Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Lithuanian national, Smykiene entered the U.S. in 1995 on a visitor’s visa. Six months after it expired, she was arrested by Border Patrol officers in New York. The officers gave her an order to show cause why she should not be deported and also told her to provide an address. The Immigration Court sent certified mail to the address that Smykiene with her hearing notice. The Postal Service returned the mail with the notation “Attempted—Not Known.” There was no follow-up. Smykiene did not appear and the immigration judge ordered her deported. A year later she married a man who, two years after that, became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 2010, when authorities located her, Smykiene swore that she had not received the notice and that at the time she was handed the order to show cause she couldn’t understand English. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an order of removal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “The government cites no authority for the proposition that an innocent mistake, especially of the kind likely to be made by a newcomer … from a non-English-speaking country, forfeits the right to reopen an order of removal in absentia.” View "Smykiene v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Hancock Center in Chicago is managed by Shorenstein (several related companies). Shorenstein hired an architectural firm, MCA, to design and oversee renovation of windows and exterior walls; MCA hired a general contractor. In 2002, a scaffold fell from the 42nd floor in a high wind and killed three people in cars, severely injuring several others. Shorenstein settled with plaintiffs in 2006 for a total of $8.7 million. MCA’s contract with Shorenstein had required MCA to obtain liability insurance covering the owner, Shorenstein, and any other party specified by the owner. MCA obtained the required insurance policy from AMICO, covering “any person or organization to whom [MCA is] obligated by virtue of a written contract.” There was a dispute concerning which Shorenstein entities were covered. Shorenstein was awarded $959,866.02 by the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court erred in apportioning the award among the Shorenstein entities. The court rejected AMICO’s arguments that the claim was barred by an exclusion of coverage for injuries “due to rendering or failure to render any professional service” by an insured and that Shorenstein gave up its right to indemnity by AMICO by asking its other insurer for indemnification. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Uribe was driving along I- 70 in Indiana, apparently in compliance with all traffic laws, in a vehicle that had no visible evidence of noncompliance with vehicle requirements other than that it was a blue Nissan with a registration number that traced back to a white Nissan. A deputy following Uribe’s car initiated a traffic stop “to check for registration compliance.” Uribe consented to a search of the vehicle, which yielded nearly a pound of heroin and indictment for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i). The district court granted Uribe’s motion to suppress, finding the government’s explanations insufficient to establish that at the time of the stop the deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Uribe was engaged in criminal activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that one lawful act in isolation, driving a car of one color with a registration number attached to a car of a different color, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal activity. View "United States v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Wells shot his gun into the air several times to celebrate the New Year, 2008. Arriving to investigate, Officer Coker shot Wells three times, seriously injuring Wells. Coker claims that Wells turned toward him and pointed a gun in his direction; Wells denies doing so. Through an agreement with the state to dismiss a felony count, Wells pleaded guilty to reckless conduct that he “discharged a firearm multiple times . . . and then pointed the firearm at [Coker].” Before entering the plea, Wells sued Coker and the City of Springfield, alleging that Coker used excessive force in shooting Wells. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Wells was judicially estopped from denying that he had pointed the gun at Coker because Wells pleaded guilty to a charge that included the statement that he had pointed the gun at Coker. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither judicial estoppel nor other doctrines of preclusion apply to the particular facts of Wells’s plea agreement. The discussion of the facts supporting the charge was brief and that Wells’s guilty plea was not specific with respect to what he admitted. View "Wells v. Coker" on Justia Law

In 2002, U.S. Health entered into a 20-year lease for a nursing home and adjacent property owned by Lock. Before mid-2006, U.S. Health assigned the lease to Americare without obtaining Lock’s written consent, a required by the lease. Two lawsuits followed. One charged that U.S. Health had violated a provision of the lease under which it was required to fund a replacement reserve and resulted in a stipulated judgment in Lock’s favor of $679,287.96, plus prejudgment interest. The next day, U.S. Health filed a motion to set aside the judgment. Days later, the parties stipulated to a new judgment of $485,430.56 with attorneys’ fees to be agreed by June 10, and entry of a supplemental judgment. After extensions, the court entered a final judgment of $485,430.56, plus post-judgment interest at 5.13 percent. The court later granted Lock’s motion for fees of $29,238.85. Weeks later, the court granted Lock’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3) to modify the judgment to include Americare as a judgment debtor because it had only then learned that U.S. Health, without the necessary authorization from Lock, had assigned its lease to Americare. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it had jurisdiction. View "Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health, LP" on Justia Law

Mustafa, a citizen of Pakistan, and his family entered the U.S. legally as non-immigrant visitors in 2003. Two days before the expiration of his visa, Mustafa filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. Mustafa claimed that as a member of the Nawaz faction of the Pakistani Muslim League political party, he fears if he were to return to Pakistan, he would be targeted for having cooperated with the opposition government by providing information about the financial affairs of his former employer, who is also a former Pakistani Senator. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of their applications, finding that Mustafa could not establish a fear of future persecution on account of a protected statutory ground because the threats and attacks Mustafa had experienced before coming to the U.S. were motivated solely by a personal dispute between Mustafa and his former boss and that he had not shown that the current government would persecute him on account of his membership in the PML-N. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the conclusion that Mustafa’s attackers were motivated solely by a desire for personal revenge was unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Mustafa v. Holder" on Justia Law

A Spanish-speaking linguist working for the Drug Enforcement Administration listened to recordings of Mendiola’s prison telephone conversations prior to testifying before a jury that Mendiola’s voice was likely the one on several wiretapped calls in which Mendiola and others planned a large-scale cocaine deal. Mendiola was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the linguist’s testimony constituted impermissible opinion testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence and violated the Best Evidence Rule. View "United States v. Mendiola" on Justia Law

When an employer participating in a multi-employer pension plan withdraws from the plan with unpaid liabilities, federal law can pierce corporate veils and impose liability on owners and related businesses. The Fund is a multi-employer pension plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act/Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461. Messina Trucking was subject to a collective bargaining agreement that required it to contribute to the Fund for retirement benefits. Messina Trucking permanently ceased to have an obligation to contribute to the Fund, triggering a “complete withdrawal” and incurring nearly $3.1 million in potential withdrawal liability. The Fund sought a declaratory judgment that defendants were jointly and severally liable for the withdrawal liability as “trades or businesses” under “common control” with Messina Trucking. The district court held that Mr. and Mrs. Messina, who owned and leased several residential properties as well as the property from which Messina Trucking operated, were not engaged in a “trade or business” and could not be held liable for the withdrawal liability, but that Messina Products, as a formal business organization could be held liable for Messina. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Fund, holding that both can be held liable. View "Cent. States Se & Sw Areas Pension Fund v. Messina" on Justia Law

Gutierrez was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Raymond. After pursuing his Illinois state court avenues for post-conviction relief, Gutierrez brought a federal action for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: Gutierrez received two trials in state court; that his testimony was contradicted by testimony witnesses and by the physical evidence at trial; and that, before the second trial, the court heard extensive testimony as to Gutierrez’ history of treatment for mental illness. The Illinois appellate court held that even if evidence of Gutierrez’ mental illness had been presented, there was no reasonable probability that the court would have found that Gutierrez had a genuine, though unreasonable, belief that it was necessary for him to use deadly force to defend himself from Raymond. That court properly analyzed the evidence and reasonably applied the law. View "Gutierrez v. Anglin" on Justia Law

In 2008 Foster pleaded guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 130 months’ imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal as frivolous after his lawyer filed an Anders brief. Two years later, after the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guideline ranges for crack-cocaine offenses and made the changes retroactive, Foster sought a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2). The district court cut his sentence to 120 months but held that it lacked authority to reduce it below the statutory minimum that was in effect when Foster committed his crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that Foster’s attorney had not identified any authority for his appointment, at public expense, to prosecute the motion. A proceeding under section 3582 is limited to the application of changes in the Guidelines and is not a full resentencing. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law