Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While working as office manager and executive assistant for three successive businesses, defendant embezzled more than $240,000 by making personal purchases on company credit cards, falsifying expense reimbursement claims, and depositing corporate checks in her personal account. She pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, reserving the right to challenge a recommendation of a two-level sentencing increase for abuse of a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3. The district court accepted the recommendation, which resulted in a guidelines range of 27 to 33 months, and imposed a sentence of 27 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that it was a "borderline" case for abuse-of-trust enhancement, and deferring to the trial court findings.

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

Defendant was convicted of 14 counts of willfully assisting in preparation of tax returns containing materially false and fraudulent claims, including phony medical and business expenses and charitable donations. The evidence at trial proved tax loss of $31,849. At sentencing, the government proposed a tax loss figure of $1.6 million by identifying 662 returns that contained materially false claims similar to those proven at trial and eliminating contested returns. The district court discounted the loss to $400,000- to $1-million to compensate for possible selection bias in a sample of 100 returns and imposed a sentence of 42 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax loss figure was not outside the realm of permissible computations. The district court considered defendant's family circumstances as well as substantial aggravating circumstances, including her education, financial and intellectual abilities, knowledge of the tax code and duty to provide truthful information, and that her actions caused the IRS to audit her clients. Defendant also failed to appear for a sentencing hearing, was dishonest to the court, frivolously denied the court had jurisdiction over her, and similarly asserted she was an independent sovereign protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

A jury convicted the defendant of defrauding a large bank. The district judge sentenced him to 96 months in prison and ordered him to forfeit the money that he had obtained from the fraud, which the judge determined to be $16,241,202, plus property that he had bought with proceeds of the fraud, and to pay restitution to the bank also in the amount of $16,241,202. Defendant challenged the order of restitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Restitution, unlike forfeiture, is limited to the victim's loss, 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A); the court remanded for determination of that loss. The court noted that loss has been limited by the government's decision to convey forfeited assets to the victim up to the limit of the loss.

A supervising building inspector was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery, 18 U.S.C. 371, and two counts of making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and was sentenced to a total of 60 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly allowed testimony about the 2005 gift list of a city businessman; the testimony was probative of intent and not so prejudicial as to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Although the court erred by admitting the list itself as a business record, the error was harmless. The court properly barred recordings between defendant and one of the witnesses who testified against him, which contained self-exculpatory statements. The court properly held defendant accountable for more than $112,500 in bribes, which resulted in an eight-level increase to the USSG offense level.

The title company provided real estate closing services. From 1984 through 1995, it served as exclusive agent for defendant and managed an escrow account that defendant contractually agreed to insure. The title company was not profitable and its managers used escrow funds in a "Ponzi" scheme. In 1989, there was a $26 million shortfall. To fill the hole, the managers began looting another business, Intrust, to pay defendant's policyholders ($40.9 million) and to pay defendant directly ($27 million), so that defendant was a direct and indirect beneficiary of the title company's arrangement with Intrust. In 2000 the state agency learned that the funds were missing, took control of Intrust and placed it in receivership. In July 2010, the Receiver filed suit for money had and received, unjust enrichment, vicarious liability), aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. The district court dismissed based on the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois doctrine of adverse domination does not apply. That doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for a claim by a corporation against a nonboard-member co-conspirator of the wrongdoing board members.

The former mayor and the head of the engineering department were convicted of conspiring to embezzle and embezzling government funds, based on use of government funds and government employees to renovate the mayor's house. The mayor claimed that he was unaware of the scheme. The district court gave the jury a conscious avoidance instruction. The mayor had an initial offense level of 10 under the Guidelines, but the court applied enhancements for obstruction of justice, leadership role, and abuse of a position of trust, for a total offense level of 18. With a criminal history level of one, the guidelines range was 27-33 months' imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months, a $60,000 fine, more than $14,000 in restitution, a $200 special assessment, and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court was within its discretion in issuing an ostrich instruction, in applying sentencing enhancements, and in its upward departure from the guidelines.

Defendant and coconspirators stole clientele books from department stores and used personal information, including credit card numbers, to order merchandise, which was intercepted and sold or returned. She pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b)(2), attempted possession of access devices, id. 1029(a)(3), and aggravated identity theft, id. 1028A(a)(1) (Count III). The district court calculated a four-level increase in her offense level because her crime had more than 50 victims, resulting in a guidelines range of 120-150 months. The court imposed a sentence of 120 months on Counts I and II (to run concurrently) and a consecutive 24-month sentence on Count III as required by 18 U.S.C. 1028A(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because the court sentenced defendant using the November 2009 guidelines, it included in the count of victims 40 stores and credit card companies that sustained actual loss as well as 65 victims whose credit cards were used, regardless of monetary loss. The court acted within its discretion in rejecting her argument that there was no evidence that cardholders were actually harmed or expended significant time or effort cancelling their credit cards and that the guidelines resulted in a sentence that was greater than necessary.

Defendant was sole owner of a corporation that was a contractor for several Illinois governmental entities. After an audit disclosed irregularities and falsified documents, defendant pled guilty to two counts of mail fraud and one count of submitting false documents; the corporation pled guilty to one count of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1001, 1341). Sentences included restitution of $10 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that defendants were entitled to a "full, dollar-for-dollar credit for the value of the monies and securities" deposited with the Clerk of Court at the time of their deposit, pre-judgment, and that the diminution in value of those securities after their deposit could not be attributed to defendants. Neither the court, the clerk, nor the government exercised authority to remove the funds or securities before sentencing and entry of judgment. Defendant chose to deposit securities, rather than cash, and the deposit did not constitute actual payment of restitution, but only security for eventual payment.

A tax employee of defendant, terminated after reporting an alleged tax fraud scheme to the company and federal enforcement agencies, filed suit asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and 1962(d). The district court dismissed, finding that the predicate acts alleged were either unrelated or did not proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The retaliatory actions were related to the alleged tax fraud scheme, under the Supreme Court's "continuity plus relationship" test. Since enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) retaliation against an employee constitutes racketeering. Retaliatory acts are inherently connected to the underlying wrongdoing exposed by the whistleblower, even though they occur after the coverup is exposed. In this case, the retaliatory acts were not isolated events, separate from the tax fraud. Plaintiff properly alleged that his termination was proximately caused by a RICO predicate act of retaliation.