Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boadi legally entered the U.S. in 2000 but overstayed and married Bonds, a U.S. citizen, in 2001. He adjusted his status to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2003, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). In 2007, Boadi and Bonds sought removal of the “condition” to his permanent resident status, with documentation supporting the authenticity of their marriage. DHS’s interview with the couple revealed that Boadi lived in Ohio and Bonds in Illinois and that Boadi may have lived with his ex-wife, another Ghanian national. Bonds could neither name Boadi’s three children nor the street on which Boadi lived. They gave conflicting answers regarding their respective children’s relationships and who paid the bills. Boadi failed to respond to a letter and DHS terminated his legal status in 2009 and issued a notice to appear. Boadi and Bonds divorced only weeks after the notice to appear, which automatically terminates an alien’s conditional legal status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii), distinct from DHS’s existing allegation of fraud. Boadi unsuccessfully requested a good-faith marriage waiver. Removal proceedings began. The immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination and found Boadi removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Boadi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals who were trying to arrest him for his latest violation of supervised release. He pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, on the ground that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after the judgment in a criminal case has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate of a federal prison, filed a “Bivens” suit against seven named prison staff members plus several unnamed defendants, complaining that in retaliation for the plaintiff’s going on hunger strikes, they used excessive force to force feed him and extract blood samples, placed him in a cell infested with feces, denied him minimal recreational opportunities, refused to allow him to have a Bible, refused to allow him to file grievances, and tried to block his access to the federal courts. The district judge dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground that the “99-page complaint defies understanding, rendering it unintelligible” and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that a complaint may be long not because the draftsman is incompetent or is seeking to obfuscate, but because it contains a large number of distinct charges. The 28-page complaint, with a 71-page appendix, is not excessively long given the number of separate claims and is “not only entirely intelligible; it is clear.” View "Kadamovas v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald had not eaten all day, had not slept in three day, and drank some wine. Feeling “down,” Fitzgerald attempted to call a hospital help line, but instead dialed a police non-emergency number. She proceeded to talk to the desk officer. Though Fitzgerald denied suicidal thought or intention, the desk officer described a “very depressed,” possibly suicidal, intoxicated female caller. As officers approached the building, Fitzgerald abruptly hung up on the desk officer. This information was relayed to the officers. Upon entering the apartment, officers and paramedics found Fitzgerald unsteady on her feet and slurring her words. For 30 minutes, they talked to her. She denied wanting to harm herself, but admitted being upset and told them that she had been taking anti-depressants. They, along with Fitzgerald, unsuccessfully attempted to contact Fitzgerald’s friends. The decision was made to take Fitzgerald to the hospital. Fitzgerald would not go voluntarily. She screamed and physically resisted. Eventually, the officers and paramedics lifted Fitzgerald onto the stretcher and handcuffed her right hand to the stretcher. She continued to resist, eventually breaking bones in her wrist. Surgical repair was necessary. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fitzgerald v. Santoro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American citizens, had bank accounts in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, in 2008 when the UBS tax-evasion scandal broke. The accounts were large and the plaintiffs had not disclosed the existence of the accounts or the interest earned on the accounts on their federal income tax returns, as required. Pursuant to an IRS amnesty program, they disclosed the interest and paid a penalty. They brought a class action to recover from UBS the penalties, interest, and other costs, plus profits they claim UBS made from the class as a result of the fraud and other wrongful acts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the “plaintiffs are tax cheats,” and rejecting an argument that UBS was obligated to give them accurate tax advice and failed to do so. Plaintiffs did not argue that they asked UBS to advise them on U.S. tax law or that the bank volunteered advice. The court stated that: “This is like suing one’s parents to recover tax penalties one has paid, on the ground that the parents had failed to bring one up to be an honest person who would not evade taxes.” The court noted, but did not decide, choice of law issues. View "Thomas v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Wren and Moton provided valuable assistance and received sentences lower than the presumptive floor of 120 months’ imprisonment for crack cocaine offenses, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), (b)(1). The original sentencing range for each was 121 to 151 months; each original sentence was 100 months. Under Amendment 750, which reduced the ratio between crack and power cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1, the range for Wren would be 100 to 125 months and the range for Moton 84 to 105 months. Judges declined to reduce their sentences after Amendment 759 authorized retroactive application. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that prisoners whose original sentences are below the presumptive statutory minimum are eligible for a reduction “comparably less than the amended guideline range.” Nothing in the revised Guidelines, or the explanations for them, indicates a goal of giving uncooperative defendants greater sentence reductions than those available for cooperative defendants. The district court may grant a motion under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2) without resetting the Guideline range at the statutory minimum. View "United States v. Wren" on Justia Law

Cowart, arrested for dealing Vicodin, acted as a confidential informant and was assigned a target: Love. After one staged purchase, Love apparently believed that Cowart was responsible for robbing Love’s crack house. Thinking things had blown over, Cowart arranged another drug buy. Cowart went inside a house with Love. Outside, a surveillance team saw the same white SUV from the earlier buy park at a nearby gas station. People got out and walked to the house. Then the team heard Cowart being beaten and questioned about the crack house robbery. Officers swarmed the house and arrested Love, who was convicted of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of insufficient evidence and that the trial court improperly declined to give a “buyer-seller” jury instruction and improperly admitted a hearsay statement, but vacated the sentence. Drug quantity should not be included in a sentencing calculation if “the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase . . . the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1; Love never actually intended to provide drugs to Cowart at the second meeting. View "United States v. Love" on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained secured loans from InBank. Their promissory notes established that InBank would calculate annual interest rates by adding a predetermined amount, usually one percent, to a variable index rate set by InBank at “its sole discretion,” which could change up to once per day. InBank stated that it would set the rate “at or around the U.S. prime rate.” Borrowers compared loan statements and found that the rate was neither consistent across customers nor close to the prime rate. After borrowers filed suit, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation took control of InBank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. MB Financial purchased InBank accounts. The borrowers filed an amended class action against MB, claiming violations of the Interest Act, 815 ILCS 205/1, and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1. The court granted a motion to substitute the FDIC as defendant, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal was proper for failure to exhaust remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(3)-(d)(13). The claims relate to InBank’s alleged acts and omissions, not MB’s, and there is no support for an assumption of liability argument.View "Farnik v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs controlled Mutual Bank. In an effort to save the bank from insolvency, at the request of FDIC-Corporate, they raised about $30 million mostly in the form of note purchases. In 2008, FDIC-Corporate requested another $70 million, which they were unable to raise. In 2009, regulators issued warnings about the bank. The bank’s board voted to redeem the notes and create deposit accounts for plaintiffs, essentially returning their money. Before FDIC-Corporate responded to a request for required approval, 12 U.S.C. 1821(i), the bank was declared insolvent and FDIC was appointed as receiver. Mutual Bank’s branches opened as branches of United Central Bank the next day. The plaintiffs filed proofs of claim, seeking to redeem the notes and obtain depositor-level priority in post-insolvency distribution scheme. FDIC Receiver rejected the claims and the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they had been misled into investing in the bank and prevented from getting their money back. The district court dismissed as moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as an unauthorized request for “money damages,” 5 U.S.C. 702. The plaintiffs did not first seek administrative review of what was essentially a challenge to the FDIC’s regulatory decision not to act on the redemption approval request. View "Veluchamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law