Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing for failure to state a claim this lawsuit raising claims under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, holding that the judge properly dismissed the case in its entirety and with prejudice.In 2017, agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) executed a search warrant at an Indiana facility owned by Paraklese Technologies, LLC, which makes and sells firearm accessories, and seized approximately $21,000 worth of inventory. In 2017, Paraklese and its owner sued ATF agents seeking damages from the search and seizure. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the case. View "Fosnight v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' amended complaint against Cboe with prejudice and entering a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) wrapping up litigation against Cboe involving claims under the Securities Exchange Act and the Commodity Exchange Act, holding there was no error.At issue was whether Cboe violated either Act by trading options and futures based on a number, called VIX, which was designed to estimate the near-term volatility in the Standard & Poors 500 Index of stocks. Plaintiff-traders argued that the Cboe knew that unknown entities could take advantage of the formula for determining VIX on the settlement dates and failed to enforce rules forbidding manipulation. The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that remedies, if any were appropriate, lay with administrative agencies rather than the judiciary at the behest of private litigants. View "Barry v. Cboe Global Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against McHenry County and its current and former sheriffs, holding that there was no basis in law supporting the claims raised in Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff, who represented the estate of the decedent Roger Gonzalez, brought section 1983 claims alleging that the McHenry County jail maintained an unwritten policy of accepting any pretrial detainee into its custody regardless of its ability to treat his medical conditions and that this policy harmed the decedent. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims could not be sustained. View "Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Illinois" on Justia Law

In this case arising out of a child welfare investigation, the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment in favor of Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) case workers on the grounds of qualified immunity, holding that the facts were too disputed to allow the Court to reach any legal conclusions with confidence.When DCS learned from a social worker that Plaintiffs may not have been providing their infant daughter prescribed medication to control epileptic seizures DCS case workers took the child to the hospital for a blood draw to clarify whether that was so. The results showed that the infant had started the prescription a few days earlier. Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the investigation and demand for a blood test violated their constitutional rights as parents under the Fourteenth Amendment and their daughter's rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the DCS defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case, holding that the facts were so contested as to limit what the Court could do on appeal. View "Jerger v. Blaize" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the United States Army and dismissing Gerald Swain's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., alleging disability discrimination, holding that there was no error.As a civilian employee at an Army installation in Illinois, Swain asked for and received several accommodations for his physical limitations. Swain later brought this lawsuit against the Army, alleging failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Army. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Army met its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. View "Swain v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court reducing Defendant's life sentence to a term of 420 months for his conviction of conspiring to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Because Defendant had four prior drug convictions under Illinois law the district court imposed a mandatory term of life in prison. More than a decade later, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court reduced Defendant's life sentence but decided not to apply Mathis v. United States, 479 U.S. 500 (2016), under which Defendant's guideline and statutory ranges would have been reduced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there is no reason that any further consideration of Defendant's Mathis argument would have changed the court's determination; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his disparity argument; and (3) the district court's comments about the weapons found at Defendant's home were not improper. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this COVID-19 pandemic-related case, the Seventh Circuit vacated in part the judgment of the district court granting Loyola University of Chicago's motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Plaintiffs, three undergraduate students, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that Plaintiffs pled enough to withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim and that Plaintiffs were entitled to leave to amend to save their alternative claim for unjust enrichment.As a result of the pandemic, Loyola suspended all in-person instruction during the Spring 2020 semester, curtailed access to campus facilities, and moved all instruction online. Plaintiffs brought a putative class action lawsuit against Loyola, arguing that the decision to shut down Loyola's campus deprived them of promised services, such as in-person instruction and access to on-campus facilities, in exchange for tuition and fees. The district court granted Loyola's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim for breach of an implied contract under Illinois law; and (2) Plaintiffs adequately pled an unjust enrichment claim in the alternative. View "Gociman v. Loyola University of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Janesville Wisconsin Police Department created a “no‐preference tow list” to simplify its response to traffic accidents in which a vehicle owner expressed no preference as to which tow company towed their car. Smith is Black and owns Flying A.J.’s Towing Company, which operates in the area. Flying A.J.’s was added to the list. Less than two months later, the Police Department removed the company from its tow list, citing the company’s unresponsiveness and complaints related to one particular tow job.Smith and Flying A.J.’s claim that their removal was due to Smith’s race and in retaliation because, in 2010, Smith had successfully sued the town of Beloit after experiencing racial discrimination by the police department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981. Smith had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to allow a jury to determine that Smith’s race or former complaints caused the decision to remove Flying A.J.’s from the tow list. Smith claimed that a tow company owned by a white man had received a lesser penalty but the situations leading to the two complaints are too dissimilar for any reasonable jury to conclude that the factor leading to any perceived disparate treatment was race. View "Smith v. City of Janesville" on Justia Law

McHale began employment at the VA Hospital in 2011 as a pharmacy technician. In 2014, side effects from McHale’s diabetes medication impacted her attendance at work. Weeks later, McHale’s supervisor, reduced McHale’s performance rating due to her use of sick leave and imposed an official sick leave restriction. McHale filed a union grievance. During the years that followed, McHale unsuccessfully applied for three other positions. McHale’s second-level supervisor stated that he did not want to select McHale for one position due to her frequent sick leave and the sick leave restriction. In interviews with the agency’s internal EEOC office, McHale never suggested that she had any disability. McHale filed a handwritten formal administrative complaint in 2015, alleging reprisal for the prior EEOC activity and unfair treatment in the form of the sick leave restrictions. The final agency decision concluded that it had not violated the law.McHale sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791, alleging she was disabled due to complications with her diabetes and that: the agency had failed to accommodate this disability; had discriminated against her because of her disability; had subjected her to a hostile work environment; and had retaliated against her. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her suit. McHale failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for the disability claims because she never complained of discrimination on the basis of disability to the agency. For the same reason, McHale cannot establish retaliation. View "McHale v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Thayer pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law for groping his 14-year-old daughter while she slept. Thayer later moved to Wisconsin without registering as a sex offender. The government indicted him for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court dismissed the indictment, finding the relevant section of SORNA categorically misaligned with Thayer’s Minnesota statute of conviction. SORNA’s “Romeo and Juliet” exception excludes from the definition of “sex offense” consensual sex where “the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” The Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted criminalizes sexual conduct both where “the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant” and where “the actor is … in a current or recent position of authority over the complainant.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal. Section 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through section 20911(7)(I), must be analyzed under the circumstance-specific method, not by a categorical approach. Section 20911(7)(I) directs courts to evaluate the nature of an individual’s conduct, not the nature of an offense or of a conviction. View "United States v. Thayer" on Justia Law