Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant owned tobacco stores. Currency sales accounted for roughly half of the revenue. He directed employees to separate currency from credit-card and check receipts. He used currency to pay employees and suppliers and failed to report currency receipts on federal and state tax forms from 2002 to 2009. He channeled much of the currency (more than $60 million) to bank accounts in Lebanon, his homeland. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and impeding administration of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). With an upward adjustment of 2 levels for using sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), 2T1.1(b)(2), he was sentenced to 76 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although defendant did not create phony corporations, use fake names to open accounts, or employ technology to conceal assets, his conduct was sophisticated because he directed employees to separate currency receipts, he withheld funds from corporate bank accounts, and concealed the magnitude of his sales. He secreted money into foreign accounts by carrying currency and cashier’s checks during his travels, avoided reporting by depositing currency in multiple transactions (structuring or smurfing) 31 U.S.C. 5324; and washed money through the accounts of relatives and associates.

Defendants operated auto dealerships, and from 1995 to 2005, more than half their sales were to drug traffickers, who preferred to deal with defendants because they were willing to accept large cash payments in small bills without question. They falsified sales contracts and liens, ignored federal tax-reporting requirements, and arranged bank deposits to avoid triggering federal bank-reporting requirements. Defendants were convicted of 97 counts of RICO conspiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, illegal transaction structuring, bank fraud, and aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to management of the trial and sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected an argument that conviction of money-laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a), required to proof that defendants engaged in specified financial transactions for the purpose of laundering the "proceeds" of an underlying crime, and that "proceeds" means net profit of the underlying crime, not gross receipts. They were convicted of concealment and transaction-avoidance forms of money-laundering. At the time of trial, it was unclear whether proof of “proceeds” in a concealment or avoidance prosecution required proof that defendant laundered net profits of the underlying criminal activity.

In 2002 Bell established mutual funds and raised about $2.5 billion for investment. Most of the firms to which the funds routed money were controlled by Petters. He was running a Ponzi scheme. There was no inventory. New investments paid older debts, with some money siphoned off for personal use. When Petters was caught in 2008, the funds collapsed; about 60% of the money was gone. The funds' bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the funds' auditor, alleging negligence. The district court dismissed without deciding whether the auditor had acted competently, invoking the doctrine of in pari delicto, based on Bell's knowledge of the scheme. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Bell was not stealing funds and that the extent of his knowledge cannot be determined at this stage. An allegation that Bell was negligent but not criminally culpable in 2006 and 2007 makes the claim against the auditor sufficient.

A new customer of the bank (Ott) obtained a loan to finance the purchase of a motor home from the dealership that Ott himself owned. Ott presented the certificate of origin and pledged the motor home as collateral. When Ott defaulted two years later, the bank discovered that the certificate of origin was a fake and the motor home did not exist. The bank’s insurer denied recovery because the fake certificate of origin did not meet the insurance bond definition of "Counterfeit." The district court ruled in favor of the insurer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The certificate of origin did not imitate an actual, original certificate of origin for a 2007 motor home because there never was an actual, valid, original certificate for the vehicle pledged as collateral: the manufacturer never produced the vehicle described.

In 1996 defendant and his cousin formed companies that bought, stored, and sold grain, and provided farming services. In 1999, the cousins obtained bank loan by falsely representing that valuable contracts existed for future grain deliveries from one company to the other and inflating balances of bank accounts by writing bad checks between accounts. Charged with loan fraud and check-kiting (18 U.S.C. 1344) that cost the bank more than $2.5 million, the cousin pled guilty. Defendant testified that the transactions were in good faith, but was convicted and sentenced to 70 months in prison and restitution in the amount of $1,967,055.30, the outstanding balance on the loans. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the indictment was multiplicitous; that there was insufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that sentencing under 2009 guidelines violated the ex post facto clause; that loss and restitution amounts were miscalculated; that an enhancement for obstruction of justice was improper; and that the disparity between defendant’s sentence and that of his cousin was improper.

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company.

Romasanta worked in Chicago as an expediter, helping developers obtain construction permits. In testifying against Curescu, a developer, she admitted bribing 25 to 30 city employees between 2004 and 2007. She paid an $8,000 bribe to a zoning inspector on behalf of Curescu. Convicted of bribery of an agency that receives federal assistance, 18 U.S.C. 666 and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, Curescu was sentenced to six months and the zoning inspector to 41 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges to testimony and to the court's refusal to severe the cases.

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.

In 2009, fire severely damaged the insureds' home. They submitted a claim to under their homeowners’ policy the next day. The insurer began requesting documents, authorizations, and interviews and learned that the insureds had at least two businesses, held numerous personal and business accounts, and were involved in several lawsuits. A fire investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally set. The insurer requested additional documents: detailed phone records, bank histories, tax returns, and mortgage information and reminded the insureds that proof of loss was due by May 2. The insurer granted extensions; on the day of the final deadline the insureds delivered almost 1,000 pages of documents. Several months later, the insurer had not received most of the requested documents or an explanation why they could not be produced. After initially acknowledging their failure to produce the documents, the insureds attempted to impose a deadline for settlement of the $2.6 million claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer in the insureds' breach of contract suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The insureds failed to perform the specific "duties after loss" listed in the policy.

Following published stories about an investigation of their business practices, principals of a waste-management company improved their chances of winning a bid for a contract to refurbish garbage carts for the City of Chicago by slashing their bid. They encouraged other companies to bid in hopes of being hired as a subcontractor if another company won the bid. Each bidder had to certify that it had not entered into any agreement with any other bidder or prospective bidder relating to the price, nor any agreement restraining free competition among bidders. The company won the bid, and after a Justice Department investigation for antitrust violations, the principals were convicted of mail and wire fraud. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the purpose of "colluding" with other potential bidders had not been to prevent them from underbidding but to provide insurance against the bid being rejected based on the earlier investigation. There was no harm as a result of the company encouraging additional bidders.