Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Loffredi’s securities brokerage firm offered investments in certificates of deposit, mutual funds, and Treasury bills. Instead of actually purchasing investments requested by customers, Loffredi diverted their money to his personal expenses and business debts. He fraudulently misappropriated about $2.8 million over four years. A customer alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to irregularities in his financial statements. After an investigation, Loffredi was charged with five counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. He pleaded guilty to one count. The judge applied a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense involving at least 10 victims and imposed a sentence of 78 months. The presentence report counted as victims each of the 14 defrauded customers whose funds Loffredi had misappropriated. Loffredi argued that the only victim of the offense was his broker-dealer parent firm, which had reimbursed the losses of 12 of the 14 customers (Loffredi reimbursed the other two). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Loffredi never asserted that his fraud was painless for his customers and rejecting his “all-or-nothing” defense that the customers cannot be victims if they were reimbursed. View "Unted States v. Loffredi" on Justia Law

Natale,a vascular surgeon, was compensated by Medicare for repairing a patient’s aortic aneurysm. Another doctor reviewed the post-surgical CT scan, which did not match the procedure Natale described in his operative reports. After an investigation, Natale was indicted for health care fraud related to his Medicare billing, mail fraud, and false statements related to health care. A jury acquitted Natale on the fraud counts but convicted him of making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1035. The trial court used jury instructions that seemingly permitted conviction for false statements completely unrelated to Medicare reimbursement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the error harmless, but clarified that under the statute, even conviction for false statements made in connection with items or services still must relate to a “matter involving a health care benefit program.” View "United States v. Natale" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2003, Schmitz convinced financial institutions and others to lend him money, ostensibly for real estate development, by stating that he was the beneficiary of a multi-million dollar trust fund whose assets were available as collateral. There was no trust; Schmitz concocted a trail of paper and digital documents, even creating a phony financial services firm (with a website and virtual office space), and filing suit against fictitious employees of the (non-existent) firm claiming mishandling of the trust. Schmitz obtained more than $6 million from seven banks and two additional lenders. He used about half to pay off previous lenders, and the rest for personal expenses. Schmitz pleaded guilty to mail fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Because Schmitz began the charged fraud in 2003, while on supervised release in connection with a prior state conviction, the advisory Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months in prison. The court imposed an 87-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that “factor creep” in the Guidelines has inflated beyond reason the sentencing range for white collar frauds, particularly for someone of Schmitz’s age (60) and health and concerning the timespan of the fraud. View "United States v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Harris was a registered representative with an affiliated broker of MetLife and sold insurance, annuities, and other financial products. Investigations by the Illinois Securities Division, MetLife, and the IRS revealed that for almost eight years, Harris had been diverting client funds, using deposit and accounting methods that substantially departed from MetLife’s standard practices. She manipulated software to generate account summaries that falsely displayed the investments that her clients intended to purchase. Harris received $10,938,986.58 in client funds from more than 50 but fewer than 250 clients, reinvested $4,055,945.73 on the clients’ behalf, and used the balance for personal purposes. MetLife settled with clients who suffered a loss, paying more than $7 million. Harris pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The court’s sentencing calculation included addition of 18 offense levels for a loss in excess of $2.5 million, four levels for the number of victims, two levels for sophisticated means, for a total offense level of 35. The final guideline range was 168 to 210 months; the court sentenced her to 210 months in prison plus $6,812,764.98 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred in counting married couples as two separate victims. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Jacob was convicted of selling an unregistered security, 15 U.S.C. 77e(a), and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment and $241,630.95 in restitution. He was granted permission to travel to Australia two weeks after sentencing. He had been traveling to Australia for work while on bond before sentencing, had returned to be sentenced, and pledged to earn additional money to pay restitution. Five days after he was to report, the probation office informed the court that Jacob had failed to surrender as ordered, and his attorney suggested that he may have fled the country. The government then moved to dismiss Jacob’s pending appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Jacob failed to respond to his attorney’s motion to withdraw, missed his deadline to file an opening brief, sent the court a rambling email arguing the merits of his appeal, and told his probation officer that he had no intention of returning to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. View "United States v. Jacob" on Justia Law

Westerfield was a lawyer working for an Illinois title insurance company when she facilitated fraudulent real estate transfers in a scheme that used stolen identities of homeowners to “sell” houses that were not for sale to fake buyers, and then collect the mortgage proceeds from lenders who were unaware of the fraud. Westerfield facilitated five such transfers and was indicted on four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. She claimed that she had been unaware of the scheme’s fraudulent nature and argued that she had merely performed the typical work of a title agent. She was convicted on three counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to admission of a codefendant’s testimony during trial, and to the sentence of 72 months in prison with three years of supervised release, and payment of $916,300 in restitution. View "United States v. Westerfield" on Justia Law

After years of paying taxes on wages he received for his work as a carpenter, Scheuneman stopped paying federal income tax in 1998. In 1999, in an effort to prevent the IRS from discovering his income, Scheuneman purchased a sham tax avoidance system from an Arizona company, Innovative Financial , and formed a limited liability corporation, Larch, and two illegitimate trusts, Soned and Jokur. Scheuneman retained complete control of all three. Scheuneman was eventually convicted of three counts of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201 and one count of interference with the Internal Revenue laws, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting arguments that that a clerical error in the indictment’s description of the relevant date rendered two counts legally insufficient and that the government constructively amended the indictment by introducing proof regarding dates other than those described in the indictment. Schueneman also claimed that the district court improperly ordered restitution for losses that are unrelated to his tax evasion offenses. The court rejected the argument; although those losses were not caused by the conduct underlying his tax evasion offenses, they are properly included as restitution because they were attributable to his interference with the Internal Revenue laws. View "United States v. Scheuneman" on Justia Law

From 1997 through 2009 Sachdeva, the vice president for accounting at Koss, instructed Park Bank, where Koss had an account, to prepare more than 570 cashier’s checks, payable to Sachdeva’s creditors and used to satisfy personal debts. She embezzled about $17.4 million, pleaded guilty to federal crimes, and was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The SEC sued Sachdeva and an accomplice because their scheme caused Koss to misstate its financial position. Koss and Park Bank are litigating which bears the loss in Wisconsin. In this suit, Park Bank argued that Federal Insurance must defend and indemnify it under a financial-institution bond (fidelity bond) provision that promises indemnity for “Loss of Property resulting directly from . . . false pretenses, or common law or statutory larceny, committed by a natural person while on the premises of” the Bank. Sachdeva did not enter the Bank’s premises. She gave instructions by phone, then sent employees to fetch the checks. The district court entered judgment in the insurer’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; every court that has considered the subject has held that a fraud orchestrated from outside a financial institution’s premises is not covered under the provision, which is standard in the industry. View "Bankmanagers Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Anchor Mortgage Corporation and its CEO, Munson, were convicted under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1), of making false statements when applying for federal guarantees of 11 loans. The district court imposed a penalty of $5,500 per loan, plus treble damages of about $2.7 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendants not have the necessary state of mind, either actual knowledge that material statements were false, or suspicion that they were false plus reckless disregard of their accuracy. The court noted that Anchor submitted bogus certificates that relatives had supplied the down payments that the borrowers purported to have made, when it knew that neither the borrowers nor any of their relatives had made down payments and represented that it had not paid anyone for referring clients to it, but in fact it paid at least one referrer. View "United States v. Munson" on Justia Law

Belmont did not pay subcontractors and suppliers on some projects. Gad, its CEO, disappeared. West Bend Mutual paid more than $2 million to satisfy Belmont’s obligations and has a judgment against Belmont, Gad, and Gizynski, who signed checks for more than $100,000 on Belmont’s account at U.S. Bank, payable to Banco Popular. Gizynski told Banco to apply the funds to his outstanding loan secured by commercial real estate. Banco had a mortgage and an assignment of rents and knew that Belmont was among Gizynski’s tenants; it did not become suspicious and did not ask Belmont how the funds were to be applied. Illinois law requires banks named as payees to ask the drawer how funds are to be applied. The district judge directed the parties to present evidence about how Belmont would have replied to a query from the Bank. Gizynski testified that Gad, as CEO, would have told the Bank to do whatever Gizynski wanted. The judge found Gizynski not credible, but that West Bend, as plaintiff, had the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on fiduciary duty, but reversed an order requiring Banco to pay West Bend’s legal fees View "W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co v. Belmont St. Corp." on Justia Law