Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, IIT, a nonprofit higher education institution, suspended all in-person instruction, moved all classes online, and restricted access to campus facilities. IIT did not refund tuition or mandatory fees to its students. Before the pandemic, IIT undergraduates were not permitted to register for an online class without special approval and were required to live on campus. Hernandez, a student who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 semester, filed a purported class action, alleging that an express or implied contract was formed under which the university promised to provide in-person instruction, services, and resources, in exchange for tuition and compulsory fees, citing Activity Fees, Student Services Fees, Professional Co-Curricular Fees, and Studio Fees. He also raised an unjust enrichment theory, based on IIT’s retention of students’ full tuition and fees.The district court dismissed, finding that Hernandez failed to identify any specific promise to provide in-person, on-campus instruction to support a breach-of-contract claim and that Hernandez failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment. While his appeal was pending, the Seventh Circuit decided "Gociman," finding that Loyola University students adequately stated claims for breach of an implied contract under Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Hernandez’s case, finding no meaningful distinctions between his case and Gociman. View "Hernandez v. Illinois Institute of Technology" on Justia Law

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The primary source of incriminating information against Taylor was “Doe,” a woman with whom Taylor and his wife were intimately involved. Law enforcement presented a warrant application to an Indiana judge, seeking to search Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography and bestiality. The affidavit did not disclose that two officers involved in the investigation had been competing with Taylor for Doe’s affection. The judge signed a typed warrant that authorized the search of Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography; it did not mention bestiality. At a time unknown and under unknown circumstances, the lead detective apparently made handwritten alterations, adding “bestiality” to the warrant’s scope. When officers executed the altered warrant, they found substantial evidence that Taylor was producing and distributing child pornography. They found no evidence relating to bestiality. Taylor's motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing were denied. Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to 324 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated. An evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the judge approved the alterations before the warrant's execution. Questions surrounding those alterations are relevant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so the hearing must encompass false statements and material omissions in the affidavit and law enforcement’s subjective good faith in seeking the warrant. The affidavit did not support probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography but did support probable cause to search for evidence of crimes of bestiality. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Participating employees can contribute a portion of their salary to their Retirement Plan account and Northwestern makes a matching contribution. Employees participating in the Voluntary Savings Plan also contribute a portion of their salary, but Northwestern does not make a matching contribution. Both plans allow participants to choose the investments for their accounts from options assembled by the plans’ fiduciaries. Northwestern is the administrator and designated fiduciary of both plans. The plaintiffs sued Northwestern under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 (ERISA).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit in 2020. The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's reliance on a “categorical rule” that providing some low-cost options eliminates concerns about other investment options being imprudent. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reinstated claims that Northwestern failed to monitor and incurred excessive recordkeeping fees and failed to swap out retail shares for cheaper but otherwise identical institutional shares. The court again affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including a claim that Northwestern retained duplicative funds. View "Divane v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA, Securities Law
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In 2016, Gill ran as an independent candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. He was 2,000 signatures short of qualifying for the general election ballot. Gill sued members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, claiming that portions of the Illinois Election Code violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to evaluate the ballot access provisions for independent candidates under the fact-intensive balancing test set forth in Supreme Court precedent. The district court did so and again granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot. While the litigation was pending, Illinois adopted a redistricting plan that changed the boundaries of the 13th District so that the suit can no longer offer Gill any effectual relief. Any declaratory or injunctive relief would speak to a congressional district that no longer exists. Gill’s circumstances are not capable of repetition yet evading review. View "Gill v. Linnabary" on Justia Law

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Another detainee threw hot coffee on King while the assigned tier officer, Szul, was gone, assisting another officer. When Szul returned, King stated that he needed medical attention. King was not examined until the next day. He was transferred to Stroger Hospital. A jail employee gave King an Inmate Grievance Response/Appeal Form for his failure-to-protect grievance, stating: “Your allegation(s) have been forwarded to the Offices of Professional Review [OPR] and Divisional Superintendent for review and/or investigation. You may follow-up with [OPR]”; “[t]o exhaust administrative remedies, grievance appeals must be made within 15 calendar days." The response to his delayed-treatment grievance stated only that he had been treated at Stroger Hospital and referred to exhausting administrative remedies. King appealed that response. King was later interviewed for the OPR investigation and signed a “Detainee/Complaint Notification,” stating, “I understand that if I do not file a complaint register within 10 days that OPR will close the investigation.” King did not file a complaint register.In King's section 1983 suit, the court granted the defendants summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although King appealed his delayed-medical-treatment grievance, he failed to give the defendants notice of the claim because it did not allege wrongdoing by any correctional officer. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the failure-to-protect claim. Because the jail’s procedure for grievances that are referred to OPR is so obscure that no ordinary prisoner could understand it, the remedy was unavailable. View "King v. Dart" on Justia Law

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Ron and Lorrie Meier investigated the purchase of a life insurance policy for Ron through Monarch Solutions. While they considered a policy offered by Lincoln, a nurse assessed Ron’s health and prepared a “Medical Supplement” and “Examiner’s Report.” Ron ultimately applied for a policy with Pacific. In June 2018, Pacific received a copy of the medical forms previously submitted to Lincoln. On July 26, Ron completed his Pacific application, referencing the Lincoln “medical examination.” Ron agreed to several terms, including a provision requiring him to update Pacific “in writing of any changes” to his health. Pacific accepted Ron’s application on July 30 and began the underwriting process. On August 6, Ron learned he had stage IV lung cancer and immediately began treatment. Ron and Lorrie orally disclosed Ron’s cancer diagnosis to their Monarch representative but did not inform Pacific. On September 6, Pacific delivered Ron's policy. A year later Ron died from lung cancer.After learning that Ron had failed to disclose his terminal cancer before the policy’s issuance date, Pacific rejected Lorrie’s claim. Pursuant to the Illinois Insurance Code, Pacific rescinded the policy and returned the premiums. The district court and Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of Pacific. Ron’s failure to inform Pacific of the diagnosis constituted a material misrepresentation allowing for the policy's rescission. View "Meier v. Pacific Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Crain, a Black woman, became the Chief of the Environmental Management Service at the VA Center in July 2014, subject to a year-long supervisory probationary period, with a GS-12 pay grade. Before Crain applied, she was told that if she successfully completed her probationary period, the Center would try to get the position’s pay grade increased to the GS-13 level. After Crain assumed the position, her supervisor added responsibilities to the role in an effort to justify a higher pay grade and asked Scaife, an HR classification specialist, to upgrade the role. Scaife concluded that she was unable to “justify anything higher than a GS-12.” Crain alleges that six White service chiefs’ pay grades were elevated to GS-13 or GS-14. During Crain’s tenure as Chief of EMS, several performance and behavior-related concerns arose.In June 2015, Crain was notified that she had failed to satisfactorily complete her supervisory probationary period and was being reassigned to a different role with the same salary. The memo identified multiple “performance-based deficiencies” as the basis for the decision. Months before her reassignment, Crain had initiated an EEOC complaint. After her reassignment, Crain sued under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the VA, rejecting Crain’s claims of disparate pay based on her race and that she was removed as Chief of EMS in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. View "Crain v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Officer Sandoval encountered inmate Hacker, who is almost totally deaf, and ordered him to return to his bed. Hacker, unable to hear, did not comply. Sandoval shoved Hacker, who awoke handcuffed to a bed. He filed an administrative grievance and received notice that it had been referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Divisional Superintendent, with a form allowing Hacker to appeal within 15 days. Neither document gave any timeline for OPR’s disposition of Hacker’s grievance. More than three months later, an OPR investigator concluded he could not substantiate Hacker’s claims; his superior officer signed the memorandum to approve the closure of the referral. The document does not state that the grievance process as a whole had ended, nor mention an appeals process. Hacker apparently received no communication from the Superintendent.Hacker had already filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing failure to exhaust claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and to comply with other PLRA requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The jail’s grievance procedures became unavailable to Hacker after the jail involved OPR; various communications forced Hacker to “go beyond the established system and guess” what he needed to do. One of Hacker’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act failed because his grievance did not give fair notice that he was requesting a personal listening device; his other claim, concerning missing medications, was not tied to a physical injury as required to recover damages under the PLRA. View "Hacker v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

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Serving a 262-month sentence for heroin-related crimes, Vaughn has repeatedly, unsuccessfully, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1). He argued in his latest petition that his health conditions (asthma, obesity, and hypertension) put him at extra risk should he contract COVID-19; that he has completed classes demonstrating his rehabilitation; and that his sentence is excessive in light of current legal standards.The district judge deemed his arguments “generic” and denied his application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. COVID-19 has been a fact of life for more than three years. Vaughn has not identified any medical data suggesting that he is at greater risk of a bad outcome inside prison than he would be outside. Taking classes while incarcerated is common rather than extraordinary. Vaughn’s lengthy sentence stems from his classification as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines rather than from a statutory minimum sentence. Vaughn’s arguments do not, even collectively, identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The discretion to evaluate multiple circumstances resides principally in the district courts. The district judge properly rejected Vaugh’s arguments. View "United States v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law