Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant did not inform the government when his mother died, but, for 12 years cashed checks for benefits she had earned under the Civil Service Retirement System, netting $158,000. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud. His Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months, but the judge sentenced him to 30 months, because she believed that he needed treatment for mental illness and alcoholism and that it would take more than 18 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge is to recognize that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a), and may not increase the length of a prison term in order to facilitate rehabilitation or correction.

After a pyramid scheme that he had maintained for nearly a decade came to light, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The district court sentenced him well above the applicable guidelines range to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court erroneously applied a 4-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for defrauding more than 50 victims and a claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Defendant, a participant in a major mortgage fraud scheme, pled guilty to committing wire fraud as part of that scam and was sentenced to 37 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,792,000 in restitution. His role was to act as a "straw," or fake, buyer of seven properties, and to cause $4,473,161.55 to be transferred from unwitting mortgage companies to their banking partners; he received $90,000 from his co-schemers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting defendant's assertion that his sentence should be lower because he gave the government substantial assistance. The court should have explained its rationale in attributing a "reasonably foreseeable" loss amount to defendant. The court also erred in interpreting the minor role sentencing adjustment guideline when it stated that an act otherwise deemed minor could, if repeated, necessarily preclude the adjustment, and that a person playing a necessary role cannot play a minor role. The court should evaluate his role in context of other participants in the scheme, keeping in mind that a minor player is substantially less culpable than the average participant, not the leaders.

In 2004, defendant spent approximately $38,000 on home repairs for a Chicago alderman, a crucial player in defendant's attempt to have industrial property rezoned for commercial and residential development. Defendant also convinced business associates to donate, at his expense, to the alderman's aunt's congressional campaign. During an investigation, defendant fabricated an invoice for the home repairs, purportedly sent from his general contractor to defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for bribing a local official (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)); exceeding federal campaign contribution limits through straw-man donations (Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1),441f & 437g(d)(1)(A)(ii)); and endeavoring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. 1503(a)). The government was not required to establish a specific quid pro quo of money in exchange for a legislative act. The district court acted within its discretion in holding an adversarial in camera hearing to determine the existence of the crime-fraud exception. Section 441f unambiguously proscribes straw man, as well as false name, contributions.

Companies filed suit, alleging that an employee engaged in a collusive trading scheme in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under section 9(a) of the Act, a private plaintiff must plead that: a series of transactions in a security created actual or apparent trading in that security or raised or depressed its market price; scienter; the purpose of the transactions was to induce the security's sale or purchase by others; plaintiffs relied on the transactions; and the transactions affected plaintiff's purchase or selling price. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The complaint adequately stated with particularity the circumstances constituting the securities fraud, and the economic loss impact on the plaintiffs as a result of the fraud and satisfied the pleading requirements of FRCP 9(b).

Defendants were convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346) for participating in a fraudulent scheme to obtain mortgage loans. The scheme involved: recruiters, who enlisted buyers to buy properties with fraudulently obtained funds; financiers, who provided funds to buyers to facilitate the transactions; administrators, who bought fake documents to enable buyers to obtain mortgages; loan officers, who prepared fraudulent applications and sent them to lenders. Between 2003 and 2005, the group acquired more than 70 properties for which lenders provided $7.2 million in loans. Most of the properties went into foreclosure, resulting in losses to the lenders of $2.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The use of the term "straw buyer" in the confession of a nontestifying co-defendant did not obviously refer to the defendant and violate his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the "Bruton" doctrine. The court properly applied a "sophisticated means" sentence enhancement and gave an "ostrich" instruction concerning defendant's knowledge.

Defendants ran the township trustee's office, which provides various social services. They defrauded the office by taking substantial payments for work they did not perform, deposited checks made out to the office into their personal bank accounts. They were convicted of two counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While evidence of mailing was circumstantial, based on usual office practice, it was sufficient. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Skilling v. U.S. did not mandate acquittal; even if honest services fraud is erased from the picture, the jury would have convicted defendants on a monetary fraud theory. The jury was properly instructed on both theories.

Plaintiff, a plastics manufacturer, dealt with a container company that filed for bankruptcy in 2002, filed a creditor's claim for more than $7 million, and objected to the sale of assets and lien priorities. The debtor had pledged all of its assets as security for a line of credit with ANB, its primary lender. Plaintiff claimed that there was a fraudulent scheme under which the debtor would produce containers and not pay for them, so that that they would be part of inventory when a successor company, let by insiders, purchased the assets in bankruptcy. After its claims were rejected in the bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff sued ANB and Gateway alleging violation of RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961) and common-law fraud. The district court dismissed as "res judicata" but denied Rule 11 sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing collateral estoppel, issue preclusion. The court did not find that the claims were frivolous or designed to harass.

Based on a scheme for laundering drug money, defendants were convicted of conspiring to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property (18 U.S.C. 1956); one was additionally convicted of engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property(18 U.S.C. 1957). The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the conspiracy count, which was supported by a "plethora" of evidence, but reversed on the second. The transaction triggering the Sect. 1957 violation occurred when a defendant handed over $8,000 of drug cash to purchase property, not when that property was sold for about $47,000; the transaction involved less than the $10,000 minimum the statute requires. The judge properly instructed the jury concerning the duration of a conspiracy and the meaning of "knowingly" and properly refused to allow the defense to address the statute of limitations to the jury.

A real estate broker received money for contracting work never completed, used false addresses in invoices from companies that did not exist, submitted loan applications with inflated incomes and account balances, and forged documentation. At trial on charges of wire fraud, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and 1343), witnesses used the words "fraud" and "misrepresentation." The district court directed acquittal on aiding and abetting and conspiracy charges and sentenced defendant to 71 monthsâ imprisonment and payment of $2,360,914.51 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction. The testimony of the lay witnesses could have been helpful and did not amount to legal conclusions about intent or "de facto" instructions to the jury. Defendant would not have been acquitted had the court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in otherwise appropriate testimony. The court vacated the sentence. The district court erred in considering transactions underlying dismissed counts as relevant conduct without making sufficient findings regarding the number of victims and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to victims not clearly harmed by conduct in her counts of conviction.