Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eight members of the Teamsters’ Union sued their former employer under the Labor-Management Relations Act, for terminating their employment on grounds forbidden by a collective bargaining agreement and sued their union, Local 705, for settling their grievances for an unsatisfactory sum, allegedly violating its duty of fair representation. The district dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim against Local 705. “Hybrid” claims for violations of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 185(a) may be asserted against an employer and a union when the employee needs the union to litigate a grievance. But the employees in this case did not need Local 705 to litigate their grievance, because as soon as the employer repudiated the arbitration procedure mandated by the contract, the employees could have gone straight to federal court with a claim solely against the employer. The claim against the union is not part of a “hybrid” and fails on the merits because the collective bargaining agreement expired before the plaintiffs were terminated, so no agreement was violated. The union had provided an unambiguous, timely notice to terminate the collective bargaining agreement. View "Rutherford v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd." on Justia Law

Schuster pleaded guilty to knowingly using a minor to produce child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The district court sentenced him to nearly 22 years of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the district court erred in finding that he distributed certain of the child pornography that he produced; the distribution of other child pornography was not “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines; the district court erred in finding that a certain other photograph that he took of a young boy constituted child pornography; and that the sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Schuster" on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law

Eight participants in a Rockford, Illinois heroin distribution conspiracy pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin and more than 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court determined that the conspiracy distributed 700 grams of heroin per week. Defendants argued that the district court failed to consider sentencing disparities between drug runners who were prosecuted in federal court and those prosecuted in state court and that the district court failed to address each of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) at his sentencing. The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments, but vacated the sentenced of a defendant who received a two-level enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of firearms by his coconspirators. View "United States v. Block" on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

Dean boarded an airplane in Chicago bound for Canada, carrying a laptop computer housing more than 14,000 still images and 700 videos of child pornography. He served 21 months in a Canadian prison. Later, in U.S. custody, the district court found Dean competent. Dean acknowledged that he downloaded the files and knew that the laptop contained child pornography, but maintained that he “didn’t knowingly, purposely want to break the law … I had it on my computer, and my intentions were not to let it out of my hands until I could get rid of it … I did not knowingly break the law … I didn’t know that it existed.” The district court explained that 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) did not require knowledge of illegality but only knowing transportation of child pornography across state lines or an international border. Dean responded: “Yes. And that is why I plead to that.” The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 151- to 188-months’ imprisonment, but stated that the “range is too severe.” Beginning at 108 months, the court deducted 21 months for Dean’s Canadian imprisonment and imposed an 87-month term with lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “state of mind” argument. View "Unted States v. Dean" on Justia Law

Vidal planned with an undercover FBI officer to rob a “stash house.” He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846; (2)); attempt to possess with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 846; (3)); Hobbs Act violation committed by attempting to rob the house (18 U.S.C.1951(a)); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The probation officer calculated an offense level of 35, upward adjustment for leadership role, and a reduction for his timely plea and acceptance of responsibility, that, with Vidal’s criminal history, yielded an advisory sentence of 210 to 262 months. The PSR noted a history of mental illness. A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder, bipolar spectrum disorder, claustrophobia, and drug and alcohol abuse. The district court sentenced Vidal to 210 months with a consecutive term of 60 months, stating: “I also note the mental health issues that you appear to struggle with. Certainly your drug abuse problem does not go well with your mental health issues.” The Seventh Circuit remanded the sentence. The district court failed adequately to consider psychiatric history, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Vidal" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, business owners appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations requiring group health insurance coverage for contraception and sterilization procedures, 42 U.S.C. 300gg‐13(a)(4). Employers who do not comply face a penalty of $100 per day per employee and an annual tax surcharge of $2,000 per employee, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). The Seventh Circuit granted an injunction, pending appeal, concluding that the businesses had established a reasonable likelihood of success on their claims, that the equitable balance favored granting the injunction; and that harm to religious‐liberty rights outweighed the temporary harm to the government’s interest in providing greater access to cost‐free contraception and related services. The court rejected arguments that a secular, for‐profit corporation cannot assert a claim under Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000 bb; that the free‐exercise rights of the individual plaintiffs are not affected because their corporation is a separate legal entity; and that the mandate’s burden on free‐exercise rights is too remote and attenuated to qualify as “substantial” because the decision to use contraception benefits is made by third parties, individual employees, in consultation with their medical providers. View "Grote v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Pharmaceutical company (Baxter) offered Dr. Rapold, who is Swiss and was living in Europe, the position of Medical Director of Cellular Therapy at its Illinois headquarters. The position was described as “at will.” Unable to wait while Rapold obtained a visa, Baxter entered into a consulting agreement with Rapold to enable him to begin work immediately from Europe. During the six-month consultancy, there were reports of problematic behavior involving rudeness and fits of anger. Baxter revoked the offer. The district court rejected his nationality discrimination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by refusing to tender his proffered mixed-motive jury instruction. View "Rapold v. Baxter Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Diaz-Rios, a 21-year-old Mexican national with no criminal history and a valid tourist visa, was staying with in-laws until he was kicked out. He spoke no English. He accepted a friend’s offer of the use of a car and agreed to pay for and pick up some “luggage” in return. Diaz-Rios suspected that “luggage” meant illegal drugs, but agreed because he felt obliged. Caught picking up 45 kilograms of cocaine, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and faced a statutory minimum term of 10 years. The government stipulated to downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and anticipated that he would qualify for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. 5C1.2, 2D1.1(b)(16). While the presentence investigation, Diaz-Rios declined to speak with the probation officer. He had debriefed government agents about the others involved in the crime, but that information was not shared with the probation officer, who concluded that Diaz-Rios did not qualify for a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 At sentencing the prosecutor agreed that reduction was warranted. The district court found that Diaz-Rios was not a minor participant, without discussion or acknowledging any factor relevant to 3B1.2 apart from drug quantity. The Seventh Circuit vacated.View "Unted States v. Diaz-Rio" on Justia Law