Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lane was detained on state criminal charges at the LaPorte County, Indiana jail. Lane sued Person, a doctor at the jail, for deliberate indifference to Lane’s medical condition, 42 U.S.C. 1983. While in jail, Lane sought medical care for an acoustic neuroma (non-cancerous tumor). Person did not order surgical removal of the tumor, which Lane believes was required. He later had the surgery. Nelson, a doctor who also treated Lane, testified that Person appropriately addressed Lane’s condition by ordering multiple MRIs and a consultation with a specialist. Person prevailed at summary judgment and was awarded $4,000 in costs; $2,750 was a one-day witness fee for Nelson,The Seventh Circuit affirmed but modified. The court noted that more than 30 days passed between the denial of Lane's motion to reconsider the summary-judgment decision and his notice of appeal, so the appeal was limited to a review of the decision on costs. There is a presumption under Rule 54(d) that a prevailing party recovers costs that are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 1920. Although section 1920 includes witness fees, another statute, 28 U.S.C. 1821, more specifically addresses the allowable amount to $40 per day, and no other authority allows more. Person may recover total costs of $1,307.59. View "Lane v. Person" on Justia Law

Granite City Police officers conducted a traffic stop in a known drug-trafficking area and found Ingram, a passenger in the vehicle, in possession of a loaded handgun and small quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Ingram pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At sentencing, the district judge added four offense levels to the Guidelines calculation after finding that Ingram possessed the firearm “in connection with” another felony—namely, felony drug possession, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The judge then sentenced Ingram to 72 months in prison, an upward variance from the 46-57 months advisory range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ingram possessed both the handgun and drugs as he left a known drug-trafficking area and fled on foot when the police initiated the traffic stop. From these facts, the judge found that Ingram’s handgun facilitated his drug possession. That finding was not clearly erroneous, making the application of the enhancement proper. Nor did the judge abuse his discretion with the upward variance, which was justified by Ingram’s criminal history and dangerous conduct during his arrest. View "United States v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Capital held tens of millions of dollars for a sole investor, with Stevanovich as its sole director. Capital invested in the multi-billion-dollar Petters Ponzi scheme, getting out before the scheme collapsed in 2008. Some investors lost everything[ Capital earned tens of millions. The Petters bankruptcy court entered a $578,366,822 default judgment against Capital in 2015, but it had dissolved. In 2018, the Trustee filed a post-judgment supplementary proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois against Stevanovich, an Illinois resident. Under Illinois law, a judgment creditor may recover assets from a third party if the judgment debtor has an Illinois state law claim of embezzlement against the third party. In his turnover motion, the Trustee argued that Stevanovich embezzled Capital’s funds to purchase high-end wine for his personal use and transferred the goods to Stevanovich’s personal wine cellar in Switzerland. The Trustee submitted ample evidence to support his claim for $1,948,670.79. The district court granted the turnover order without conducting an evidentiary hearing and found that Stevanovich embezzled the funds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stevanovich’s claims that the wine purchases were an investment strategy for Capital and that the five-year statute of limitations for embezzlement applied, accruing from the dates of the wine purchases. The court applied the seven-year statute of limitations for supplementary proceedings accruing from the date of the bankruptcy court judgment. Stevanovich failed to present any evidence creating an issue of fact that necessitated a hearing. View "Kelley v. Stevanovich" on Justia Law

Lanahan was a longtime employee of Cook County’s Department of Public Health responsible for managing federal grants. After her retirement, Lanham filed a qui tam suit, alleging various violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1), arising out of the use of federal grants. Lanaham claimed she repeatedly warned Cook County it was seeking federal reimbursement for unincurred expenses, for example by estimating the time dedicated to federal service after the fact and pinning the salary allocations submitted for reimbursement to the CDC to pre-performance budget estimates and failing to segregate federal reimbursement funds from unaffiliated Cook County revenue.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The court noted the lack of specificity about false claims and statements and the complaint’s use of conclusory statements. The complaint alleged, for example, that Cook County failed to segregate government funds but did not allege that the county was not entitled to those funds. View "Lanahan v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Peoples led a gang that robbed four Indiana banks in 1997-1998, brandishing an assault rifle. At least once, he pointed the gun at tellers and threatened to kill them. Peoples stole getaway cars; twice he burned them. A jury convicted Peoples on multiple counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(d)), using a firearm during a felony (section 924(c)) and to commit a felony (844(h)), and maliciously destroying a vehicle by fire (844(i)). The four 924(c) convictions required the imposition of consecutive minimum sentences totaling 65 mandatory years. The two 844(h) convictions required a sentence of at least 30 consecutive years. Peoples was sentenced to almost 111 years.In prison, Peoples has successfully completed many classes and received no disciplinary infractions. Peoples, at substantial risk to his own safety, took steps to save another person’s life in prison. Nine correctional officers supported his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which cited his rehabilitation and the reality that, under the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c), he would face a much shorter sentence today for the same armed bank robberies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. In a compassionate release motion, the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction, but that reason cannot include, alone or in combination with other factors, consideration of the First Step Act. Peoples otherwise failed to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting early release. View "United States v. Peoples" on Justia Law

Allen earned a Ph.D. in physics from Yale University in 1965 and embarked on a successful career in the aerospace industry. He retired in 2004 and granted a financial power of attorney to his daughter, Key, when he and his wife experienced declining health and he could no longer manage their finances. For several years Key used the power of attorney to make withdrawals from Allen’s investment accounts held by affiliated investment firms (Brown). Five years later Allen revoked the power of attorney and sued Brown, raising contract and fiduciary-duty claims under Maryland law. He alleged that Key’s withdrawals (or some of them) were not to his benefit and that the investment companies should not have honored them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Maryland Court of Appeals has clarified that a plaintiff may plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty even when another cause of action (like breach of contract) is available to redress the conduct. . Still, the power of attorney shields Brown from liability for breach of fiduciary duty just as it does for breach of contract. Brown had no fiduciary obligation to refuse to carry out transactions authorized by the power of attorney. View "Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC" on Justia Law

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. View "United States v. Protho" on Justia Law

Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Yegger, whose five children include FT, who was seven years old and had special needs. The Bureau of Child Welfare had received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger’s children, who were eventually placed with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup. A pediatric nurse practitioner observed five genital lesions on FT. A pediatrician later observed genital and anal lesions; an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes. In a recorded interview with a forensic interviewer, FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson. Wilson was charged with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child, which requires at least three qualifying acts “within a specified period of time.” The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, which requires only a single qualifying act. The jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense. The judge referred to “overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults” and sentenced Wilson to 37 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for habeas relief. Wisconsin courts reasonably rejected his arguments that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient. View "Wilson v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

During a decade as a member of USA Gymnastics, J.J. was one of the hundreds of gymnasts sexually assaulted by Larry Nassar, the organization’s physician. In response to the claims based on Nassar’s conduct, USA Gymnastics filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court set a deadline for filing proofs of claim. USA Gymnastics mailed notices to all known survivors who had filed or threatened to file lawsuits, had reported abuse, had entered into a settlement agreement, or had received payment as a result of an allegation of abuse--more than 1,300 individuals. USA Gymnastics also emailed copies of the notice to more than 360,000 current and former USA Gymnastics members, and placed information about the bar date on its website, social media pages, in USA Today, and in gymnastics journals, podcasts, and websites J.J. did not receive actual notice and filed her proof of claim five months late.The bankruptcy court treated her claim as untimely. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. J.J. argued that she was entitled to actual notice; she claimed USA Gymnastics should have known that she was a potential claimant because it needed to retain medical records under Michigan law and should have known that she had seen Nassar for medical care. The court found no evidence that USA Gymnastics had these records; J.J.’s argument that Michigan law required retention of any relevant documents “is dubious.” View "Jane Doe JJ v. USA Gymnastics" on Justia Law