hallway, where the dog sniff occurred. Regardless of whether the government’s use of real-time CSLI amounted to a search, the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Stamey began working at Forest River in 2007 at age 51. He accumulated a strong work record, receiving several raises and avoiding any discipline. Stamey claims that his coworkers began harassing him in 2017 when he was 61. The alleged harassment continued for roughly 10 months and included verbal harassment, which Stamey described as escalating to the point where he “caught old age insults practically every morning on [his] way into the building, when [he] left for the day, during breaks, and whenever [he] walked into other parts of the plant.” The harassment also included interference with Stamey’s work. His coworkers repeatedly defaced his workstation, writing profanity on his tool cabinet, in the bathroom, and around the plant, and zip-tying his tools together. He resigned in 2018 at age 62 and sued, alleging that the company constructively discharged him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by refusing to address a relentless and ruthless campaign of age‐based harassment by his coworkers.The district court granted River Forest summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the case is close, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Stamey’s favor, a jury could return a verdict in Stamey’s favor. If Forest River shows that Stamey’s account lacks credibility, the company may prevail. View "Stamey v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law

Tinimbang invested $811,400, founding Donnarich Home Health in 2005 with his then-wife Josephine and their children. In 2006-2007, the others forced him out of management; Tinimbang maintained his equity position. Josephine and their son, Richard, later incorporated two healthcare businesses: Josdan and Patient Home; some of the funding came from Donnarich’s assets. Tinimbang later asserted that he was not compensated for those asset transfers or for his removal as Donnarich’s president.Josephine and others were charged with conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349) and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of healthcare fraud and unlawful payments for patient referrals (18 U.S.C. 1956(h)) by using Donnarich and Josdan to fraudulently bill Medicare and creating shell companies to deposit checks. The government sought the forfeiture of assets involved in or traceable to the conspiracies. Josephine fled. Guerrero, an employee, pled guilty and agreed to forfeit assets. The district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture.Tinimbang asserted a claim to the assets by instituting ancillary proceedings, citing his investment in Donnarich, his removal without compensation, and the allegedly improper transfers from Donnarich to Josdan and Patient. Tinimbang did not provide any financial tracing. The government “reviewed the movement of funds” and did not trace any of Tinimbang’s investment to the forfeiture assets. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. Tinimbang had not carried his burden to show a vested or superior interest in the forfeited assets at the time of the criminal acts. View "United States v. Tinimbang" on Justia Law

In 2004, Watkins was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. He received a mandatory life sentence based on three prior convictions for “felony drug offenses.” After multiple unsuccessful collateral attacks, Watkins filed this 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision and arguing that two of his prior convictions did not qualify as predicate felony drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), so his enhanced sentence was unlawful. Following enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, Watkins applied for relief under that statute, was resentenced to time served, and was released from prison. He is currently serving a reduced term of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the 2241 petition as moot. Watkins can only speculate that Watkins might benefit from a decision on the merits; the mere possibility that a decision might influence the court’s determination on remand concerning his term of supervised release is not enough to keep the case alive. Intervening case law, combined with the government’s concession, should be more than enough to make clear in any future section 3583(e) proceedings that Watkins was not properly subject to a mandatory life sentence. View "Watkins v. United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois" on Justia Law

AFM ran 52 mattress stores in Indiana and Illinois. Motorists insured AFM with a policy covering loss of Business Income, Extra Expense, and loss due to actions of a Civil Authority. An exclusion applicable to all coverage stated: We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the governors of Illinois and Indiana ordered the closure of businesses. AFM was forced to cease business activities at all of its stores. AFM submitted a claim for coverage. Motorists denied it.AFM sought a declaratory judgment in Illinois state court. The judge dismissed the case with prejudice, based on the Virus Exclusion, rejecting a claim of “regulatory estoppel.” AFM claimed that Motorists misrepresented the Virus Exclusion to the Illinois Department of Insurance so that the regulators would approve it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Illinois does not recognize regulatory estoppel. The Virus Exclusion unambiguously precludes “civil authority” coverage. View "AFM Mattress Company, LLC v. Motorists Commercial Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Aguirre-Zuniga’s family immigrated from Mexico to the U.S. when he was three years old. He is now raising his own six-year-old daughter, an American citizen in Indiana. He became a lawful permanent resident 15 years ago. His primary language is English, and he has visited Mexico only three times since emigrating. In 2018, he pled guilty to the delivery of methamphetamine in Indiana. DHS concluded that his conviction was an aggravated felony subjecting him to deportation, and the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Indiana law prohibiting the delivery of methamphetamine criminalizes more conduct than the corresponding federal law given that Indiana defines “methamphetamine” in a way federal law does not. When a state statute is broader than its federal counterpart, a conviction under that statute cannot trigger a noncitizen’s deportation. View "Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland" on Justia Law

JPMorgan loaned the debtors $1.3 million on the security of a Cook County restaurant. After the debtors stopped paying real estate taxes, Wheeler paid on their behalf and received the right to a tax deed once a redemption period expired. JPMorgan did not pay the taxes or redeem from Wheeler. The debtors filed a bankruptcy petition. They listed some tax debts but did not identify Cook County or Wheeler as creditors. Neither was served with notice or a summons. JPMorgan knew about the unpaid taxes but failed to ensure that the County or Wheeler was served. The bankruptcy judge approved a plan of reorganization. The debtors did not pay; Wheeler got the judge to lift the automatic stay in order to get a tax deed. A state judge issued the requested deed. The federal district court held that the stay should have been left in place because the confirmed plan superseded Wheeler’s unpaid lien. On remand, the bankruptcy court declared the tax deed “void” and approved a revised plan of reorganization, calling for JPMorgan to pay Wheeler $65,000.In a second appeal, the district court concluded that the order approving the revised plan and knocking out Wheeler’s lien was valid. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wheeler is a party, the plan has been confirmed, and Wheeler has bypassed its principal opportunities to contest the plan. View "Wheeler Financial, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law