Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998 Williams, a leader of the Gangster Disciples, was indicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Convicted, Williams was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 240 months on two counts and a life sentence on a third count; there was evidence that Williams directed a murder to further the gang’s drug dealing activities. Williams invoked the 2018 First Step Act, seeking to reduce his sentence to time served. Williams cited the revised penalty scheme for crack cocaine offenses in place before the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, his advanced age, poor health, and record of good behavior in prison. The government argued that Williams remained affiliated with the Gangster Disciples and posed an ongoing risk to the public.The court held a hearing and reviewed photos of Williams posing in prison with other Disciples and investigative reports showing that Williams was helping distribute drugs for the gang within the prison. Williams disputed the extent of his involvement but admitted that he continued his association with the Disciples. The district court explained that Williams’s ongoing affiliation with the Disciples was “sufficient” to deny relief and found that Williams was still participating in drug dealing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court acted well within the bounds of its broad discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

At St. Vincent Hospital, police spoke to Banks. He told them he had been shot three times in the hip. Roland explained that he drove Banks to the hospital in his Buick, which was in the parking lot.” Officers found Roland’s Buick in the hospital parking lot and saw blood and firearms through the window. Sergeant Lewis provided all this information in his search warrant application. Pursuant to the warrant, Detective Shue searched Roland’s Buick. In addition to the visible blood and handguns, Shue and an evidence technician found ammunition in a duffel bag and a loaded magazine in the armrest console. Banks told Shue that he did not know who shot him, that he called Roland after being shot, and that Roland drove him to the hospital. None of this information appeared in the warrant application but comes from an affidavit Shue prepared to support Roland’s arrest as a felon in possession of a firearm.Roland waived his Miranda rights and stated that the car, handguns, and ammunition belonged to him. He had prior convictions for robbery and for possessing cocaine. Roland unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his Buick and his statements. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his arguments that there was not probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant application omitted material information that would have negated probable cause. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

Fun's warehouse had a functional sprinkler system with a working water supply. In 2016, an inspector from Legacy found no problems. In 2017, the inspector found the system had no water pressure. South Bend Water Works could not explain the problem and had no record of shutting off the water. Two months later, Fun contacted the fire inspector, who did not know how to restore the water. Fun's owner again called the Water Works and was told there was no record of disconnection. He asked the operator to restore the water and “assumed that she was going to ... figure out what was going on.” Fun never heard from any Water Works personnel and did not check whether the water was restored. In 2018, another Legacy employee performed the inspection. Fun was not notified of any problems. A fire destroyed the warehouse in 2019. Fun claimed losses exceeding $7 million. The city apparently had capped the pipe supplying the sprinkler system in 2017 when the neighboring building was demolished. Fun's Frankenmuth insurance policy contained an exclusion for situations in which the insured knew of any suspension or impairment in any protective safeguard, including sprinkler systems, and failed to notify Frankenmuth.Frankenmuth obtained a declaratory judgment that it did not owe insurance coverage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cao had knowledge in 2017 that the system had no water yet never reported that impairment nor determined that the problem was solved. View "Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fun F/X II, Inc." on Justia Law

Selective denied coverage of Creation's insurance claim. Creation sued for breach of contract and won. Creation then pursued costs and fees for Selective’s vexatious and unreasonable delay under the Illinois Insurance Code, 215 ILCS 5/155. The Seventh Circuit held that the remedy was unavailable. Creation then sued Selective’s in-house lawyer, the lawyer’s supervisor, and its outside counsel, alleging they tortiously interfered with the contract between Selective and Creation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The suits were an attempt at double recovery—one from the principal and one from its agents. The corporate form limits, not doubles, liability. In Illinois, tortious interference requires some sort of interloper and precludes applying the economic loss doctrine to claims for tortious interference. Illinois provides a corporation’s agents with a conditional privilege, rooted in the business judgment rule, from tortious interference suits. When an agent acts in the corporation’s interests, she is protected from liability for interfering in her principal’s contractual affairs. When an agent interferes with a contract, she is presumed to do so for the company’s benefit. Under Illinois law, overcoming the privilege was Creation’s burden to plead, and its failure to do so with more than mere conclusory allegations dooms its suit. View "Creation Supply, Inc. v. Hahn" on Justia Law

In May 2020 Rehm expressed concern that Haven was not doing enough to protect her and other employees from COVID. Dillett, Haven’s Director of Operations and co-owner, did not appreciate Rehm’s suggestions. Rehm sent a staff-wide email criticizing Dillett’s handling of COVID health risks. Dillett fired her. After Rehm complained to the NLRB, Dillett threatened legal action. An ALJ found that Haven had unlawfully terminated and threatened Rehm, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Haven to compensate Rehm for lost pay and expenses, offer to rehire her, notify her that it had removed references to her unlawful termination from her employee file, post notices of employee rights, and file a sworn certification of compliance.The Seventh Circuit summarily enforced that order in September 2021. Haven did not comply. In December 2022, the Seventh Circuit directed Haven to respond to the Board’s contempt petition. Haven disregarded a subsequent “show cause” order. The Seventh Circuit entered a contempt order, requiring Haven to pay a fine of $1,000, plus a fine of $150 per day for every day of the next week that Haven fails to comply, beginning on February 28, 2023. The daily fine will increase by $100 each day that Haven fails to comply beyond the next week. The court will forgive the fines if Haven files a sworn statement within seven days demonstrating full compliance. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Miedzianowski was convicted of conspiring to participate in racketeering activity from 1985-1998, conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, more than 50 grams of cocaine base, and unspecified quantities of heroin and marijuana, conspiring to commit extortion, using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a violent or drug-trafficking crime, distributing cocaine and cocaine base, wire fraud, possessing stolen ammunition, possessing a dangerous weapon, and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to life in prison.Miedzianowski moved to reduce his sentence after the 2018 First Step Act made retroactive the lower penalties enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act, to reduce the disparities between sentences for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. If a defendant is eligible for relief because he could have received a lower sentence had the Act been in effect at the time of the crimes, the court must exercise its discretion and weigh the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Miedzianowski was eligible for relief. The Act modified the penalty for conspiring to distribute crack.Miedzianowski cited his post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and family support and argued that his sentence was greater than those of co-defendants. The district court acknowledged those factors but concluded that they did not outweigh the need for general deterrence, the seriousness of his crimes, misusing his status as a police officer, perjuring himself, and threatening witnesses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The court sufficiently addressed Miedzianowski’s arguments and did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Miedzianowski" on Justia Law

Ross worked as a sales representative for First Financial until 2018. Ross sued First Financial and two of its senior executives for sales commissions he claimed he was owed. Under the terms of his employment contract, Ross could earn a commission both when a customer first leased an item from First Financial and then at the end of a lease term, if the customer either extended the lease or purchased the equipment outright. In early 2017, First Financial acted to reduce future commission rates. Ross argued that First Financial breached his contract by applying the new, lower commission rates to end-of-lease transactions that occurred after the change took effect if the leases originally began before the change.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The company’s commission payments to Ross were correct because commissions on end-of-lease transactions are not earned until the customer actually agrees to and pays for the new transactions. Although Ross was reluctant to accept the new plan, he still accepted it by continuing to work for First Financial under its terms. View "Ross v. First Financial Corporate Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Pierner-Lytge, a Second Amendment supporter, walked to a public park near Walker Elementary School that contains a playground and a baseball field. Many children and families were reportedly present that evening. Pierner-Lytge carried a rifle with a spike bayonet bolted to the end of the barrel, a holstered semi-automatic handgun, plus a duty belt containing pepper spray, a baton, and handcuffs. Milwaukee County officers responded to reports. Pierner-Lytge stated that she was exercising her Second Amendment rights and confirmed that she had a concealed carry weapon license but did not have it with her. Pierner-Lytge had previously resisted arrest and threatened officers and had been the subject of six mental health detention proceedings. Officers arrested Pierner-Lytge for disorderly conduct. She complied with instructions. Officers confiscated her rifle, bayonet, handgun, and duty belt. Pierner-Lytge was released from custody and was not charged. The seized property was returned.Pierner-Lytge sued. 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity. While a reasonable officer should have known in 2020 that simply carrying a firearm in public does not constitute disorderly conduct, more is required to show that the legality of Pierner-Lytge’s conduct was “beyond debate.” To the extent the officers misjudged whether probable cause existed to arrest Pierner-Lytge, it was a reasonable decision given the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute at the time View "Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Bailon accompanied Aguila on a trip to purchase cocaine. The seller was a DEA confidential source. DEA agents arrested both men and searched Aguila’s car, recovering a pistol. The agents questioned Bailon inside a DEA van; he had limited English. Bailon admitted he owned the handgun. In the DEA office, an agent spoke Spanish and translated. Bailon was given an “Advice of Rights” form written in Spanish, explaining his Miranda rights. Bailon initialed next to each of his rights and signed the form. Bailon admitted to being in the country without authorization, stated that he had seven children, and consented to searches of his home and his phone. Agents had asked him if he “want[ed] to go back to Mexico or … tell [them] the truth.” They stated that they were going to call ICE and that they would test the gun for fingerprints. Agents found a photo of a gun on Bailon’s cell phone.Bailon was charged as an alien unlawfully in the U.S. in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The court excluded the statements made in the van but not those made in the DEA office, finding that the Miranda warning was not undermined by the references to his children or his lack of formal education. Convicted, he has been removed to Mexico. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Considering the totality of the circumstances, Bailon’s conduct and statements establish that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Bailon" on Justia Law

Richardson was the driver and sole occupant of a car that was stopped for a traffic violation. He gave the police false names. Trying to identify him, officers conducted an inventory search and uncovered a firearm stashed beneath the passenger seat, within the driver’s reach. Before telling Richardson about the gun, officers asked him whether he had a firearms license; he responded, “That gun’s not mine.” The search uncovered other items belonging to Richardson, including a pay stub bearing his name. When Richardson had an asthma attack, he stated that his inhaler was in the glove box. During jail calls with his girlfriend, who owned the gun, he confirmed that the gun was “in the same place that it’s always in.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 15-year sentence, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on any person convicted of possessing a firearm if that person has three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Each of three robberies committed over 36 hours when Richardson was 16 was committed on a different occasion. The second robbery was committed more than an hour after and 12 miles away from the first; the third was committed the next day. Richardson constructively possessed the gun. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law