Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A southern Illinois outpatient surgery clinic accused the area’s largest hospital system and its largest health insurer (Blue Cross) of violating federal and state antitrust laws by entering into contracts that designate the hospital but not the clinic as a Blue Cross preferred provider (in-network provider). A district judge granted judgment in favor of Blue Cross, reasoning that insurers are customers and cannot be liable for the practices of sellers with market power. The clinic and the hospital agreed that a magistrate judge could handle the rest of the case and enter a final judgment, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). Discovery followed. After reviewing a special master’s report, a magistrate granted the hospital summary judgment on the ground that the clinic had not been injured.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that Blue Cross had not consented to a magistrate having final authority. However, Blue Cross received a district judge's decision and impliedly consented to the magistrate by submitting documentation. Neither federal nor state law prohibits preferred provider agreements; the agreements are not exclusive dealing or tie-in arrangements. The clinic "scarcely tries to show that it has been injured by reduced output or higher prices," nor does it allege that there is any historical link between the hospital’s insurance-contracting practices and either prices or output. View "Marion HealthCare, LLC. v. Southern Illinois Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Goliday’s Indianapolis home, recovering drugs and a loaded handgun. Goliday arrived during the search, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted that the drugs and gun were his. Goliday stated that he had bought two ounces of heroin every week for the last year from the same supplier, then resold smaller amounts. He pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs—one count each for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and, based on his statement, to conspiring to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin. Without the conspiracy charge, he would have faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years; the conspiracy charge, enhanced by Goliday’s prior conviction, carried a statutory minimum of 15 years.At sentencing, when the court asked Goliday if the facts relating to the conspiracy charge were accurate, Goliday indicated that his statement about how much he purchased was only intended to implicate his supplier. However, he subsequently agreed to the judge's recitation of the charge.The Seventh Circuit vacated his 15-year sentence. Goliday’s statements suggested he did not understand how a conspiracy offense differed from just buying and selling drugs. The district court did not resolve the confusion and should have ensured that Goliday understood the nature of the charged conspiracy offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea. View "United States v. Goliday" on Justia Law

A 2015 Wired magazine article described a controlled hack of a Jeep Cherokee driven by one of the magazine’s journalists. Cybersecurity researchers exploited a vulnerability in the Jeep’s “uConnect” infotainment system, designed by Harman, for installation in vehicles manufactured by FCA (formerly Chrysler). FCA immediately issued a recall and provided a free software update to patch the vulnerability. Federal regulators supervising the recall determined that the patch eliminated the vulnerability. Other than the Jeep in the Wired test, no other vehicle was successfully hacked.Four plaintiffs sued FCA and Harman on behalf of every consumer who had purchased or leased a 2013–2015 Chrysler vehicle equipped with the uConnect infotainment system, asserting federal and state warranty and consumer-fraud claims. The plaintiffs argued that although the alleged defect never manifested again after the Wired hack, they paid more for their vehicles than they would have if they had known about the cybersecurity vulnerability. After discovery closed, faced with a factual challenge to standing, the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence in support of their claimed overpayment injury.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. When litigation moves beyond the pleading stage and Article III standing is challenged as a factual matter, plaintiffs cannot rely on mere allegations of injury; they must provide evidence of a legally cognizable injury in fact. These plaintiffs continued to rely on allegations and legal arguments. View "Flynn v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Childs pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. While serving supervised release, Childs, who is addicted to alcohol and controlled substances, had numerous violations: resisting a peace officer, two charges of reckless driving, DUI, other traffic offenses, possession of marijuana, retail theft, and use of alcohol. The court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Childs to 14 months of imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. During his second term of supervised release, Childs again committed multiple violations and overdosed on controlled substances.The government argued that Childs was a danger to himself and others. Childs’ lawyer noted that Childs had accepted responsibility and argued that a short sentence would allow Childs to “get on with” the steps needed to overcome his addictions. The court remarked on Childs’ significant criminal history, dangerous conduct, and the many opportunities he had been given for treatment, then focused on deterrence and the need to protect the public, sentencing Childs to 24 months’ imprisonment with no further supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court considered the facts of Childs’ violations, his criminal history, the relevant section 3553(a) factors, and the policy statements, and said enough about the reasons for the sentence to provide an adequate basis for review. The sentence was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Childs" on Justia Law

Parker suffers from MS and sciatica and has received social security disability benefits for that diagnosis for several years. Brooks hired Parker in 2017. Parker worked as a receptionist 25 hours per week (usually mornings). Parker had different supervisors and received mixed feedback on her performance. Parker had to be “coached” concerning her use of paid time off (PTO). In 2018, Parker requested time off to get treatment for pain. Her supervisor, Williams, learned that during Williams’ absence, Parker had taken unapproved time off and made schedule changes. Williams approved the requests but warned that Parker was exceeding her PTO. Parker acknowledged that she needed to do a better job complying with the policy. Williams understood Parker’s statements to be admissions and emailed HR employees, recommending termination. After receiving their assent, Williams informed Parker that she was being terminated. Brooks apparently told the Indiana Department of Workforce Development that Parker had voluntarily quit to accept other employment. In response to her EEOC complaint, Brooks stated that its reason for terminating Parker was repeated failure to follow established PTO policies.In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Brooks. Parker did not produce evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to infer a link between her request for accommodation (time off for pain treatment) and her termination. View "Parker v. Brooks Life Science, Inc." on Justia Law

Thurston was convicted of felony rape after his DNA was matched to cigarette butts found in the park that was the scene of the crime. Thurston claimed that his attorney did not object to the admission of a report summarizing the DNA analysis of the cigarettes because the defense attorney did not notice that the report also identified Thurston’s DNA as matching a “sperm fraction” collected in “case IP06051889”—another rape for which Thurston was charged. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reasoning that the reference to the sperm fraction was “too vague” to “support the forbidden [propensity] inference.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, finding that the Indiana decision was not an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals was entitled to presume that the jury would not disobey its instructions and speculate about the reference to case ‐889. View "Thurston v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Lesiv works for the Illinois Central Railroad. His brother, Lyubomir, had also worked there but left shortly after he filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against Illinois Central. Lyubomir later filed a discrimination suit in state court; Lesiv testified in a 2018 deposition. Almost three months later, his supervisors gave Lesiv a dangerous work assignment and suspended him after he refused to complete it. Lesiv asserts that Illinois Central violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by direct individual retaliation because he testified in his brother’s lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and by third-party retaliation, to harm his brother in retaliation for his brother’s charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Illinois Central on both claims. A retaliation claim requires proof that the employer took a “materially adverse” action against an employee because he engaged in protected activity or because another person close to him did so. A jury could find here that the dangerous work assignment and the suspension amounted to materially adverse actions but could not find retaliatory motives. Lesiv had no evidence that his supervisors took these actions against him because of his or his brother’s protected activities. None of the relevant supervisors knew that Lesiv had engaged in protected activity by testifying in his brother’s lawsuit. View "Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

After filing for bankruptcy, the Terrells proposed a plan that classified about $30,000 they owed to Wisconsin as a “priority debt,” 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(1)(B) based on an overpayment of public assistance. The existence of a priority debt meant that the Chapter 13 plan had to continue for 60 months, after which unpaid debts would be discharged. After the plan was confirmed, the Seventh Circuit held that public assistance debts are not entitled to priority status, which raised the possibility of cutting the duration of the Terrell plan to 36 months and reducing the amount they paid. The bankruptcy court eventually amended the plan accordingly.The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the Terrells waited almost two years after the confirmation of their plan to seek a modification. A bankruptcy court needs authority from a statute, a rule, or the litigants’ consent to modify a confirmed plan. The Terrells acted too late to use Rule 60(b), the best and possibly the only source of authority for the relief they sought. View "State of Wisconsin Department of Children and Families v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Officers patrolling an area known for drug activity, observed three men, with a Dodge Ram truck, acting strangely. The events that followed were recorded on a dashcam. Officer Harvath believed the truck rolled through a stop sign. The truck pulled into a parking lot. Officers approached. The truck’s driver was Zimdars; Taylor and Yang were passengers. Harvath asked Zimdars for identification and whether were any weapons in the vehicle. Zimdars said he was not “aware” of any weapons, which raised Harvath’s suspicions. After obtaining Zimdars’ identification, Harvath called for a canine unit. Officer Russell, speaking to the passengers, repeatedly told Yang to keep his hands visible. A canine unit arrived. Russell instructed the truck's occupants to exit. According to Russell, Yang became pale and his shoulders slumped. As Yang exited the truck, Russell again ordered him to keep his hands visible. Yang reached for his waist, which prompted Russell to press Yang against the side of the truck. Yang resisted. A handgun fell from Yang’s waistband, with a package containing methamphetamine and marijuana. Yang attempted to flee. Harvath subdued Yang with a taser. Officers found additional methamphetamine in the vehicle. The canine remained in the car throughout the stop. The period between Harvath’s first communication with the truck’s occupants to the start of the altercation was less than six minutes.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Yang’s motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation occurred and that the vehicle’s occupants were involved drug activity, and did not unlawfully prolong the stop. View "United States v. Yang" on Justia Law

In a jury trial before District Judge Bruce, Shannon was convicted of 19 counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), and one count of distributing child pornography, sections 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). The charges arose from Shannon’s relationship with J.W., a minor; the two originally met when J.W. was around eight years old. Shannon was in his forties at the time. Judge Bruce sentenced Shannon to 720 months in prison.Shannon challenged those convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he did not receive a fair trial before an unbiased judge. The motion was assigned to District Judge Shadid, who denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the extensive and powerful evidence against Shannon, even if his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any deficiency. On the judicial-bias claim, the court found that ex-parte communications between Judge Bruce and staff of the U.S. Attorney’s office do not warrant a new trial on guilt or innocence. Based on those ex parte communications and comments by Judge Bruce at Shannon’s sentencing that implicitly discouraged an appeal, the court concluded that Shannon must be resentenced before a different judge. View "Shannon v. United States" on Justia Law