Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bakke, a Wisconsin beef farmer, began suffering from serious back pain in 2017. He has had temporary relief from epidural steroid injections, spinal fusion surgery, physical therapy, and pain medications. Bakke sold his farm because the upkeep was too physically demanding and applied for disability benefits in 2019. Two state agency physicians examined him and concluded that Bakke was capable of light, full-time work. His general practitioner concluded that he could tolerate no more than four hours of work per day. At a hearing, Bakke testified about intense pain, with some days so bad he could not get out of bed; that he could not sit for more than two hours; that pain often required him to lay down during the day; that he could not lift or carry much weight; and that he was unsteady on his feet.An ALJ performed the Social Security Administration’s five-step disability analysis and agreed that Bakke could not engage in substantial gainful activity due to his back injury and obesity but concluded that his impairments were not as severe as those listed in 20 C.F.R. 404. Considering residual functional capacity, he determined that Bakke could still perform light, full-time work. Citing the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ decided that light, full-time work was available in significant numbers in the national economy, precluding a finding that Bakke was disabled. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Bakke v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Two men entered the bank, wearing masks. One, wearing a black Pacer’s hat, presented a demand note. The other had a gun. They used zip ties to bind the employees and stole over $67,000. Surveillance footage shows the robbers getting into a Chrysler Aspe in the parking lot. Only 637 Aspens were registered in Indiana. Police found a disposable glove near the parking spot. DNA analysis revealed Tinsley’s DNA on the glove. An Aspen was registered to Tinsley. Police obtained a search warrant for the vehicle and Tinsley’s home. They conducted a traffic stop and found two loaded guns on Tinsley. Searches of his vehicle and home revealed other guns, extended magazines, baggies of marijuana, pills, and a powder, each containing methamphetamine, disposable gloves, a black Pacers hat, and zip ties. Text messages on Tinsley’s phone from around the time of the robbery show individuals asking to purchase drugs and Tinsley replying that he did not have any. Hours after the robbery, Tinsley contacted a supplier to purchase drugs. He later messaged his customers that he had restocked.Tinsley unsuccessfully moved to sever the bank robbery counts from the drug and firearms charges. The court admitted the text messages, subject to a limiting instruction. Tinsley did not object to the court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary decisions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and Tinsley’s sentence. View "United States v. Tinsley" on Justia Law

Williams sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), citing as “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances the fact that a district court treated him as having a prior conviction for unlawful drug delivery, which increased his minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), while his Illinois conviction for delivery of cocaine did not satisfy the criteria of a “serious drug felony.”The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, noting its own precedent. Section 3582(c)(1) addresses some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief with distinct requirements, such as the time limits in 28 U.S.C. 2255(f) or the need for a declaration by the Sentencing Commission that a revision to a Guideline applies retroactively. There is nothing “extraordinary” about a legal error and the law provides methods other than compassionate release for dealing with those claims.Williams also argued that he has a spotless conduct record in prison, has completed educational programs that will allow him to participate in society, and has a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 and other diseases in prison. The court rejected those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by presenting them to the Bureau of Prisons. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit three times ordered Neises to bargain with the Union that represents its employees. After reaching numerous tentative agreements on articles to be included in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Neises retracted those tentative agreements without good cause. The NLRB sought to hold Neises in contempt. The court appointed a Special Master to resolve factual disputes. After more than a year of discovery, motions, and deliberation, the Master found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Neises should be held in contempt.The Seventh Circuit held Neises in contempt and imposed most of the NLRB’s proposed sanctions, including a $192,400 fine. Neises significantly violated an unambiguous command to bargain in good faith by retracting, without good cause, the aspects of the CBA to which it tentatively had agreed. The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Neises disobeyed a court order. The court rejected arguments that the NLRB did not have the authority to file the contempt petition and that the petition was not properly ratified; that the Report improperly decided that the parties reached tentative agreements; and that Neises did not violate an unambiguous command because the judgment and consent order do not use the phrase “in good faith” and such a phrase is too vague anyway. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Neises Construction Corp." on Justia Law

In 2018, Escamilla was stationed at Fort Drum. During an on-base medical appointment, he complained of hearing voices that were telling him to commit suicide. He agreed to seek treatment at Samaritan Hospital, where he was admitted to the inpatient mental health unit under New York State Mental Hygiene Law, 9.39(a), which permits the director of a hospital to “receive and retain therein as a patient for a period of fifteen days any person alleged to have a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.” Escamilla was discharged 11 days later, with diagnoses of mild depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and autism spectrum disorder.A year later, Escamilla attempted to purchase a handgun from an online retailer, who shipped the gun to a federal firearm licensee in Wisconsin. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System generated a response denying the firearm transfer. Escamilla was prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), as a person who “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for the government. Escamilla’s admittance to Samaritan constituted a “commitment” under section 922(g)(4). The court rejected Escamilla’s argument that his hospitalization did not qualify as a commitment because he was there on a voluntary, informal basis. View "Escamilla v. United States" on Justia Law

Xiong is Hmong and speaks English as a second language. He joined the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh as its Director of Affirmative Action in 2018, reporting to Kuether, Associate Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. Kuether found Xiong’s work to be of poor quality. Xiong gave Kuether a self-assessment as part of his annual performance review in which he claimed he was being paid less because he is Hmong. Kuether canceled his review meeting, declined to reschedule it, and did not share the final written performance review with him.When Xiong wanted to hire a compliance officer who had a law degree and would add diversity to the HR department, which was primarily white, Kuether questioned Xiong’s judgment. Xiong recalls Kuether saying “people of color are not a good fit.” Kuether denies saying anything like that. After multiple cross-accusations, Xiong demanded that he no longer report to Kuether. Xiong says he also raised concerns about the HR department’s hiring and promotion policies. The next day, Xiong was terminated for insubordination and poor work performance.Xiong sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the University. Because the University fired Xiong one day after his whistleblowing, a reasonable jury could infer that his termination was retaliatory. Employers often have mixed motives for adverse actions against employees. The existence of both prohibited and permissible justifications reserves the question for a jury. View "Xiong v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

Alley, working at Penguin Random House’s warehouse, was promoted to the management position of Group Leader. Penguin required all managers and supervisors to report sexual harassment allegations and provided clear instructions, including how to report anonymously. Alley received a copy of this policy and participated in training that referred to it. In 2019, Penguin employee Guzman informed Alley that Lillard was sexually harassing her. Alley conducted her own investigation. Haines, Guzman’s then-coworker and roommate, submitted a corroborating statement. Alley also contacted Pendleton, a former Penguin employee, who had stopped coming to work months earlier; Alley suspected it involved Lillard.Haines and another employee went to HR independently, reporting that Lillard was sexually harassing Guzman. Penguin investigated. Alley admitted that she already knew of Guzman’s allegations and that she had contacted Pendleton. She forwarded the statements from Guzman and Haines. Alley later alleged that she too had been sexually harassed by Lillard starting in 2015. Golladay, her former Group Leader, acknowledged that Alley had reported the harassment and that he did not report it. Golladay was not disciplined. Penguin terminated Lillard and demoted Alley.Alley sued, alleging retaliation under Title VII and breach of contract under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims, Alley was demoted for her failure to report allegations as required by Penguin policy. She did not engage in statutorily protected activity. View "Alley v. Penguin Random House" on Justia Law

Peraica represented Dordevic in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding and submitted a Statement of Financial Affairs (Rule 2016 disclosure) in which he reported that Dordevic had paid him $5,000. As the Trustee learned during discovery, Dordevic had actually paid Peraica $21,500. The Trustee informed Peraica that he needed to file an updated Rule 2016 fee disclosure. Peraica instead sent the Trustee an informal accounting document listing $21,500 in fees. The Trustee responded: “The Rule 2016 disclosures actually need to be filed with the Court” by submitting “an official form.” Peraica repeatedly ignored the Trustee’s reminders. The Trustee filed a motion, 11 U.S.C. 329, to examine the fees. Peraica failed to respond; the Trustee then requested that all fees be forfeited. The bankruptcy court granted the motion.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beyond Peraica’s brazen disregard of the Trustee’s advice, Peraica’s proffered explanation for not updating his fee disclosure lacking, if not false. Peraica had been involved in more than 350 bankruptcy cases in the Northern District of Illinois alone. The bankruptcy court ordered Peraica to disgorge all past fees as a penalty for his blatant lack of compliance with his obligations. There is no leeway for partial or incomplete disclosure. View "Peraica v. Layng" on Justia Law

In 2007, Llanos was convicted for possessing heroin with intent to distribute it in March-July 2007. While serving his sentence for that conviction, he was indicted for dealing heroin between 2006 and April 2007. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to those charges before a different judge and received a sentence concurrent to the one imposed in the 2007 case. In 2015, while he was on supervised release for the 2009 case, Llanos again was caught distributing heroin. He entered another guilty plea, before a third judge, who sentenced him to 120 months. Another judge revoked his supervised release for the 2009 case and imposed a new term of 30 months in prison, consecutive to the 120-month term in the 2017 case.Llanos appealed the sentence he received when his supervised release in the 2009 case was revoked. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government should not have brought the 2007 and 2009 charges as separate cases, because they involved the same conduct and the same conspiracy, and by doing so the prosecutor artificially inflated Llanos’s criminal history for purposes of future Guidelines calculations. Llanos has two prior felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), and is subject to the “career offender” provisions. View "United States v. Llanos" on Justia Law

Robinson let Solorzano, stay at his Chicago home. The two frequently exchanged coded text messages about cocaine deals. Robinson drove to Indiana to pick up Solorzano after a transaction ended with Solorzano getting robbed. Robinson later texted Solorzano, “You should have taken me to watch your back.” Later, Solorzano arranged a deal with an undercover officer. Robinson drove him; upon their arrival, authorities approached the vehicle to arrest them. One officer said that, during the arrest, he saw his colleague pull a handgun from Robinson’s waistband; it was loaded. The officer who interrogated Robinson said that Robinson told him he had brought the gun to avoid being robbed. A jury found Robinson guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and of possessing a firearm as a felon but found him not guilty of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court imposed a sentencing enhancement to the felon-in-possession conviction, finding Robinson possessed a firearm “in connection with” the cocaine conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of acquitted conduct to enhance Robinson’s sentence did not violate his constitutional rights and the court made sufficient factual findings to apply the enhancement. The district court’s rationale for connecting the gun to the cocaine conspiracy was clear. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law