Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alley, working at Penguin Random House’s warehouse, was promoted to the management position of Group Leader. Penguin required all managers and supervisors to report sexual harassment allegations and provided clear instructions, including how to report anonymously. Alley received a copy of this policy and participated in training that referred to it. In 2019, Penguin employee Guzman informed Alley that Lillard was sexually harassing her. Alley conducted her own investigation. Haines, Guzman’s then-coworker and roommate, submitted a corroborating statement. Alley also contacted Pendleton, a former Penguin employee, who had stopped coming to work months earlier; Alley suspected it involved Lillard.Haines and another employee went to HR independently, reporting that Lillard was sexually harassing Guzman. Penguin investigated. Alley admitted that she already knew of Guzman’s allegations and that she had contacted Pendleton. She forwarded the statements from Guzman and Haines. Alley later alleged that she too had been sexually harassed by Lillard starting in 2015. Golladay, her former Group Leader, acknowledged that Alley had reported the harassment and that he did not report it. Golladay was not disciplined. Penguin terminated Lillard and demoted Alley.Alley sued, alleging retaliation under Title VII and breach of contract under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims, Alley was demoted for her failure to report allegations as required by Penguin policy. She did not engage in statutorily protected activity. View "Alley v. Penguin Random House" on Justia Law

Peraica represented Dordevic in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding and submitted a Statement of Financial Affairs (Rule 2016 disclosure) in which he reported that Dordevic had paid him $5,000. As the Trustee learned during discovery, Dordevic had actually paid Peraica $21,500. The Trustee informed Peraica that he needed to file an updated Rule 2016 fee disclosure. Peraica instead sent the Trustee an informal accounting document listing $21,500 in fees. The Trustee responded: “The Rule 2016 disclosures actually need to be filed with the Court” by submitting “an official form.” Peraica repeatedly ignored the Trustee’s reminders. The Trustee filed a motion, 11 U.S.C. 329, to examine the fees. Peraica failed to respond; the Trustee then requested that all fees be forfeited. The bankruptcy court granted the motion.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beyond Peraica’s brazen disregard of the Trustee’s advice, Peraica’s proffered explanation for not updating his fee disclosure lacking, if not false. Peraica had been involved in more than 350 bankruptcy cases in the Northern District of Illinois alone. The bankruptcy court ordered Peraica to disgorge all past fees as a penalty for his blatant lack of compliance with his obligations. There is no leeway for partial or incomplete disclosure. View "Peraica v. Layng" on Justia Law

In 2007, Llanos was convicted for possessing heroin with intent to distribute it in March-July 2007. While serving his sentence for that conviction, he was indicted for dealing heroin between 2006 and April 2007. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to those charges before a different judge and received a sentence concurrent to the one imposed in the 2007 case. In 2015, while he was on supervised release for the 2009 case, Llanos again was caught distributing heroin. He entered another guilty plea, before a third judge, who sentenced him to 120 months. Another judge revoked his supervised release for the 2009 case and imposed a new term of 30 months in prison, consecutive to the 120-month term in the 2017 case.Llanos appealed the sentence he received when his supervised release in the 2009 case was revoked. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government should not have brought the 2007 and 2009 charges as separate cases, because they involved the same conduct and the same conspiracy, and by doing so the prosecutor artificially inflated Llanos’s criminal history for purposes of future Guidelines calculations. Llanos has two prior felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), and is subject to the “career offender” provisions. View "United States v. Llanos" on Justia Law

Robinson let Solorzano, stay at his Chicago home. The two frequently exchanged coded text messages about cocaine deals. Robinson drove to Indiana to pick up Solorzano after a transaction ended with Solorzano getting robbed. Robinson later texted Solorzano, “You should have taken me to watch your back.” Later, Solorzano arranged a deal with an undercover officer. Robinson drove him; upon their arrival, authorities approached the vehicle to arrest them. One officer said that, during the arrest, he saw his colleague pull a handgun from Robinson’s waistband; it was loaded. The officer who interrogated Robinson said that Robinson told him he had brought the gun to avoid being robbed. A jury found Robinson guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and of possessing a firearm as a felon but found him not guilty of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court imposed a sentencing enhancement to the felon-in-possession conviction, finding Robinson possessed a firearm “in connection with” the cocaine conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of acquitted conduct to enhance Robinson’s sentence did not violate his constitutional rights and the court made sufficient factual findings to apply the enhancement. The district court’s rationale for connecting the gun to the cocaine conspiracy was clear. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Scott was suspected of shooting and killing Bishop. Scott claims he asked for an attorney during his arrest, but no questioning occurred at that time. Approximately four hours later, Scott was taken for an interview. After the detectives read Scott his Miranda rights, he admitted in a recorded interview to murdering Bishop. Four attorneys worked on Scott’s case before trial; one moved to exclude Scott’s confession on the basis of intoxication. The judge denied the motion, doubting Scott’s testimony. The jury heard the confession and convicted Scott.In a postconviction motion, Scott unsuccessfully alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession on the theory that, because he requested an attorney during his arrest, his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Scott's second unsuccessful postconviction motion claimed his first postconviction counsel deficiently pleaded his claim by failing to marshal facts showing he informed his trial counsel of his request for an attorney.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, in which he claimed both his trial and first postconviction attorneys were ineffective. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, which has never extended Miranda beyond the context of custodial interrogation to permit an accused to request an attorney at the time of his arrest so as to cut off questioning before any attempt at questioning. View "Scott v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Fetting, 50 years old and suffering from back pain, headaches, depression, and anxiety, unsuccessfully applied for supplemental security income. During an administrative hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified to Fetting’s physical and mental limitations and his ability to perform certain jobs, stating that Fetting could perform the representative occupations of a cleaner/housekeeper, routing clerk, and marker. The VE estimated that, in the national economy, there were 200,000 cleaner/housekeeper jobs, 40,000 routing clerk jobs, and 200,000 marker jobs. During cross-examination, the VE stated that he calculated his estimates from numbers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, using his “knowledge of the labor market, [acquired] over 30+ years of job placement activities.” He stated: “It’s not a hard and fast scientific type formula” and that he had not conducted any “formal analysis” to validate his estimates but had “in the past checked numbers in other reporting formats.”The ALJ found that Fetting did not have a disability under the Social Security Act based on the VE’s testimony. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the VE’s methodology for calculating his job number estimates was unreliable. Substantial evidence supports the finding that a significant number of the identified jobs exist in the national economy. View "Fetting v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

GEFT, a billboard company, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Monroe County did not allow the installation of a digital billboard along I-69. Receiving a sign permit required compliance with size limits, height restrictions, setback requirements, a ban on changeable-copy (or digital) signs, and a prohibition on off-premises commercial signs, The ordinance provided exceptions to the permit requirement for government signs and certain noncommercial signs. If a proposed sign was ineligible for a permit, the applicant could apply for a use variance, which required specific findings.The district court granted GEFT summary judgment and enjoined the permitting scheme and the variance procedures. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first declining to extend the injunction to encompass the entire ordinance. Monroe County’s substantive sign standards do not need a permitting scheme to function. Indiana law provides that local government entities can enforce their own ordinances through civil penalties or injunctions. The court reinstated the variance procedure. That procedure is a “prior restraint” but is not unconstitutional; it does not involve consideration of content, permits ample alternatives for speech, including displays of messages on signs, and it does not give the Board of Zoning Appeals so much discretion that it violates the First Amendment. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County Indiana" on Justia Law

Perry died from gunshot wounds sustained during a fight with Shirley. In 2008, Shirley was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide. Shirley uses a prosthetic device below his knee. Although he can walk, during his trial Shirley was in a wheelchair with his legs shackled. To prevent the jury from observing the shackles, fabric was draped over both counsel tables. During voir dire, Juror 34 stated, if he’s in cuffs, "he did something.” Juror 34 separately confirmed he had seen the restraints, had not mentioned them to other jurors, and that his observations did not bias him. Shirley and his counsel said they were satisfied with those responses and did not request accommodations to muffle the noise of the shackles while Shirley was on the witness stand.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected claims that his presumption of innocence was violated because Juror 34 noticed his restraints, that being shackled inhibited his right to present a complete defense because it limited his ability to approach exhibits, make demonstrations and show the jury which leg his prosthesis was on. The court could not locate an explanation in for the restraint decision but found Shirley “had little difficulty communicating” in an “intelligent and articulate” manner from the witness stand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shirley’s petition for habeas relief. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the decision to shackle a criminal defendant while testifying violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. View "Shirley v. Tegels" on Justia Law

To claim the research tax credit under Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer must demonstrate that at least 80 percent of its research activities for a business component constituted elements of a process of experimentation. The Taxpayer, the parent of a shipbuilding company, claimed expenses for building 11 new vessels under the tax credit. The IRS disallowed the credit and assessed a tax deficiency.The Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit upheld the IRS determination. Although the Taxpayer never built a drydock before and the vessels were first-in-class, the Taxpayer claimed more tax credit than it could prove; it did not offer a principled way to determine what portion of the employee activities for each vessel constituted elements of a process of experimentation or research activities. The Taxpayer relied on arbitrary estimates and the newness of the vessels. To claim the credit, a taxpayer must adequately document that substantially all of such activities were research activities that constitute elements of a process of experimentation. Generalized descriptions of uncertainty, assertions of novelty, and arbitrary estimates of time spent performing experimentation are not enough. View "Little Sandy Coal Co., Inc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Police discovered a gun in Hatley’s possession during a Gary, Indiana traffic stop. Hatley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which ordinarily carries a statutory maximum of 10 years. The government contended that Hatley’s criminal history exposed him to an enhanced sentence of at least 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in particular under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which applies to offenders with “three previous convictions … for a violent felony … committed on occasions different from one another.” Hatley’s criminal history included convictions for robbery and criminal battery under Indiana law, both violent felonies under 924(e), and eight separate federal convictions for Hobbs Act robberies committed on eight different occasions.The district court rejected an argument that those robbery convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” and sentenced him to the 15-year minimum term mandated by 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court compared the elements of Hobbs Act robbery with the elements of a violent felony under ACCA. Hobbs Act robbery committed by using force against a person fits within ACCA’s force clause. The other way of committing Hobbs Act robbery—using force against property—does not fit within ACCA’s force clause but qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s enumerated definition of generic extortion. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law