Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Peoples pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year of incarceration plus one year of mandatory supervised release. He received credit for time served, effectively completing his incarceration term. However, due to Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) policies, he was detained at Cook County Jail for four additional days until he could be transferred to IDOC for processing and release.Peoples filed a Section 1983 claim against Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, alleging that his detention beyond his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendments applied to Peoples's claim and that he failed to present a triable Eighth Amendment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Peoples's post-conviction detention. Instead, the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits incarceration beyond the end of a sentence without penological justification, was applicable. The court found that the Cook County Sheriff's Office had a penological justification for detaining Peoples until IDOC could process him, as required by Illinois law and the court's commitment order.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Peoples failed to establish that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference, a necessary element for an Eighth Amendment violation. Consequently, without a constitutional injury, Peoples's Section 1983 claim could not succeed. View "Peoples v Cook County" on Justia Law

Dale Staten, a coal miner for nearly thirty years, retired in 2000 and passed away in January 2017 from respiratory failure after a two-week hospitalization. His widow, Bernadette Staten, filed for survivor benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A Department of Labor administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded benefits, concluding that Bernadette qualified for a statutory presumption that Dale died from black lung disease due to his extensive underground mining work and total disability at the time of his death. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision in a divided ruling.Consolidation Coal Company (CONSOL), Dale's former employer, challenged the ALJ's award, arguing that the 15-year presumption should only apply to chronic pulmonary conditions, not acute illnesses like Dale's respiratory failure. CONSOL contended that Dale's total disability was due to an acute condition rather than a chronic one. The ALJ had credited Dr. Sanjay Chavda's opinion that Dale was totally disabled at the time of his death, while discounting the opinions of CONSOL's experts, Dr. James Castle and Dr. Robert Farney, who argued that Dale was not disabled based on his medical history before his hospitalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the ALJ's award of benefits. The court held that the Black Lung Benefits Act does not require a claimant to prove that a miner's total disability arose from a chronic pulmonary condition to invoke the 15-year presumption. The court found that the ALJ acted within its authority in crediting Dr. Chavda's opinion and concluding that CONSOL failed to rebut the presumption that Dale's death was due to pneumoconiosis. The court denied CONSOL's petition for review and affirmed the judgment of the Benefits Review Board. View "Consolidation Coal Company v OWCP" on Justia Law

Police stopped Martin Devalois for a traffic violation. During the stop, a drug-sniffing dog alerted to narcotics in Devalois’s rental vehicle. Instead of complying with the police request to exit the car, Devalois initiated a high-speed chase that ended in a crash. Police searched the vehicle and found a small amount of marijuana and a gun. Devalois, a convicted felon, was charged with illegally possessing a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the police unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. The district court denied his motion, and a jury found him guilty.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a suppression hearing where the court found the police officer’s testimony credible and determined that the officer did not extend the length of the stop. The district court denied Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun, and the jury subsequently found him guilty of the firearm charge. Devalois was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court’s factual finding that the officer did not prolong the traffic stop was not clearly erroneous. The court held that the officer’s actions during the stop were within the mission of the traffic stop and did not unlawfully extend its duration. The court also held that the dog sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it was conducted while the officer was still diligently pursuing the stop’s mission. Consequently, the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the gun were lawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Devalois’s motion to suppress the gun. View "United States v. Devalois" on Justia Law

The case involves Shamond Jenkins, who was convicted of robbing a Centier Bank branch in South Bend, Indiana, in December 2020. Jenkins was identified as a suspect in three robberies in northern Indiana between December 2020 and January 2021. During a traffic stop on January 8, 2021, Jenkins was found with cash, including a bait bill from the South Bend robbery, and was wearing red-and-white Air Jordan sneakers similar to those worn by the robber. Jenkins was charged with multiple counts, including the South Bend bank robbery, to which he pleaded not guilty.In the district court, Jenkins was found guilty of the South Bend bank robbery but not guilty of the Granger Centier Bank robbery. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision on the Check Into Cash robbery. Jenkins objected to the Presentence Investigation Report's recommendations, including an enhancement for obstructing justice by presenting false testimony and the inclusion of juvenile adjudications in his criminal history. The district court overruled these objections and sentenced Jenkins to 100 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Jenkins's appeal. Jenkins argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to the face mask he had to wear during the trial, and that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for perjury and in counting his juvenile convictions. The Seventh Circuit found no error in the district court's decisions. The court held that the face mask did not render the in-court identifications unduly suggestive or violate Jenkins's confrontation rights. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing decisions, affirming Jenkins's conviction and sentence. View "USA v Jenkins" on Justia Law

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (WPC) alleged that its Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the City of Waukegan did not advance its casino proposal for licensing consideration. WPC claimed it experienced intentional discrimination during the application process as a "class of one." The City of Waukegan certified three other applicants but not WPC, which alleged that the process was rigged to benefit another applicant, Lakeside Casino, LLC. WPC pointed to the relationship between the City's mayor and a founding partner of Lakeside, as well as the City's handling of supplemental information from applicants, as evidence of discrimination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that WPC, as an arm of a sovereign Native American tribe, could not maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the court found that WPC's class-of-one equal protection claim failed because WPC was not similarly situated to the other applicants and there were multiple conceivable rational bases for the City's conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that WPC could not carry its heavy burden as a class-of-one plaintiff. The court noted that there were several rational bases for the City's decision, including differences in the casino proposals and the applicants' experience. The court also found that WPC failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably. The court concluded that the City's conduct throughout the review process, including its handling of supplemental information, had rational justifications. Thus, WPC's class-of-one claim failed under both prongs of the analysis. View "Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Herrera Hernandez, an inmate at Waupun Correctional Institution, alleged that his legal paperwork was misplaced during his temporary transfer to restrictive housing in October 2021. Before entering restrictive housing, Hernandez surrendered his personal property, including legal documents. Upon return, he signed a form indicating receipt of all his property but later realized his legal paperwork was missing. Hernandez claimed that Sergeant Theresa Lee assured him he would receive his paperwork once he returned to the general population, but it remained missing. Hernandez filed a grievance, which was rejected as untimely by the complaint examiner, and the warden affirmed this decision.Hernandez then filed a lawsuit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Sergeant Lee and other prison officials deprived him of his right of access to the courts. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Hernandez failed to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Hernandez argued that his time in restrictive housing complicated his ability to file a timely grievance and that he was not provided a handbook explaining the grievance process in Spanish. The court found that Hernandez did not preserve the handbook issue in the district court. However, the court determined that there were genuine disputes regarding whether Hernandez had any reason to file a grievance before learning his paperwork was missing and whether Sergeant Lee's assurances excused his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court also noted the need to determine the personal involvement of the other defendants in the alleged deprivation. View "Hernandez v Lee" on Justia Law

Kein Eastman was abducted at gunpoint from his grandmother’s house by Kenwyn Frazier, taken to an apartment in East St. Louis, and subjected to threats, beatings, and a gunshot over a piece of jewelry. Eastman fled the scene with a bloodied face and has not been seen since. Kenwyn and his brother Kendrick Frazier were charged with kidnapping and found guilty by a jury. They appealed on several grounds, including a violation of Kendrick’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel, the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, the sufficiency of the evidence, and aspects of their sentencing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the Fraziers' motion to dismiss the indictment and their post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court also applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Eastman sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. Kendrick’s request for joint representation by attorney Beau Brindley was denied due to potential conflicts of interest, and he retained separate counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying Kendrick’s choice of counsel, given the potential for conflicts of interest. The court upheld the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, citing precedent that the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as cars and cellphones, suffices for federal jurisdiction. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Kendrick’s conviction for aiding and abetting the kidnapping. Lastly, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancement, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that Eastman sustained a permanent or life-threatening injury. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Felix Franco, a commercial truck driver, was asleep in his parked semi-trailer truck when it was hit by another truck driven by an employee of Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC. Franco claimed that the accident caused a back injury that necessitated surgery, while Richland acknowledged the accident but disputed the cause of Franco's injury. Franco had a history of degenerative back problems and had experienced back pain before the accident. The case went to trial, and a jury found in favor of Richland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial trial. Franco sought to admit medical illustrations as evidence, but the court only allowed two as demonstrative exhibits. The court provided jury instructions and a special verdict form, focusing on whether the accident caused Franco's injury. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Richland, and Franco's post-trial motions were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, including the denial of Franco's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the accident did not cause Franco's injury. The court also upheld the jury instructions and special verdict form, stating they accurately reflected Wisconsin law. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude two of Franco's medical illustrations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Franco v Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Joshua Smitson applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income, claiming that his asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) prevented him from working. His medical records indicated frequent episodes of shortness of breath and difficulty walking and standing for long periods. He was hospitalized for a week in 2021 due to an acute respiratory exacerbation. Smitson used a nebulizer four times a day, with each session lasting about thirty minutes. Despite his conditions, his medication regimen effectively controlled his symptoms.An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Smitson's application for benefits, concluding that his conditions were limiting but not disabling. The ALJ found that Smitson could manage his symptoms with proper medical treatment and determined that he had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform "light work" with certain limitations. A vocational expert testified that jobs were available for someone with Smitson's RFC. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana affirmed the ALJ's decision. After Smitson's death, his widow, Lacey Thorlton, continued the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ALJ's decision. The court emphasized that claimants bear the burden of proving their disability and that the ALJ's decision must be supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the ALJ's conclusion that Smitson could perform light work was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records showing that his conditions were well-managed with medication. The court acknowledged that the ALJ could have more directly addressed Smitson's testimony about his nebulizer use but concluded that the ALJ's decision, when viewed holistically, sufficiently considered this evidence. The court found no compelling evidence in the record to reverse the ALJ's decision. View "Thorlton v King" on Justia Law

William Hudson was convicted in Wisconsin state court of conspiracy to commit first-degree intentional homicide and conspiracy to commit arson. The convictions stemmed from an agreement Hudson made with another inmate, Scott Seal, to kill Seal’s ex-girlfriend and commit arson in exchange for payment. Seal, however, was an informant. After Hudson was released, he met with an undercover officer posing as Seal’s defense attorney, accepted an envelope with $6,000 and the targets' addresses, and was arrested. Hudson claimed he never intended to commit the crimes but was trying to scam Seal to support himself and his sister, Dana Hudson.Hudson filed a direct appeal alleging outrageous governmental conduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not arguing the government’s conduct. The Wisconsin circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review. Hudson then filed a postconviction motion under Section 974.06, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling Dana as a witness and not investigating her testimony. The Wisconsin circuit court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Hudson filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and postconviction counsel. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state court had not misapplied Strickland v. Washington and that trial counsel’s performance satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Hudson failed to demonstrate that the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the case. View "Hudson v DeHaan" on Justia Law